






v^^ 
















.V ^<i..^^ :^mA'^ ^-..^^ :. 









• ,0"^ "*^ 






"j»«.^ 









L- '»i.v> 



.^^^ 






V<^^ 



*.^^ ..-•* ^, 



• c«5^^«».'- v> 




*. ^^o< 










°^ 



o_ * 



b1 



CIVIL SERVICE LAW: 



A 

DEFEXSE OF ITS PRINCIPLES, WITH CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE 

FROM THE WORKS OF MANY EMINENT 

AMERICAN STATESMEN. 



BY 



WILLIAM HARRISON CLARKE. 



SECOND EDITION — REVISED. 



Offices are public trusts, not private spoils.— Danid Webster. 

No people have a higher public interest, except the preservation of the' 
liberties, than integrity in the administration of their government in all its 
branches.— Z7. S. Supreme Court. 



NEW YOllK r 

CHARLES T. DILLINGHAM, 

718 & 720 Broadway. 

1891. 






Copyright, 1891, by William H. Clarke. 



The Lovejoy Co., Electrotypers, 
444 & 446 Pearl St., New York. 



From the Press of P. F. McBreex, 
61 Beekman St., New York. 



PREFACE. 



The improvements in the revised edition of this work consist in an 
Appendix, a new Index, the addition of fresh matter to about thirty- 
pages of the Introduction and various chapters, and tlie correction of 
a few errors. Tlie Appendix possesses much historical value, for it 
contains pertinent quotations from the works of many contemporary 
and recent statesmen not quoted in the body of the book. 

The warning of Storey and Washington (pages 225, 226) concern- 
ing the dangers of party spirit, sliould be read and heeded by every 
American. Parties, when they strive solely for principle, are the 
life of a nation ; but when they strive solely for pelf, patronage, and 
power, they are its death. Even corrupt party leaders may destroy a 
republic; sometimes even ambitious leaders may do so. Did a nation 
ever make a narrower escape than did our own during the slaveholders' 
rebellion ? Who but ambitious party leaders caused that rebellion ? 

Some truthful words concerning the crime of buying and selling votes 
have been added to page 52. This evil cannot be too soon remedied. 
Voters should be educated up to a higher standard. The American 
who acknowledges any man as his poHtical " boss, " at the polls or 
elsewhere, disgraces the name American. Independent voting and an 
educational test for voters are what is wanted. The man who can- 
not botli read and write the English language, should not be allowed 
to vote. This would supersede the necessity for the so-called Force 
Bill, for the rule would apply to blacks as well as whites. A few 
words concerning the crime of business men neglecting to vote would 
be an important supplement to page 52. 

The subject of civil service reform is still one of the greatest issues 
of the day. The Christian Register (Boston) trul}^ says : '' We are yet 
on tlie threshold of this the most important reformation in American 
political history y Other newspapers have testified to the same effect, 
extracts from a few of w^hich appear on page 240. 

There is much work yet to be done. But the outlook is hopeful. 
If civil service reformers are as vigilant in the future as they have 
been in the past, ultimate victory is assured. A people who have 
the intelligence to discover their mistakes and the courage to correct 
them, are capable of self-government ; otherwise they are not. 

Some allowance should be made for the harsh words concerning Mr. 
Van Buren (pages 76-*79), as they were uttered in the heat of debate. 

New York, May, 1891. 



PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION. 



The chief object of this work is to defend the principles of the Civil 
Service Law. It is not a criticism of the law, nor does it treat to anj 
great extent of civil service economy as such, except in so far as the 
subject is expounded incidentally, but with ability and in the aggregate 
with great success, by many American statesmen, extracts from whose 
works embellish and enrich its pages. These extracts in fact constitute 
a great part of the civil service history and literature of the country, 
particularly its early history and literature, and therefore constitute 
much of the value of this volume. This is well, and is besides oppor- 
tune, for the subject of civil service reform is one of the greatest issues 
of the day, and too mucti hght cannot be shed upon it. A work that 
even aids in elucidating such an important subject ought to be accepta- 
ble ; indeed it appears to be one of the needs of the times. The fact that 
one chapter of the work is mostly devoted to corruption at elections and 
remedial election laws, only adds to its value, for the subject is not only 
collateral but of great importance, of as great importance perhaps as 
civil service reform itself. Whatever may be said of the original parts of 
the volume, the compiled parts are certainly both useful and instructive 
reading, and ought to aid in elevating and purifying American pohtics. 

The importance of a sound civil service pohcy was never better illus- 
trated perhaps than by the New York Times, when criticising, in 1864, 
Senator Sumner's civil service bill. It said the subject was second in 
importance only to the crushing of the then rebellion. The Times was 
then under the editorial direction of Mr. Henry J. Raymond, a states- 
man and one of the best known editors of his day. 

I am indebted to Mr. Qeorge William Curtis, the President of the 
National Civil Service Reform League, for valuable suggestions and 
encouragement to persevere in my researches, and also to the Astor 
Library for the use of many books. Other obligations are acknowl- 
edged here and there throughout the vohime. 

This work, it should be understood, refers to the national civil ser- 
vice law. The civil service laws of New York and Massachusetts are 
patterned after the national law, but of course contain provisions pe- 
culiar to themselves. 'V^. H. C. 

New York, July, 1888. 



CONTENTS. 



PAGE 

INTRODUCTION— History of Civil Service Legislation, Summary 
of the salient points of the Civil Service Law, experiences of 
Chief Examiners, number of persons examined yearly, &c. - 1 

CHAPTER I. 

FRUITS AND FACTS. 

The law promotes Education, Efficiency, Economy. — Its chief Ob- 
ject. — Its Constitutionality. — In harmony with the Teachings 
of Madison, Hamilton, and Jay. — Aids instead of Hampers the 
President, who makes his own Rules for its Execution - -11 

CHAPTER II. 

COMPETITIVE EXAMINATIONS. 

Their Utility proved by trial by Probation, examinations for Pro- 
motion, contrasts with non- Competitive Examinations, &c. — 
Appointees independent of Politicians. — Educational require- 
ments. — Opinions and Experiences of practical men, &c. - 26 

CHAPTER III. 

SOME OF THE LAW'S PROMISES. 

Reforms of Priceless value Probable. — The danger of Bribery at 
Elections. — Opinions thereon of Messrs. Buchanan, Harrison, 
Benton, Jefferson, Barton, Bell, and Graves. — The chief English 
Election laws from 1275 to 1883 38 

CHAPTER IV. 

THE PATRONAGE AND MERIT SYSTEMS COMPARED. 

The superiority of the Merit System shown by various Contrasts. — 
Picture of an extraordinary Officeseeking Drama (page 58).— 
How the President and Congressmen are harassed by Office- 
seekers. — Congressman Kleiner's Experience - - - 53 



VI co:n'tents. 

CHAPTBE V. 

DAKGER OF AK OFFICEHOLDERS' ARISTOCRACY, p^^^. 
The importance of the Subject. — The Cause of and Remedy for 
Aristocracies. — No danger in Life Tenures when based on 
Merit. — Greorge WiUiam Curtis's Opinion of them. — Insolence 
of Office. — G-reat Depravity of the Roman Aristocracy (note) - 61 

CHAPTEE VI. 

THE patro:n"age system. 

Its practicabihty only Apparent. — Jackson versus Jackson. — Prob- 
able causes of his Radical Change.— Marcy's famous Speech 
and humorous Letter to Buchanan.— Lincoln versus Lincoln.— 
His overweening Ambition. — The Spoils Doctrine undemocratic 
and ruinous. — Appalling Corruption at Washington after the 
Civil War. — The Civil Service Law a Rock to build upon - 71 

CHAPTEE VII. 

LEADI:N^G STATESMEN'S PRINCIPLES. 
The Merit System both Preached and Practiced by the six first 
Presidents. — Powerful blows at the Patronage System. — A pro- 
found Disquisition on its Evils by William Paley of England. — 
Justice Wilson on Patronage and Official Appointments - - 91 

CHAPTEE VIII. 

THE POWER OF REMOVAL. 

A remedy for its Mistakes and Abuses. — The Power discussed in 
the first Congress (1789). — The Decision then made criticised 
by Benton, Webster, and others. — The 4- Years' Term Law - 112 

CHAPTEE IX. 

COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY. 

Its Utihty.- — Th© Civil Service Systems of England, Canada, British 
India, G-ermany, France, Sweden, Norwaj^, and. China - - 177 

APPENDIX — Letters to the Albany Evening Journal; words of 
warning from Storey and Washington ; extracts from Bishop 
Potter's Centennial Address ; Civil Service Statute - - 195 

INDEX 233 

PUBLIC OPINION - - - - - - - - 240 



INTRODUCTION. 



The Civil Service Law was passed January 16, 
1883. The bill was drawn by Dorman B. Eaton of New 
York, as Chairman of the Committee on Legislation 
of the New York Civil Service Keform Association.* 
The law was preceded by two other laws, namely. Sec- 
tions 164 and 1753 of the United States Eevised Stat- 
utes (printed on page 23). Sec. 164 was passed March 
3, 1853 ; Sec. 1753 March 3, 1871. The latter was 
originated by Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois. 

The civil service law bill was preceded by three other 
bills, all of which failed to pass Congress. The first 
was introduced, in 1864, by Senator Charles Sumner of 
Massachusetts, whose only recorded words are (Cong. 
Globe, 1864, p. 1985): ^^The object of the bill is to 
provide a competitive system of examination in the civil 
service of the United States. ^^ The bill, a good founda- 
tion only on which to build, may be found in Sumner^'s 
Works, vol. viii, p. 452. The bill, owing perhaps to 
the pressure of other business, never came up for dis- 
cussion by the Senate. The second bill, which was 
wider in its scope than Mr. Sumner^ was introduced, 
in 1865, by Eepresentative Thomas Allen Jenckes of 
Ehode Island, and again, with improvements, in 1866. 
Mr. Jenckes advocated his bill ably, argumentatively, 

* For an account of Senator Pendleton's connection with the bill, see 
pages 216, 217. 



Vlll VARIOUS CIVIL SERVICE BILLS. 

and earnestly during several sessions of Congress.* The 
third bill was introduced, in 1869^ by Senator Schurz 
of Missouri. It gave the President the option of select- 
ing from among the men who passed the Board, or of 
ordering men of his own selection before it, and re- 
quired five and eight year terms of office. The object 
of the five-year term was to prevent such appointments 
from being made during the year of the inauguration 
of the President. The idea was, as explained by Mr. 
Schurz, that appointments, as a rule, should not be 
made until the administration was well settled down to 
business. Senator Schurz^'s bill required a year of pro- 
bationary service, Representative Jenckes^s six months. 
Both required competitive examinations. Other civil 
service bills have been introduced at different times by 
Senators Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts, George F. 
Edmunds of Vermont, and B. Gratz Brown of Missouri, 
and Representatives John A. Kasson of Iowa, Albert S. 
Willis of Kentucky, and Thomas M. ^ayne of Pennsyl- 
vania. 

It is noteworthy in this connection that Representa- 
tive Samuel Brenton of Indiana, on August 11, 1852, 
offered an amendment to a resolution proposing to in- 
crease the pay of civil service clerks in Washington, the 
concluding part of which is as follows (Congressional 
Globe, vol. xxiv, pt. 3, p. 3189): ^^No removals shall 
be made except for incompetency, or cause shown to 
the satisfaction of the President of the United States. 
And in the selection of said clerks, they shall, as far as 

* The New York Independent^ in criticising the first edition of this 
work, says : " The only correction we have to suggest to the historical 
part of the book is that Thomas A. Jenckes deserves more credit for 
the fiist steps to which he forced a reluctant Congress than is accorded 
to him." The criticism is well taken. Mr. Jenckes's works are his best 
monument, however. Words are empty things in comparison. 



THE LAW'S CHIEF PROVISIONS. IX 

practicable^ be taken from the several States and Terri- 
tories in proportion to the number of Senators, Eepre- 
sentatives, and Delegates from each in the Thirty-third 
Congress/^ 

This is practically the same, so far as it goes, as the 
civil service law. Mr. Brenton said his object was to 
secure permanency, to prevent sectionalism in the se- 
lection of clerks, and to ^^ break down party spirit as 
much as possible. ^^ 

The provisions of the civil service law concerning ex- 
aminations are : It provides that in any State or Terri- 
tory ''where there are persons to be examined,^' at least 
two examinations shall be held each year, and in such 
places ''as to make it reasonably convenient and inex- 
pensive for applicants to attend before them."*^ It pro- 
vides that the examiners, "not less than three, ^^ shall 
be chosen from among United States officials* "resid- 
ing in said State or Territory. ^^ It requires the Com- 
missioners to make regulations for examinations and 
annual reports of their proceedings, with such sugges- 
tions as in their judgment will result in improving the 
service ; and it authorizes them to make investigations 
concerning all matters "in respect to the execution of 
this act."*^ It requires that selections for office shall be 
from among the three competitors graded highest in 
the examinations. It forbids favoritism in examina- 
tions, and exempts officeholders from either political 
assessments or services, and makes a violation of either 

* This is required uot only in the interest of economy but to secure 
examiners who are famihar with the real needs of the offices for Avhich 
applicants are examined. The examiners receive no extra compensation. 
(Third An. Rept., p. 43.) Yet many persons favor the employment of 
paid examiners — experts in their respective lines. Common-sense ex- 
aminers are what are needed, whether paid or not paid — men who wiU 
not injure the cause by asking irrelevant questions. A few do so. 



X THE EFFICACY OF THE NEW EULES. 

provision a misdemeanor^ punishable by fine or impris- 
onment or both^ and the new rules (adopted February 
2, 1888) require that a violation of the latter provision 
shall be followed by dismission from the service. It 
exempts from examination — (a) One private secretary, 
or one confidential clerk, of the head of each classified 
department, and of each assistant secretary thereof ; 
and also of each head of bureau appointed by the Presi- 
dent by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
(b) Direct custodians of money, for whose fidelity an- 
other officer is under oflficial bond ; but this exception 
shall not include any officer below the grade of assistant 
cashier or assistant teller, {c) Disbursing officers who 
give bonds, {d) Persons employed exclusively in the 
secret service of the government, (e) Chief clerks. (/) 
Chiefs of divisions. ^^ Other exceptions are: Deputy 
collectors who do not also act as inspectors, examiners, 
or clerks ; otherwise not ; cashier, assistant cashier, and 
auditor of the collector ; chief acting disbursing officer ; 
deputy naval officers ; deputy surveyors ; assistant post- 
masters, and superintendents, custodians of money, 
stamps, stamped envelopes, or postal-cards, who are 
designated as such by the Postoffice Department. It 
provides for non-competitive examinations when com- 
petent persons do not compete, and for several other 
cogent and justifiable reasons. As said on page 27, 
competitors must answer 70 per cent, of the questions 
asked, except ex-soldiers and sailors, who ar^ required 
to answer but 65, the old standard. Competitive exam- 
inations for promotion are compulsory, except for ex- 
soldiers and sailors, and the widows and orphans of 
deceased soldiers and sailors. These also receive pref- 
erence in case of a reduction of force in any branch of 
the classified service. All who attain an average of 75 
per cent, are eligible to promotion. The education 



EDUCATIOK^ AGE LIMITS, ETC. XI 

required in examinations for ordinary offices embraces 
common-school studies only, and in many cases only a 
few of these. As to the age at which a person may be 
examined, in the Customs Department clerks and mes- 
sengers must be 20 years old ; all others 21. In the 
Postal Department clerks must be 18 years old ; mes- 
sengers, stampers, and junior clerks must not be under 
16 or over 45 ; carriers not under 21 or over 40; all 
others not under 18 or over 45. Soldiers and sailors 
may be examined on the written consent of the Secre- 
tary of War or the Secretary of the Navy. * 

Other important provisions of the law are : It de- 
clares that its officials shall not ^^ coerce the political 
action of any person or body, or interfere with any 
election,^^ and dismission is the penalty of a violation 
of the provision. It forbids any questions as to an ap- 
plicant's political or religious opinions, and when such 
opinions are known, any discrimination on account of 
them. Further, it requires its officials to discounte- 
nance the disclosure of such opinions. And again dis- 
mission is the penalty. It forbids the appointment to 
office of persons who habitually use intoxicating liquors 
to excess. It limits the number of members of the 
same family who may hold office in the grades covered 
by it. It forbids its three Commissioners, ^"^not more 
than two of whom shall be adherents of the same par- 
ty, '^ from holding any other office under the United 
States. It authorizes the President to remove any Com- 
missioner. An appointing officer may, if he deems it 
for the good of the service, object in writing to making 
an appointment, and refer the matter to the Commis- 
sion for investigation. No eligible person can be cer- 

* For further information about competitive examinations, and also 
some facts about trial by probation, as well as a few other facts perti- 
nent to the above summary, see Chapter II (page 26). 



Xll BUSINESS MEIS" FOR POSTMASTERS. 

tified for appointment more than three times. When 
necessary, transfers may be made from one department 
to another. There are four branches of the classified 
•civil service, namely, the departmental, the customs, 
the postal, and the railway mail service. (For the civil 
service statute itself, see page 228.) 

Such is a summary of the chief features of the law 
and its rules and regulations. The whole is certainly 
:a good foundation on which to build a sound civil ser- 
vice system. This is proved by experience, for the sys- 
tem is working as satisfactorily as could be expected 
under the circumstances. The law should be increased 
in scope till all postmasters, employes of the internal 
Tevenue service, mints, &c., come within its provisions, 
with the necessary exceptions of course. Postmasters 
should be removed only for good cause known to the 
Postmaster-General or President, or at the request of a 
majority of the business men of their place of office.* 
T'urther, where it is practicable to hold promotion ex- 
aminations, vacant postmasterships as well as subordi- 

* Complaints on account of partisan postmasters are not new. As 
•early as 1848 Postmaster- G-eneral Cave Johnson said (Appendix to 
Cong. G-lobe, Dec. 2, 1848, p. 30): "There has been for some years past 
a strong feehng pervading the country that tlie system (the Postoffice 
Department) had been conducted * * * with the view of promoting 
party purposes and party organization, rather than the business and so- 
cial interests it was created to advance — that the ofiBces were bestowed 
as tlie reward of partisan services, rather than from the merit and qual- 
ifications of those selected. * * * The postoffice system was designed 
for business purposes, * * * and should be in nowise connected with 
the party politics of the day." As a remedy, Mr. Johnson proposed 
that ''the Postmaster-Greneral be nominated by the President to the 
Senate for a specific term of years ; be separated from the Cabinet, and 
onl}^ removable by impeachment : and the appointment of the principal 
subordinate officers, for a hke term of years, be given to him ; and to 
provide that no removal should be made except for good and sufficient 
cause, to be reported to each session of the Senate." 



MR. WEBSTER'S 22 YEARS' EXPERIENCE. XllI 

nate positions should be filled by the person standing 
the best test. The selection of postmasters under the 
civil service law system would of course require special 
rules and regulations, just as the other departments do. 
The politics of a postmaster is about as important to a, 
citizen as the politics of the fireman who extinguishes a 
fire in his house. There are now about 3,000 postmas- 
ters drawing $1,000 or over a year, who have for this 
reason to be confirmed by the Senate. In twenty years 
more the number will probably be 5,000. It is impos- 
sible for the Senate to confirm this great number prop- 
erly and attend to other business at the same time. 
This is one of many good reasons why postmasterships 
should be brought under civil service law rules. 

The law seems to be working satisfactorily. Chief 
Examiner AYm. H. Webster of the national service, who 
has held office in Washington for 22 years, and, like the 
late Mr. Windom, is ^^able to judge by comparison of 
the two systems^'' (see page 213) writing (Dec. 1, 1890) 
in answer to questions propounded by myself, says : 

'' With few exceptions, tlie applicants are of good character, and I 
believe tlie morale of the employes has already been much improved 
by the merit system. In a vast majority of cases the intelligence of 
the appointees under this system is of a higher order than that of 
those appointed under the old system. However, it may be well to 
state in this connection that the intelligence of the applicants varies. 
considerably according to the different sections of the Union from 
which they come. The small percentage of appointees '^ dropped at 
the end of the probationary period " proves that the appointees pos- 
sess practical ability. Great injustice is sometimes done civil service 
appointees and the merit system itself by comparing the service ren- 
dered by these newly-made clerks with that of men appointed under 
the old system — men who have had the benefit of an extended ex- 
perience in the public service, and many of whom have gradually 
become efficient clerks by lapse of time and at the expense of the 
government. The proportion of the qualified applicants who were^ 
appointed for the year ended June 30i, 1890, was : Departmental 



XIV ME. SHEKWIK'S EXPEEIEi^^CE AXD OPINIONS. 

service, about 25 per cent. ; customs service, nearly 20 per cent. ; 
postal and railway mail services, about 45. These percentages are 
general averages of all the kinds of examination given in each branch 
of the service. The proportion of appointments varies of course for 
the different examinations in any branch of the service. In the de- 
partmental service, for instance, a much larger proportion of those 
who pass technical examinations — stenography, type-writing, specials 
for the Patent and Pension offices, &c. — are appointed than of those 
who pass clerk or copyist examinations. In this connection it may 
be proper to state that the number of applicants has not been in- 
creased by the application of the civil service rules, charges by certain 
spoilsmen to the contrary notwithstanding. Applicants for positions 
not included under the rules, especially for consulships, are much 
more numerous than for those under the rules. I have no personal 
knowledge that tlie examinations have aided any one in securing 
private work ; but it seems reasonable that they should do so. But I 
do know that complaints are made that the government is competing 
too strongly with private industries. The Commission has been in- 
formed by certain business men that one government department has 
been taking the most valuable employes in their establishments, and 
that they found it impossible to retain an efficient force in conse- 
quence. I do not think that failure to obtain public employment is 
more discouraging or demoralizing than failure to obtain private em- 
ployment. Non-competitive examinations amount to nothing so far 
as the great object of the civil service law is concerned." 

Chief Examiner Henry Sherwin of the Massachusetts 
Civil Service Commission says (Nov. 18^ 1890) : 

'' The general intelligence of our applicants is as good as that of 
persons seeking private employment in similar positions. This is 
especially true of our poUce and fire departments. The latter also 
excel in physique, proportion, strength, and agility. Of course there 
is a difference in applicants, as there is in school children. About a 
third of those examined fail to get the required 65 per cent. A great 
majority of those who pass examinations show practical abihty, in- 
terest in their work, sobriety, and good deportment in every way. 
The dismissals for cause are fewer in proportion than under the old 
rules. A few persons have received private employment in conse- 
quence of having passed examinations. I thii>k there would be more 
if it were generally known that the Commission is willing to obUge 
the public in this way. Some eligibles have had their names stricken 



MR. PHILLIPS'S EXPERIENCE AKD 0PI:N'I0]S"S. XV 

<rfrom the list because their emploj^ers, rather than lose their services, 
have increased tlieir pay. I do not see how failure to obtain public 
employment can possibly be so discouraging or demorahzing as failure 
to obtain private employment. It may be a little disheartening to a 
person who is certitied, and not chosen ; but it certainly carniot be 
so demoralizing as seeking private employment now, when the per- 
son who does so finds nearly every place for which he thinks he is 
fitted occupied, and does not always receive a courteous answer from 
the person to whom he apphes. A majority of those who quahfy in 
examinations know that their chances of appointment are small, as 
others have higher ratings. But they have the proud satisfaction of 
knowing that they have passed absolute tests, and that this fact is 
a recommendation to them. I think competitive examinations are far 
superior to non-competitive, and my instructions from tlie Commission 
are to hold them whenever it can be done, the wishes of some appoint- 
ing officers to the contrary notwithstanding. But the latter are often 
held because tlie offices are so poorly paid that men will not com- 
pete for them. Two suggestions occur to me. 1. No person who 
deserves dishonorable dismissal should be allowed to resign, whether 
charges have been preferred against him or not. When dismissed, 
he should be placed in such a position that he cannot appear again 
as an applicant, and thus plague a civil service commission. 2. Every 
discharge from the classified service should be accompanied by a writ- 
ten statement, signed by the person making it, stating explicitly the 
cause of the same, a copy of which should be filed with the Civil 
Service Commission." 

Mr. Lee Phillips, Secretary and Executive Officer of 
the New York City Civil Service Board, says (Dec. 1, 
1890) : 

'' The character and general intelligence of the applicants is very 
fair indeed. So far as I know, the appointees, with rare exceptions, 
show practical ability. I attribute this to the fact that our examin- 
ations are very practical. About 40 per cent, of the qualified appli- 
cants receive appointment. I know of several instances where per- 
sons have obtained private employment through having their names 
upon our eligible lists. It is not uncommon for private individuals 
to write to me requesting the names of such persons. Failure to 
obtain public employment is not, in my opinion, any more discouraging 
or demoralizing than failure to obtain private employment. Experi- 
ence leads me to prefer competitive to non-competitive examinations." 



XVI CIVIL SERVICE REFORM PROGRESS. 

Mr. Wm. Potts, ex-Chief Examiner of New York, reports, among- 
other things, that a civil engineer of a leading railroad company re- 
quested a cop3^ of a list of 16 civil engineers v^ho had passed an 
examination, with a view of filling a position on the staff of that road. 

In the national service the number of persons examined in 1883 
was 3,542; in 1884, 6,347; 1885, 7,602; from January 16, 1886, to 
June 30, 1887, 15,852; July 1, 1887, to June 30, 1888, 11,281; July 
]. 1888, to June 30, 1889, 19,060; July 1, 1889, to June 30, 1890, 
22,994— total, 86,678. Of the 13,947 who passed in 1889-1890, the 
education was: common school, 11,594; college, 1,479; business col- 
lege, 874. 38,608 women have passed examinations since January 
16, 1886. 20,060 appointments were made prior to June 30, 1890. 

Neio Y. State, 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 Total. 

Examined - - - *683 4,822 4.007 5,517 4,832 4,719 4,896 29.476 

Passed 612 3,629 3,158 3,974 3,032 3,761 3,455 21,621 

Appointed - - - 435 2,725 2,035 2,693 2,674 2,162 2,322 14,992 

Neiv Y. City. 

Examined - - - 200 2,409 1,927 2,490 2,397 3,139 2,110 tI4,672 

Passed 158 2,143 1,653 1,949 1,791 2,545 1,661 11,910 

Appointed--- 98 1,148 1,216 1,411 1,524 1,278 912 7,587 

Massachusetts. 

Examined - - - — 1.292 1,035 1,433 1,505 1,483 1,572 8,320 

Passed — 958 791 938 1,014 1,016 1,044 5,761 

Appointed - - - — 188 355 403 523 471 451 2,391 

In New York 156* appointees were war veterans; average age 
about 31 ;* education about 90 per cent, common school. In Massa- 
chusetts 226 appointees were veterans (appointed without examina- 
tion), and about 4 per cent, were women ; education about 98 per 
cent, cc-nmon school; average age about 34. The 8,320 examinations 
are exclusive of the Boston and Cambridge labor services, about 1.500 
men, who are registered and, after inquiry as to character, &c., certi- 
fied for employment. One of the best features of this 'labor service' 
is that the men, when wanted, are notified by mail. No time is lost. 
The system, which now includes mechanics as well as laborers, 
should be applied to all large cities. It seems to be about perfect. 

Mayor Hugh O'Brien of Boston says (speech in 1885): "I can cer- 
tainly testify that it has been a great relief to the cit}^ of Boston that 
the Civil Service Commission has taken care of the laboring population. 
No men have been more abused than the laborers. They have been 
made the tools of political tricksters ; and with civil service reform 
enforced they are no longer in the hands of political tricksters." 

* Exclusive of cities, f Only 1,848 of which were non-competitive. 



THE CIVIL SERVICE LAW. 



CHAPTER I. 

FRUITS AISTD FACTS. 

The law promotes Education, Efficiency, Economy. — Its chief Object. — 
Its Constitntionahty. — In harmony with the Teachings of Madison, 
Hamilton, and Jay. — Aids instead of Hampers the President. 

The Civil Service Law, judged by its fruits, is 
a useful and successful reformatory measure. Its fruits 
or reforms are necessarily limited in number, for it ap- 
plies to only about a fifth of the subordinate and non- 
political public offices. But notwithstanding this fact, 
it has made a good beginning in reforming the patron- 
age system of distributing offices, and it promises well 
for the future. One of its best reforms is the relief 
of officeholders from compulsory political assessments. 
Another is the making of subordinate official tenures 
coequal with efficiency and fidelity, instead of their 
depending on the politics of chief officials. It has also 
greatly relieved the President, the Cabinet,* Congress- 
men, and customs, postoffice, and other officials of the 
annoying and sometimes embarrassing burdens of office- 
seeking. The National Ci^dl Service Commission, and 
also the State Commissions of New York and Massa- 
chusetts, have received encouraging reports of the util- 
ity of the system from nearly every city wherein it has 
been fairly tried. The New York Commissioners say 

* See Secretary Windom's testimony, pages 213, 214. 



18 INSPIRED BY GENIUS OF OUR INSTITUTIONS. 

(Second Report, p. 84) : " Higher grade employes, 
better service, reduction in the number employed, and 
large economy in expenditure are among the prominent 
results already partially realized." 

The laAV is certainly in harmony with the spirit of 
the times, for it both promotes and encourages educa- 
tion.* Mr. Everett P. Wheeler truly says : " So far 
from its being opposed to the genius of our institutions, 
it is inspired by that genius." Another good feature 
of the law is that it is, like all laws should, be, non- 
partisan in its character, having been originated by the 
best known men of both* the Democratic and Republi- 
can parties. It makes no distinction on account of sex. 
The provision which requires that examinations for and 
appointments to office shall be controlled by separate 
sets of officials, these by a third set (the Civil Service 
Commissioners), and the Commissioners by the Presi- 
dent, is certainly a wise one, for, like the government's 
legislative, executive, and judicial officials, one set 
checks as well as aids the other. For example, appoint- 
ing officers are required to keep records of removals, 

* Mr. Henry Sherwin, chief examiner of the Massachusetts Civil Ser- 
vice Commission, says (Third Annual Report, p. 11) : " It may be said 
truthfully that, in their way, civil service examinations form a part of a 
general educational system. The demands made upon applicants vary 
in accordance with the positions for which they are examined. A first 
examination has shown many of them their various deficiencies, and 
they have been stimulated to bring their education up to the required 
standard. In many cases this has been done with the help of friends, 
but more frequently by attendance at the evening schools which are 
maintained in many of the cities of the Commonwealth." 

Many other Americans have made similar testimonials to the above, 
and Sir Charles Trevelyan and many other Englishmen have testified 
that the English civil service law has the same effect in England, Can- 
ada, Australia, British India, &c. To print even a synopsis of so many 
similar testimonials is certainly superfluous. 



PUBLIC BUSINESS THE SAME AS PRIVATE. 19 

rejections, resignations, transfers, and the name and 
residence of persons selected for trial by probation. 
This enables the Commissioners to check either unjust 
removals or rejections after trial by probation. 

The chief object of the law is the application of the 
common-sense principles of private business to public 
business. Public and private business may differ more 
or less in detail, and even in mode of performance, yet 
their fundamental principles are the same.* For exam- 
ple, the violation of certain rules will be followed by 
more or less injury, while the violation of certain others 
will be followed sooner or later by insolvency. One of 
these principles or rules is the retention in employment 
of efficient and honest men. Another is the removal of 
either inefficient or dishonest men. The foregoing being 
universally admitted facts, it is therefore self-evident 
that, the services rendered being satisfactory, and the 
exigencies of business permitting, the tenure of service 
of subordinate public employes, like that of private em- 
ployes, should be during efficient and faithful service, 
which service should be rewarded, when practicable, by 
promotion and a reasonable increase of pay. In private 
business the removal of efficient and faithful employes 
to make room for untried men, who might prove to be 

* The oft-repeated maxim that the public service should be conducted 
on business principles, means that accuracy, promptitude, honesty, econ- 
omy, and efficiency are as essential in public as in private affairs ; but 
the methods of securing these qualities cannot be exactly the same. 
The merchant has a direct personal and pecuniary interest in his private 
affairs which leads him to make a careful selection of his employes ; 
but in the public service there must be substituted some more compli- 
cated agency in the form of laws, regulations, reports, and inspections. 
—Col. Silas W. Burt. 

The very men who advocate the spoils system for public business, 
would call a man a fool if he proposed the same system for private 
business. — Thomas H. Benton. 



20 REASONABLE WAGES PROMOTE HONESTY. 

both inefficient and unfaithful, is deemed the hight of 
folly. Is it any less so in public business ? Do railroad 
or telegraph companies injure their business by chang- 
ing their employes every time they change their presi- 
dents ? Further, reasonable wages and employment 
during satisfactory service tend to promote honesty. 
Will not an accountant or weigher, public or private, 
who learns that he is to be superseded, be tempted to 
do wrong ? 

The law itself is new, but its principles are as old as 
the government, if not in fact as old as civilization. 
The fact that its principles are in exact conformity with 
boih the principles and practices of the founders of the 
government, is a good if not perhaps the best argument 
that can be made in favor of its constitutionality, for it 
is not reasonable that the founders of the government 
would both preach and practice doctrine that is in vio- 
lation of the Constitution.* The law is certainly not 
unconstitutional. It in effect simply authorizes the 
President to appoint commissioners to aid him in dis- 
charging his constitutional functions. The President's 
powers are therefore really increased, not, as charged 
by the opponents of the law, diminished. Thus, instead 
of hampering the President, the law materially increases 
his facilities for transacting business ; and the increase 
of facilities is not greater than the increase of business. 

* Daniel Webster says (iv, 196, 198): "I think the legislature pos- 
sesses the power of regulating the condition, duration, qualification, 
and tenure of office in all cases where the Constitution has made no 
express provision on the subject. * * * jf Congress were to declare 
by law that the Attorney-General or the Secretary of State should hold 
his office during good behavior, I am not aware of any ground on 
which such a law could be held unconstitutional. A provision of that 
kind might be unwise, but I do not perceive that it would transcend 
the power of Congress." 



PEESIDEIS'T MADISON'S VIEWS. 21 

Further, so far as the President is concerned, the en- 
forcement of the law is optional instead of compulsory. 
In fact he can nullify it by merely refusing to enforce 
it. Thus everything is practically left to the President. 
This is precisely what the Constitution says Congress 
may do. Art. II., Sec. 4, says " the Congress may by 
law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as 
they think proper in the President alone^ in the courts 
of law, or in the heads of departments." 

This is the modest, not to say timid, way in which the 
Congress of 1883 sought " to regulate and improve" a 
small part of the national civil service. But here is the 
way in which President Madison, one of the framers* 
of the Constitution itself, says he would proceed (iv, 
385) : " The right of suffrage, the rule of apportioning 
representation, and the mode of appointing to and re- 
moving from office, are fundamentals in a free govern- 
ment, and ought to be fixed by the Constitution. An 
unforeseen multiplication of offices may add a weight 
to the executive scale, disturbing the equilibrium of the 
government. I should therefore see with pleasure a 
guard against the evil, * * * even by an amendment 
of the Constitution,'^'' 

Alexander Hamilton, another framer of the Constitu- 
tion, not only advocated principles but even proposed a 

* The opinions of the framers of the Constitution ought to have great 
weight. William E. Gladstone says : " As the British Constitution is 
the most subtile organism which has proceeded from progressive his- 
tory, so the American Constitution is the most wonderful work ever 
struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man." If this 
does not increase the weight of the framers' opinions, what can ? But 
the Constitution needs revising. Jefferson says (iii, 106) : " Every con- 
stitution and every law naturally expires at the end of every 34 years." 
Speaking of other omissions, he said he thought the Constitution ought 
to contain a provision for " the restriction of monopolies." (ii, 229.) 



22 HAMILTON'S PLAN AND JAY's PRACTICE. 

plan very similar to both the plan and fundamental prin- 
ciples of the civil service law. Indeed it may be said 
that the law is only an enlargement and improvement 
of his plan. His " select assembly " would have been, 
what the Civil Service Commissioners are to-day, a 
material aid to the President, if not in fact a sort of 
second Cabinet. He says (" The Federalist," p. 355) : 
^' It will be agreed on all hands that the power of ap- 
pointment, in ordinary cases, can be properly modified 
only in one of three ways. It ought to be vested in a 
single man ; or in a select assembly of moderate num- 
ber ; or in a single man, with the concurrence of such 
an assembly." He deprecated " party bargains " (p. 
356) as a mode of distributing ofiices, because '^ party 
victories " would " be more considered than the intrinsic 
merit of the candidate" or ^Hhe advancement of the 
service." 

The Federalist papers were intended by their authors 
= — Hamilton, Madison, and Jay — to be explanations of 
the Constitution. So it is hardly necessary to say that 
Hamilton's plan is what he believed to be the Constitu- 
tion's plan. 

John Jay, the first Chief Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court, did not, so far as I know, formulate 
any plan for or expatiate at length concerning the dis- 
tribution of ofiices. But his actions, when Governor of 
New York, in 1795, spoke louder than plans, or even 
the emphatic words he then used, for he refused to 
make removals on account of politics, notwithstanding 
Gov. Clinton's ofiiceholders had bitterly opposed him, 
and his (Jay's) political friends "anticipated the spoils 
of victory."* (Life of Jay, i, 392.) When one of the 

* These words were written by William Jay, John Jay's son and biog- 
rapher, before the delivery of Senator Marcy's spoils doctrine speech. 



TWO OTHER CIVIL SERVICE LAWS. 23 

council of four men that then confirmed nominations, 
advised the Governor to appoint a Federalist to office, 
on account of ^^his zeal and usefulness/^ he replied: 
^^ That, sir, is not the question. Is he fit for the office V 
In his inaugural address he said (i, 389) : ^^To regard 
my fellow-citizens with an equal eye, to cherish and 
advance merit wherever found, * * * are obligations 
of which I perceive and acknowledge the full force. ^^ 

The civil service law, so far as non-competitive ex- 
aminations are concerned, is not without precedent. 
Two other acts, namely, sections 164 and 1753 of the 
United States Eevised Statutes, provide as follows : 

§ 164. Xo clerk shall be appointed in any department, in [any] of 
the four classes above designated, until he has been examined and found 
quahfied by a board of three examiners. 

§ It 53. The President is authorized to prescribe such regulations for 
the admission of persons into the civil service of the United States as 
may best promote the efficiency thereof, and ascertain the fitness of 
each candidate in respect to age, health, character, knowledge, and 
ability for the branch of service into which he seeks to enter ; and for 
this purpose he may employ suitable persons to conduct such inquiries, 
and may prescribe their duties and establish regulations for the conduct 
of persons who may receive appointments in the civil service. 

The civil service law is a careful elaboration and im- 
provement of sections 164 and 1753. Therefore one is 
about as unconstitutional as the other. But even if all 
were unconstitutional, the abuses they are designed to 
correct would have to be dealt with by some other law. 
The law not only seems to be constitutional, but it or 
a law similar to it seems to be expressly authorized by 
the Constitution itself.* It causes, it must be admit- 

* Art. i, § 8, says : " The Congress shall have power to make all laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the fore- 
going powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the gov- 
ernment of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. " 

The United States Supreme Court sa^'s (106 U. S. Repts., 371) : " With- 



24 EMIXEXT LEGAL OPIXIOXS. 

ted^ a radical change. Therefore it is not strange that 
it should meet with opposition^ for doubt and distrust 
are the natural consequences of all radical goyernmen- 
tal changes. The Constitution itself was not an excep- 
tion to this rule, for it was voted down by two of the 
States,* and even some of its framers doubted its per- 
manent utility. Is it strange then that some men doubt 
the utility of the civil service law ? 

The Constitution requires that the President ^^ shall 
take care that the laws be faithfully executed. ^^ In har- 
mony with and apparently in view of this fact, the civil 

in the legitimate scope of this grant Congress is permitted to determine 
for itself what is necessary and what is proper." 

In the practical application of government, the pubhc functionaries 
must be left at liberty to exercise the powers with which the people by 
the Constitution and laws haye intrusted them. They must liaye a 
wide discretion as to the choice of means ; and the only limitation upon 
tliat discretion woyld seem to be that the means are appropriate to the 
end. (Storey on Const., § 432.) 

The subject k the execution of those great powers on which the wel- 
fare of the nation depends. * * * Tliis could not be done by confin- 
ing the choice of means to such narrow limits as not to leaye it in the 
power of Congress to adopt any wliich might be appropriate and which 
were conduciye to the end. (4 Wheaton. 415.) 

The question whether a statute is a valid exercise of legislative power 
is to be determined solely by reference to constitutional restraints and 
prohibitions. It may not be declared void because deemed to be op- 
posed to natural justice and equity. (74 New York Reports. 509.) 

The construction given to a statute by those charged with tlie duty 
of executing it, ought not to be overruled without cogent reasons. The 
officers concerned are usually able men and masters of the subject. 
Not unfrequently they are the draughtsmen of the laws they are after- 
ward called upon to interpret. (113 United States Reports, 571.) 

* Rhode Island and North Carolina. George Bancroft says (His. of 
Const., ii, 350): "Neither of the two States which lingered behind re- 
monstrated against tlie establishment of a new government before their 
consent; nor did they ask the United States to wait for them. The 
worst that can be said of them is that they were late in arriving." 



HOW TO ADAPT LAWS TO THE PEOPLE. 25 

service law authorizes the President to make his own 
rules for its execution^ and requires the Commissioners 
to aid him, ^"^as he may request/^ in preparing them. 
As the rules are subject to such modifications as the 
President and his aids may find necessary, they ought 
in the course of time to become not only satisfactory as 
rules, but also important adjuncts to the law itself. 
This is well, for the law, which has not yet, except in 
certain places, had a fair trial, may have faults of both 
omission and commission, the exact nature of and rem- 
edy for which time only will determine.* Therefore, in 
the meantime, good rules will give it strength as well 
as facilitate its execution. The execution of the law, 
like the law itself, is simple, but it is laborious, for ex- 
aminations are held in nearly every State and Territory 
twice a year. 

* Sir Greorge Cornwall Lewis says ('' Methods of Observation and 
Reasoning in Politics," i, 1*73): "A government is, by tlie nature of its 
action, constantly trying experiments upon the community. All new 
measures, ail laws enacted for the first time, are in the nature of ex- 
periments. They are not indeed scientific experiments ; but they are 
•experiments made for a practical purpose, and they are regarded merely 
as provisional and tentative until experience has proved their fitness 
-and they are confirmed by the proof of practical success. Being tried, 
not in cor pore vili, but upon the lives and fortunes of the people, the con- 
duct of tiie experiment must be regulated by the nature of the subject 
upon which it is made. Hence the progress of such experiments is care- 
fully watched by the legislature, while the executive authorities proceed 
■cautiously and gently with a new law, feeling their way as they advance, 
and exercising their discretion as to its more rapid or tardy advance- 
ment, either generally or in particular districts. It is by trying a new 
law on a people, as the maker of new apparel fits it on the body, and by 
■enlarging here and diminishing there, where it does not suit the shape, 
that the legislature gradually adapts its work to tlie wants and feelings 
of the community. This is an experimental process, for the purpose, 
not of ascertaining a general truth, but of improving the institution, and 
of giving it the form best suited to the circumstances of the nation." 

2 



CHAPTEE II. 

COMPETITIVE EXAMIN^ATIOI^S. 

Their Utility proved by trial by Probation, examinations for Promotion^ 
contrasts with non-Competitive Examinations, &c. — Appointees in- 
dependent of Politicians. — The education required. — Opinions and 
Experiences of practical men, &c. 

The competitive examinations, which may be called 
the backbone of the civil service law system, about 
which there is more or less complaint, are a simple 
mode of ascertaining the relative theoretical qualifica- 
tions of applicants for office, and of naming those who 
are entitled to trial by probation as to their practical 
qualifications before final appointment. The proceed- 
ings of the examiners are as impartial as are those of a 
court of justice, and " are open to such spectators as 
can be accommodated without interfering with the 
quiet due to those being examined." The examiners 
know the applicants and their respective papers by 
numbers, not by names.* There is therefore practically 
no reason for favoritism f on the part of the examiners, 



* Regulation 21. The examination papers of each applicant shall be 
marked only with a number, and his name with his number shall be 
placed in a sealed envelope, which shall not be opened until after his 
papers are marked. 

Regulation 35. Complaints which show injustice or unfairness on the 
part of any Examining Board, or any one acting under the Commission, 
or any error in marking, will be considered by the Commission, and if 
necessary it will revise the marking and grading on the papers, or oi'der 
a new examination, or otherwise do justice in the premises. 

f It (the Commission) does not regard itself or the examiners as hav- 



HOW TO WEED OUT IMPRACTICABLE THEORISTS. 27 

and consequently no reason for complaint on the part 
of the applicants. Applicants who answer seventy per 
cent, of the questions asked, except veteran soldiers and 
sailors, who are required to answer bat sixty-five, are 
eligible, when wanted, to trial by probation, without 
further examination. Those who do not, are eligible to 
try again in some future examination. 

The utility of competitive examinations is proved in 
many ways, but best perhaps by trial by probation. 
Trial by probation is for six months. It is the gover- 
nor, as it were, of the civil service law system. Its 
province is to correct an inherent fault of all theoretical 
examinations, namely, the indorsement now and then 
by the examiners of impracticable theorists. Experi- 
ence shows that, when tried by probation, less than two 
per cent, of the applicants who have passed competitive 
examinations fail of final appointment. What system 
could do better? The utility of the system is also 
proved by examinations for promotion among office- 

ing any more right to take into account requests, recommendations, or 
the wishes or sympathies of persons, however high in otficial and social 
standing, than a judge or jury has to depart from the law or the evi- 
dence by reason of such interposition. (Com'rs' Third An. Rept , p. 73.) 

The Postmaster-General has found the recommendations of persons 
for inspectors in the Postal service, who are not yet within the civil ser- 
vice examinations, to be so unreliable that he has been compelled to 
resort to examinations to protect himself against fraud and incompe- 
tency. For the same reasons the Secretary of the Navy has enforced 
examinations for securing skilled workmen at the navy-yards. (Ibid., 
p. 60.) 

Applicants are required to file formal application papers. These are 
of themselves " a sort of preliminary examination," for they contain a 
record of the birth, age, education, physical condition, capacity for 
business, residence, &c., of each applicant. Besides this three reputable 
persons must vouch for the applicant's character. In New York and 
Massachusetts the sponsors must certify their willingness that their cer- 
tificates may be pubhshed. This makes them careful. 



28 CIVIL AND MILITARY SERVICES COMPARED. 

holders themselves. The records in such cases are de- 
cidedly in favor of those who have passed competitive 
examinations as against those who have not. Examina- 
tions for promotion should receive careful attention, for 
sooner or later many chief officials may be chosen from 
among the subordinates who pass best in them. * 

The best feature perhaps of the competitive system is 
the entire independence of its appointees of politicians. 
How can public business be efficiently conducted if 
politicians practically appoint, control, and tax the men 
who conduct it? Under the competitive system ap- 
pointees win their positions by merit, and by merit only 
can they retain them or be promoted. 

The civil service law system of competitive examina- 
tions is similar to the system of choosing cadets to the 
•military school at West Point,f that is when the latter 
is not made a matter of patronage, and it compares 
favorably with it in its results. The failures, in after 
life, among the cadets who graduate, like those who are 
tried by probation in the civil service, are less than two 
per cent. The cases are not strictly analogous, but 



* In 1860 a Parliamentary Committee of Investigation said that 
among the ends to be accomphshed was the following : " To encourage 
industry and foster merit, by teaching all public servants to look for- 
ward to promotion according to their deserts, and to expect the highest 
prizes in the service if they can qualify themselves for them." (Eaton's 
" Civil Service in Great Britain," p. 220.) 

f The respective civil departments of the government being in effect 
schools of practical instruction, as in fact are all offices, vocations, and 
avocations, would it not be policy, when practicable, to make them, hke 
West Point and Annapolis, schools of special theoretical instruction 
also ? In practical instruction, under the civil service law system, they 
are equal if not superior to either West Point or Annapolis. Such 
schools would produce diplomatists, financiers, soldiers, &c. All able- 
bodied public employes should be soldiers, for they not only belong to 
but are a part of the government itself. 



POLITICALLY AMBITIOUS OFFICIALS CHECKED. 29 

educational tests are required in both, and trial by pro- 
bation also, it may be said, for the cadets are practically 
on trial for four years, during which time incompetent 
persons are weeded out by numerous examinations. 

Again, the examinations are a check on politically 
ambitious officeholders. For example, under the pat- 
ronage system the Collector of the Port of New York^ 
wishing to be Governor of the State of New York, can 
remove subordinate officials, with or witliout cause, to 
make room for his personal political supporters. Under 
the competitive or merit system he is checked in two 
ways. 1. While he has an unrestricted power of re- 
moval, it is dangerous to abuse it, for, as before said, 
he has to furnish the Civil Service Commissioners with 
records of removals, rejections, &c. 2. He cannot make 
appointments to office, except in conjunction with other 
officials, with whom he has no connection, and then only 
such as have passed an examination. 

The examinations relieve the President of burdens of 
which Washington complained, even before his inau- 
guration as President. {'' Writings," ix, 479.) As the 
public offices have increased about a hundredfold since 
Washington's day, it is self-evident that a proper exam- 
ination into the qualifications of all subordinate office- 
holders would occupy the time of at least fifty men, 
that is if the officeholders were changed every four 
years. Hence the enactment of sections 164 and 1753 
of the United States Revised Statutes, and finally of 
the civil service law. The President and Cabinet now- 
adays are sometimes overworked in the performance of 
regular official duties. Those of the Secretary of the 
Treasury are sufficient for two men. 

The failure now and then of worthy and practical 
men to get appointments is no valid argument against 
the competitive system, for where there are so many 



30 A BUSINESS SCHOOL-HOUSE (i^OTE). 

applicants, the same thing will occur sometimes under 
any system. No system of course is perfect. But can 
any. system do more than require applicants to prove 
both theoretical and practical ability before appoint- 
ment ? The question of satisfactory future service is 
always a problem, let the business be public or private, 
and must be taken for granted. Further, the failure 
of men who have passed creditable competitive exam- 
inations to get public employment is the means some- 
times of securing them private employment.* 

For ordinary purposes competitive examinations are 
superior to non-competitive in perhaps every respect ; 
further, it is far more creditable to an applicant to pass 
the former than the latter. The non-competitive ex- 
aminations held under Sec. 164 soon degenerated into 
a farce, the questions asked, according to J. D. Cox, 
consisting of such as the following: ^^How far is it 
to your boarding-house V^ Competitive examinations 
will probably never degenerate into a farce. The num- 
ber, vigilance, and jealousy (jealous of their rights) of 
competitors alone will prevent this, and will also tend 
to prevent favoritism on the part of appointing officers. 
President Grant denounced the non-competitive system 
in 1870, and John Stuart Mill says it ^'^ never, in the 
long run, does more than exclude absolute dunces. ^^ 

The competitive examinations, while not a guarantee 
of good character, are sometimes, but very rarely, the 
means of exposing bad character. Dorman B. Eaton, 

* See pages 14, 15, 16 of this work ; also IT. S. Civil Serv. Com. Rpts. 

Note. — The McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. of Chicago say : 
"In reply to your queries, we beg leave to say that we do not hold 
competitive examinations with our employes, either in the shops or in 
the field. We have the school-house always running to educate them 
to our manner of doing business. ATe promote the most worthy." 

The latter rule is the same as the civil service law rule. 



THE ADVANTAGE OF BUSINESS EXPERIENCE. 81 

who speaks from experience, having been a Civil Ser- 
vice Commissioner, and having also studied the subject 
(civil service) in Europe, says (" The Spoils System and 
Civil Service Reform," p. (60) : " Every competitor has 
his chance of an appointment increased by every one he 
can strike from the list above him. If he can expose 
bad character in any person graded higher, that person 
will be no longer in his way. This interest leads to 
inquiry and exposure." But, Mr. Eaton might have 
added, this privilege is liable to abuse. * 

The claim that a collegiate education is necessary to 
pass a competitive examination is not sustained by the 
facts. As a rule about 85 per cent, of the appointees, 
as is shown in the Introduction, are from common 
schools and 15 from colleges. But it is true that some 
offices require proficiency in a greater number of studies 
than others, and that others again require special educa- 
tion. The fact that more or less knowledge of mathe- 
matics, grammar, geography, and a few other elemen- 
tary studies, is necessary to the proper discharge of 
general commercial and financial business is certainly 
indisputable, and it is no hardship for young men fresh 
from school to be examined in them. But with elderly 
men the case is different. It is not reasonable to expect 
them to describe the minute details of these studies 
after fifteen, twenty, or twenty-five years of more or 
less disuse. f There is need of intelligent and practical 

* The Commissioners say (Third Annual Report) that out of more 
than 17,000 mdividual examinations, not more than six or seven un- 
worthy persons have been discovered on the records. " The ' Records * 
are the books in which the names of applicants for examination are 
entered. The ' Registers' are the books in which the names of those 
found eHgible for appointment after examination are entered." 

•j- The Commissioners' Report for 1885 says business experience is 
almost the exact equivalent of a fresh recollection of studies. 



V 



32 WASHINGTON, GALLATIN, JEFFERSON, EVERETT. 

discrimination here. In private business uneducated 
men do not apply for work which requires educated 
men. It would be useless. But in public business the 
case is different. This fact alone justifies competitive 
examinations. 

The requirement of educational qualifications on the 
part of officeholders is not new in this government, nor 
perhaps in any other. Washington says ("Writings,'^ 
ix, 461) : " The nominator ought to be governed pri- 
marily by the abilities which are the most peculiarly 
adapted to the nature and duties of the office which is 
to be filled." In his last message to Congress Washing- 
ton recommended the establishment of both a Military 
School and a National University, the specific object of 
the latter to be, he said, '^ the education of our youth in 
the science of government. In a republic," he con- 
tinues, '' what species of knowledge can be equally im- 
portant?" (Benton's Abridged Debates, ii, 16.) His 
admonition, in his Farewell Address, to promote " the 
general diffusion of knowledge " is familiar to every 
school-boy. 

Albert Gallatin, writing to Jefferson, in 1801, said : 
" So far as respects subordinate offices, talent and integ- 
rity are to be the only qualifications." Jefferson, in re- 
ply, said : '' Talent and worth alone are to be inquired 
into." (Adams's Gallatin, p. 279.) 

Edward Everett, in an address on " The importance 
of Education in a Republic," says ('' Orations," &c., ii, 
319, 320) : "But I have not yet named all the civil 
duties for which education is needed as the preparatory 
discipline. The various official trusts in society are to 
be filled, from a Commission of the Peace to the place 
of Chief Justice ; from a Constable up to the President 
of the United States. The sphere of duty of some of 
these functionaries is narrow ; of others, large and in- 



EDUCATION CONGENIAL WITH REPUBLICANISM. 33 

expressibly responsible ; of none, insignificant. Taken 
together, they make up the administration of free gov- 
ernment — the greatest merely temporal interest of civil- 
ized man. There are three courses, between which we 
must choose. We must have officers unqualified for 
their duties; or we must educate a privileged class to 
monopolize the honors and emoluments of place ; or we 
must establish such a system of gent^ral education as 
will furnish a supply of well-informed, intelligent, and 
respectable citizens, in every part of the country and in 
every walk of life, capable of discharging the trusts 
which the people may devolve upon them. The topic 
is of great compass, but I cannot dwell upon it. It is 
superfluous to say which of the three courses is most 
congenial with the spirit of republicanism." 

Similar citations might be made from many other 
statesmen, but they are certainly superfluous. Some 
statesmen's deeds speak louder than words ; as, for ex- 
ample. Governor Samuel J. Tilden's late posthumous 
gift for educational purposes. 

The New York Civil Service Commission says (Second 
Report, 1885, p. 20) : " The competitive method is sup- 
ported by reasons so obvious and cogent that argument 
in its favor seems almost superfluous. Competition is 
the law of nature, and is universal in its application. It 
prevails in every department of human activity, and is 
the test by which men are measured in every profession, 
calling, and sphere. It is the only absolutely democratic 
rule, and therefore consonant with the spirit of our in- 
stitutions, founded on the political equality of men. By 
eliminating the elements of favoritism, nepotism, and 
partisan recompense, it stimulates manly aspirations, 
develops independence in thought and character, pro- 
tects the equal rights of every citizen, and secures fair 
play against selfishness and presumptuous mediocrity." 



V 



84 COMPETITIVE EXAMINATIONS IN IRELAND. 

Again the Commission says (Same Report, p. 24) : 
" It is rapidly becoming clear that the system of com- 
petitive examinations is easily applicable to almost every 
subordinate post, however high, in every branch of the 
public service, State or municipal. In Ireland the four 
national examiners of the public schools are selected by 
competitive examination, and a note of the subjects for 
examination gives an idea of the varied scientific and 
scholarly attainments in which the applicants must be 
versed." 

And again the Commission says (Fourth Report, 1887, 
p. 26) : " One advantage of the competitive system, on 
which stress has been laid by a Professor of Trinity 
College, Dublin, is in its avoidance of animosities aris- 
ing from religious differences, which, he remarked some 
thirty years ago, ' are greatly embittered by the patron- 
age system.' " 

Mayor Seth Low of Brooklyn, New York, in 1885, said 
of the competitive system : " There is a fairness and 
openness about it peculiarly American, and smacking of 
all that is best in the American love of fair play and the 
American demand for equal treatment of all citizens." 

Governor David B. Hill says (An. Message, 1886) : 
" Open competition rests on the solid basis of equal 
rights and fair play, and is a principle so thoroughly 
democratic in its character, so completely in harmony 
with the theory of our institutions and the spirit of our 
people, that the method would seem to commend itself 
to universal approval. When merit alone, ascertained 
by fair competition, is recognized as the ground of ap- 
pointment and promotion, the equity and propriety of 
the mode are self-evident and require no defense. * * * 
It is besides a constant stimulus to the better education 
and training of the people, and a recognition of the 
utility of our common schools, sustained at the public 



GOOD EFFECT OF THE PROBATIONARY TERM. 35 

expense, and an incentive for the best men to seek the 
public service." 

Collector William H. Robertson, writing Dec. 8, 1883, 
says (First Kept. New York C. S. Com., p. 266) : " For 
several years the civil service system has been in force 
in the Custom House at this Port, and the results are 
highly gratifying to its friends. The appointments are / 
made upon competitive examination wherever it is prac- 
ticable to do so. No wiser or safer rule could be de- 
vised for filling these offices." 

Postmaster Henry G. Pearson of New York, who 
also believes in the wisdom of competitive tests, says 
(Same Report, p. 271) : "I do not desire, however, to 
be understood as maintaining that the syston of ap- 
pointment through competitive examination is a never- 
failing means of securing the services of none but the 
most efficient and deserving for the performance of the 
public business. In spite of all precautions, it is and 
has been possible for idle, intemperate, dishonest, and 
careless persons to obtain employment under that sys- 
tem. But the cases have been rare in which those 
defects have not been discovered before the expiration 
of the six months' term of probation, and the unfaithful 
or incompetent servant dismissed." 

Silas VV. Burt, who speaks from experience as Naval 
Officer of the Port of New York and also Chief Exam- 
iner of the New York Civil Service Commission, says 
(Second Rept. N. Y. C. S. Com., p. 47) : " Open compe- 
tition gives the broadest scope of choice, determines 
with substantial accuracy the relative fitness of all who 
apply, and puts on record all the transactions, with their 
details." 

As early as 1881, two years before the passage of the 
civil service law, the New York Chamber of Commerce, 
whose members' business connection with Custom House 



36 N. Y. CHAMBER COMMERCE, WEBSTER, G0DKI:N^. 

officials makes them eminently qualified to judge of their 
merits, passed the following among other resolutions : 

Mesolved, That in the judgment of this Chamber the 
system of examinations for appointment to place in the 
Custom House, which has ruled during the last few 
years, has been of substantial value to the mercantile 
community, and is, in their eyes, of great importance. 

Resolvedy That this Chamber hereby instructs its 
Committee on Foreign Commerce and the Revenue 
Laws to wait upon the new Collector, when he shall be 
installed, with a copy of these resolutions, and to press 
upon his attention the importance of their subject- 
matter. 

The following maxim of Webster is similar in princi- 
ple to competitive examinations (iii, 4) : " Nothing is 
more unfounded than the notion that any man has a 
/ right to an office. This must depend on the choice of 
others, and consequently on the opinions of others, in 
relation to his fitness and qualification for office." 

Edwin L. Godkin says (" Danger of an Officeholding 
Aristocracy," p. 14) : '^ It may be laid down as one of 
the maxims of the administrative art, that no public 
officer can ever take the right view of his office, or of 
his relation to the people whom he serves, who feels 
that he has owed his appointment to any qualification 
but his fitness, or holds it by any tenure but that of 
faithful performance. No code of rules can take the 
place of this feeling. No shortening of the term can 
take its place." 

So far as my researches go. Commissioner of Patents 
S. S. Fisher has the honor of being the first person to 
practice the system of competitive examinations in this 
country. He began them in 1869, and his example was 
followed by most if not all of his successors in the 



FISHER AND THOMAS AS PIONEERS. 37 

Patent Office. Colonel Fisher, who was a well-known 
patent lawyer, accepted office more to accommodate 
President Grant than anything else. But as his profes- 
sion was more remunerative than his office, he resigned 
at the end of eighteen months. 

John L. Thomas, Collector of the Port of Baltimore, 
instituted, in 1869, strict non-competitive examinations 
in the Baltimore Custom House. The system was so 
satisfactory that liis two successors in office continued 
it. When Mr. Thomas was again appointed Collector, 
in 1877, he found that all the clerks, with three or four 
exceptions, whom he had appointed between 1869 and 
1873 had been retained ; and when he left the office, in 
1882, they were still there. (Senate Report No. 576, 
for 1882, pp. 179, 182.) 

Silas W. Burt instituted competitive examinations 
for promotion among the employes in the New York 
Naval Office in 1871. This was on his own responsibil- 
ity. In 1872 he began competitive examinations under 
the Grant rules for general admission to the service. 
In the same year Postmaster Patrick H. Jones began 
competitive examinations in the New York Postoffice. 
These were continued by his successor in office, Thomas 
L. James, in 1873. In 1879 Mr. James improved the 
system, and issued '' Rules governing appointment and 
promotion in the New York Postoffice." 

Collector Chester A. Arthur, who was appointed in 
1871, introduced radical changes in the New York Cus- 
tom House. Mr. Eaton says (" Term and Tenure of 
Office," p. 82) that in five years Mr. Arthur made only 
144 removals as against 1,678 during the preceding five 
years. Mr. Arthur advocated as well as practiced re- 
form in the civil service, as is shown in Chapter VII of 
this work. 



CHAPTER III. 

SOME OF THE LAW'S PEOMISES. 

Reforms of priceless value Probable. — The danger of Bribery at Elec- 
tions. — Opinions thereon of Messrs. Buchanan, Harrison, Benton, 
Jefferson, Barton, Bell, and Graves. — The chief English Election 
Laws from 1275 to 1883. 

An honest and intelligent enforcement of the civil 
service law promises to have numerous beneficial effects, 
some of which are more or less indirect. This is nat- 
ural. A good law not only aids in and leads to other 
reforms, but is sometimes the parent of other good laws. 
Further, it creates a general spirit of reform. 

It promises, by securing the services of men of busi- 
ness as well as intellectual ability, to materially in- 
crease, if not double, the efficiency of the civil service. 
In fact this has been partly accomplished already. In- 
crease of efficiency will naturally lead to perfection of 
system, and perfection of system will naturally lead to 
economy. Are efficiency and system probable, or, in a 
great degree, even possible, when officeholders are ap- 
pointed chiefly on account of their politics, and without 
much if any regard to their ability to discharge the 
peculiar duties of their offices, and who, for obvious rea- 
sons, take more interest in politics than in their official 
business ? 

It promises to aid in purifying and elevating politics, 
and to thereby induce and encourage men of character 
and ability to take part in the affairs of state. It was 
by such men that the government was founded, and it 



HOW TO STRENGTHEN REPUBLICAN INSTITUTIONS. 39 

is only by such that it can be preserved. Henc^ the 
necessity of using any and every means to thwart the 
bold and violent men whom Franklin warned us would 
thrust themselves into our government and be our 
rulers. 

It has materially interfered with and promises to ruin 
what, for lack of a better name, may be called the office 
brokerage business, the stock in trade of which has 
heretofore consisted rather in the promise than the be- 
stowal of office. When there are fewer offices to either 
promise or bestow, the evil will be abated ; and when 
there are none at all, it will cease altogether. 

It promises to stimulate and lead men to vote for 
principle — principle, the pedestal on w^hich the monu- 
ment of republican institutions rests! — principle, the 
life-blood of the body-politic ! When men vote for 
principle, they vote to refresh, preserve, strengthen, 
deepen, broaden, and spread republican institutions. 
This is as unquestionable as is the opposite proposition 
that when they vote from purely selfish motives, they 
vote to undermine and weaken republican institutions, 
and to sooner or later put pirates in command of the 
ship of state. From Alderman to President men should 
vote for principle. And voting for a man of principle 
is voting for principle. Officeholders themselves can 
now so vote, for, as before said, they are independent of 
politicians. This is well, because it is not only proper 
to so vote, but a respectful independence, even of office- 
holding itself, is both desirable and commendable. 

It promises to at least ameliorate an evil that threat- 
ens the most direful ultimate results, namely, bribery at 
elections. Even the amelioration of this body-politic 
cancer is a matter of importance, for in the course of 
time, with the aid of and in conjunction with other re- 
forms, it may be practically eradicated. The nation can 



40 THE LAW AIDS ANOTHER NEEDED REFORM. 

Stand the sporadic and local corruptions that are the 
bane of private as well as public business, but it cannot 
stand, as a republic, the general, far-reaching, and mul- 
tiform evils that continual bribery at elections will 
cause.* 

If the cause of corruption at elections be removed, 
there will be no corruption. As official patronage, either 
direct or indirect, is a great if not perhaps the chief 
cause of corrupt elections, it logically follows that the 
less patronage there is, the less corruption there will be. 
Therefore if all, or nearly all, of the non-elective public 
offices were distributed strictly as rewards of merit, and 
without regard to politics, there would be far less cor- 
ruption at elections. This plan ought besides to mate- 
rially increase public interest in elections, in which of 
course too much care and interest cannot be taken. 
The civil service law will aid in accomplishing this 
reform ; and in this way it will tend to renew and 
strengthen public confidence not only in the fidelity and 
sacredness of the ballot, but in the stability of the gov- 
ernment itself. 

President Buchanan, writing to the Pittsburg Cen- 
tenary Celebration, in 1858, said (Reports Coms. H. of 
Rep., 36th Cong., 1st Sess., 1859-60, v, -25) : '' We have 

* Webster says (iv, 179, 180) : "The principle of republican govern- 
ments, we are tauf];ht, is public virtue ; and whatever tends either to 
corrupt this principle, to debase it, or to weaken its force, tends, in the 
same degree, to the final overthrow of such governments. * * * 
Whenever personal, individual, or selfish motives influence the conduct 
of individuals on public questions, they affect the safety of the whole 
system. When these motives run deep and wide, and come in serious 
conflict with higher, purer, and more patriotic purposes, they greatly 
endanger that system; and all will admit that, if they become general 
and overwhelming, so that all public principle is lost sight of, and every 
election becomes a mere scramble for office, the system inevitably must 
fall." 



VENALITY VERSUS LIBERTY. 41 

never heard until within a recent period of the employ- 
ment of money to carry elections. Should this practice 
increase until the voters and their representatives in the 
State and National legislatures shall become infected, 
the fountain of the government will be poisoned at its 
source, and we must end, as history proves, in a military 
despotism. * * * When the people become venal, 
there is a canker at the root of the tree of liberty which 
must cause it to wither and die." 

President Harrison, in 1841, in a circular prepared by 
his Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, said (Civil Ser- 
vice Reform League Proceedings, 1885, p. 15) : " I will 
remove no incumbent * * * who has faithfully and 
honestly acquitted himself of the duties of his office, 
except where such officer has been guilty of an active 
partisanship, * * * thereby bringing the patronage of 
the government in conflict with the freedom of elec- 
tions." (These words appear in Tyler^s inaugural also.) 

Senator Thomas H. Benton, in reporting, in 1826, on 
the " expediency of reducing the patronage of the Exec- 
utive," said (Appendix to Gales & Seaton's Debates in 
Congress, 1820, p. 137): "The power of patronage, 
unless checked, must go on increasing until Federal in- 
fluence will predominate in elections as completely as 
British influence predominates in the elections of Scot- 
land and Ireland. * * * « The President wants my 
vote, and I want his patronage. I will vote as he wishes, 
and he will give me the office I wish for.' What will 
this be but the government of one man ? and what is 
the government of one man but a monarchy ?" 

Thomas Jefferson, in a letter to Governor Thomas 
McKean of Pennsylvania, in 1801, says (" Writings," 
iv, 350) : " The event of the election is still in dubio. 
A strong portion in the House of Representatives will 
prevent an election if they can. I rather believe they 



42 PURE ELECTIONS THE PILLLARS OF LIBERTY. 

will not be able to do it, as there are six individuals of 
moderate character, any one of whom, coming over to 
the Republican vote, will make a ninth State. Till this 
is known, it is too soon for me to say what should be 
done in such atrocious cases as those you mention, of 
Federal officers obstructing the operation of the State 
governments. One thing I will say, that, as to the 
future, interference with elections, whether of the State 
or general government, by officers of the latter, should 
be deemed cause of removal, because the constitutional 
remedy by the elective principle becomes nothing, if it 
may be smothered by the enormous patronage of the 
general government. How far it may be practicable, 
prudent, or proper to look back, is too great a question 
to be decided but by the united wisdom of the whole 
administration when formed." 

Mr. Jefferson issued a circular to the officers of the 
government after his election, wherein he said he had 
*' seen with dissatisfaction officers of the general gov- 
ernment taking, on various occasions, active parts in the 
election of public functionaries, whether of the general 
or State governments." He further said that an officer 
should " not attemjDt to influence the votes of others, 
nor to take any part in the business of electioneering, 
that being deemed inconsistent with the Constitution 
and his duties to it." 

Senator David Barton of Missouri says (Gales & Sea- 
ton's Debates, 1830, vol. vi, pt. i, p. 462) : "The free- 
dom and purity of elections are as essential to our liber- 
ties as the pillars to the dome they support." 

Representative John Bell of Tennessee (afterward 
United States Senator, and, in 1860, a prominent candi- 
date for the presidency), introduced, in 1837, " A bill 
to secure the freedom of elections." In the course of a 
most remarkable speech he said (G. & S.'s Debates, vol. 



SPOILS SYSTEM TOO DANGEROUS EVEN FOR WAR. 43 

xiii, pt. ii, pp. 1455, 1462, 1475, 1478) : "I presume, sir, 
it will scarcely be denied that a large proportion of the 
officers of the Federal government, from the President 
down to the lowest grade of persons employed in its 
service, have interfered of late in all Federal elections, 
directly, openly, and industriously. * * * Offices and 
employments have been given as the wages of political 
profligacy — the rewards of hireling service in support 
of favorite candidates. * ^' * The abuse of patronage 
is the Pandora's box of our system. It is the original 
sin of our political condition, to which every other sin 
of the times may be fairly ascribed. * * * It is labor 
thrown away to pursue with research, however relent- 
less and penetrating, the authors of corruption in the 
public offices, while the prolific j.arent of all is permit- 
ted to survive. * * * It is * * * not so much the 
aggregate amount of patronage within the control of 
the government as it is the want of proper legal limita- 
tions and restrictions upon the use of it, in the hands of 
the Executive, which is to be dreaded and guarded 
against. All other dangers in the operation of the gov- 
ernment will wear out by time, and are of small moment 
in comparison with this of patronage. * * * If, in 
war between civilized nations, the spoils principle is 
regarded as too dangerous for the general safety of 
property and society, how much more dangerous and 
insufferable must such a principle be when applied to 
the contests for power between political parties in a 
free government ?"* 

* Mr. Bell quotes copiously from English history. He says (p. 1472) 
that, in 1779, " A Lord Lieutenant of a county, an officer appointed by 
the Crown, was detected in writing to his friends in the county of 
Southampton, urging them to give their support to his friend, who was 
also the government candidate for Parliament. When his conduct was 
brought before the House of Commons, and some of the letters which 



44 A MEMORABLE PARLIAMENTARY RESOLUTION. 

Representative Wm. J. Graves of Kentucky, speak* 
ing of Mr. Bell's freedom of elections bill, said (Same 
Debates, pp. 1517, 1518, 1525) : "In 1829 the attention 
of this nation was called to this subject, in the most sol- 
emn manner, by General Jackson, in his first inaugural 
address, in which he employs the following language : 
' The recent demonstrations of public sentiment inscribe 
on the list of executive duties, in characters too legible 
to be overlooked, the task of reform, which will require 
particularly the correction of abuses that havq brought 
the patronage of the Federal government into conflict 
with the freedom of elections.' * * * This was the 
precept of President Jackson when first elected. But, 
incredible to tell, in the first term of his administration 
he hurled from oftice between nine hundred and one 
thousand ofiicers. * * * j^gt as well might General 
Jackson march the regular army to the doors of this 
capitol, and demand the head of every member or Sen- 
ator who has dared to speak the truth of him, as to 

he had written exhibited, Lord Xorth ventured to say that he thought 
the case presented no great cause of alarm. Instantly, and it would 
appear from all sides of the House, there arose such indignant clamors 
that it was some time before order could be restored, and Lord North 
was obliged to explain and qualify his meaning. But the most decisive 
pro:)f of the spirit which prevailed upon the subject, even in corrupt 
times, and the odium in which all intermeddling of officeholders in elec- 
tions has ever been held in Great Britain, is to be found in the follow- 
ing resolution, which the House of Commons adopted on that occasion 
(1779), without a division, and without a dissenting voice: 

" ' Resolved, That it is highly criminal for any minister or ministers, 
or any other servant of the Crown in Great Britain, directly or indi- 
rectly to make use of the power of his office in order to influence th$ 
election of members of Parliament ; and that an attempt to exercise 
that influence is an attack upon the dignity, the honor, and the inde- 
pendence of Parliament, an infringement of the rights and liberties of 
the people, and an attempt to sap the basis of our free and happy Con- 
stitution.' " 



MR. CURTIS FORMULATES CIVIL SERVICE RULES. 45 

wreak his vengeance, or that of some unprincipled sub- 
altern, upon the helpless officer, by hurling him from his 
station, for daring to discharge his constitutional right 
at the polls. Yes, a thousand limes better would it be 
for the country, for in the one case the people would 
see and understand the object of the movement, and 
would fly to the rescue, and deal out vengeance on such 
a blood-thirsty despot ; whilst in the other case the 
same object is attained by the concentration of all power 
in the hands of one man, but in a secret, sly, and insin- 
uating mode, which it seems the acuteness of the public 
vision has not yet so clearly discerned." 

George William Curtis lays down the following fun- 
damental principles for the general guidance of office- 
holders (^aiarper's Weekly," Nov. 19, 1887): "When 
a man accepts public office he necessarily surrenders the 
exercise of certain private rights as a citizen. He is 
morally bound to promote public respect for the office 
that he holds and personal confidence in himself. He is 
bound in every proper way to prevent all suspicion that 
he misuses his position either for a personal or a partisan 
object. He is indeed a member of a party, and by a 
party he is nominated and elected. But he administers 
his office not for the benefit of a party, but of the peo- 
ple ; and while upon fitting occasions and in a becoming 
manner he may justly profess his confidence in the po- 
litical principles that he holds, he cannot without gross 
impropriety descend to the mere details of party conten- 
tion, and endeavor by the weight of his official position 
to promote the interest of individual party candidates." 

As before said, too much care and interest cannot be 
taken in elections. The recognition of this fact no 
doubt accounts, to a great extent, for the wonderful 
stability of the English government, a stability that has 
carried it through war after war, civil as well as foreign, 



46 AKCIEKT ELECTION" LAWS. 

and even revolutions. The following extracts from the 
chief election laws passed by that government show the 
jealous care with Avhich it has guarded^ defended^ and 
perfected its elective franchise system. Every act was 
passed for the purpose of remedying dangerous evils. 

In 1275 (3 Edward I) it was provided: "And be- 
cause elections ought to be free, the King commandeth 
upon great forfeiture, that no man by force of arras, nor 
by malice or menacing, shall disturb any to make free 
elections." (The Statutes : Revised Edition, i, 16.) 

In 1429 (8 Henry VI, 7) Parliament passed the fol- 
lowing law : " Item, whereas the elections of knights of 
shires to come to the Parliaments of our Lord the King, 
in many counties of the realm of England, have now of 
late been made by very great, outrageous, and excessive 
number of people dwelling within the same counties of 
the realm of England, of the which most part w^as of 
people of small substance, and of no value, whereof 
every of them pretended a voice equivalent, as to such 
elections to be made, with the most worthy knights and 
esquires, dwelling within the same counties, ^vhereby 
manslaughters, riots, batteries, and divisions among the 
gentlemen, and other people of the same counties, shall 
very likely rise and be, unless convenient and due rem- 
edy be provided in this behalf ; our Lord the King^ 
considering the premises, hath provided, ordained, and 
establislied, by authority of this present Parliament, 
That the knights of the shires to be chosen within the 
same realm of England to come to the Parliaments of 
our Lord the King hereafter to be holden, shall be 
chosen in every county of the realm of England by peo- 
ple dwelling and resident in the same counties, whereof 
every one of them shall have free land or tenement to 
the value of 40 shillings by the year at the least above 
all charges ; and that they which shall be so chose shall 



PENALTY FOR FALSE ELECTIOK RETURKS. 47 

be dwelling and resident within the same counties; 
and such as have the greatest number of them that 
may expend 40 shillings by year and above, as afore is 
said, shall be returned by the sheriffs of every county, 
knights for the Parliament, by indentures sealed be- 
tween the said sheriffs and the said choosers so to be 
made/' * * ^ (Ruff head's Stat, at Large, i, 481.) 

In 1444 (23 Henry VI), owing to sheriffs returning 
'' knights, citizens, and burgesses * * * Avhich were 
never duly chosen," and other fraudulent practices, a 
stringent law was passed, which, among other things, 
imposed a fine of £100 to the King and £100 to the 
aggrieved person for false election returns. 

In 1690 (2 William and Mary, 7) Parliament passed 
" An act to declare the right and freedom of election of 
members to serve in Parliament for the Cinque Ports " 
as follows : " Whereas the election of members to serve 
in Parliament ought to be free ; and whereas the late 
Lord Wardens of the Cinque Ports have pretended 
unto, and claimed as of right, a power of nominating 
and recommending to each of the said Cinque Ports, 
the two ancient towns, and their respective members, 
one person whom they ought to elect to serve as a baron 
or member of Parliament for such respective port, an- 
cient town, or member, contrary to the ancient usage, 
right, and freedom of elections, * * * be it therefore 
declared * * * that all such nominations or recom- 
mendations were and are contrary to the laws and con- 
stitutions of this realm, and for the future shall be so 
deemed and construed." (Rnffhead, &c., iii, 422.) 

In 1696* (7 and 8 William III, 4) Parliament passed 

* T. B. Macaulay, writing of this period, s^ys (" History ofi England," 
iv, 549) ; " It was something new and monstrous to see a trader from 
Lombard street, who had no tie to the soil of our island, and whose 



48 MONEY IN ELECTIONS IN SIXTEEN NINETY-SIX. 

" An act for preventing charge and expense in elec- 
tions of members to serve in Parliament " as follows : 
" Whereas grievous complaints are made * * * of 
undue elections of members to Parliament, by excessive 
and exorbitant expenses, contrary to the laws, and * * 

* dishonorable, and may be destructive to the constitu- 
tion of Parliaments, * * * be it enacted * * * that 
no person or persons hereafter to be elected to serve in 
Parliament, * * * shall * * * directly or indirectly 
give, present, or allow to any person or persons, having 
voice or vote in such election, any money, meat, drink, 
entertainment, or provision * * * to or for such 
person or j^ersons * * * in order to be elected, or 
for being elected, to serve in Parliament. * * hj 
And * * * that every person and persons so giving 

* * * are hereby declared and enacted disabled and 
incapacitated, upon such election, to serve in Parlia- 
ment." (Ruffhead, iii, 570.) 

During the same year Parliament passed " An act for 
the further reo^ulatinor elections of members to serve in 
Parliament, and for the preventing irregular proceed- 
ings of sheriffs and other officers in the electing and 
returning such members." The preamble charges that 
*' freeholders and others, in their right of election, as 
also the persons by them elected to be their representa- 

wealth was entirely personal and movable, post down to Devonshire or 
Sussex with a portmanteau full of guineas, offer himself as a candidate 
for a borough in opposition to a neighbormg gentleman, whose ances- 
tors had been regularly returned ever since the Wars of the Roses, and 
come in at the head of the poll. Yet even this was not the worst. 
More than one seat in Parliament, it was said, had been bought and 
sold over a dish of coffee at Garra way's. The purchaser had not been 
required even to go through the form of showing himself to the elec- 
tors. Without leaving his counting house in Cheapside, he had been 
chosen to represent a place which he had never seen. Such things 
were intolerable." 



HEAVY PENALTY FOR CORRUPT VOTING. 49 

lives, have heretofore been greatly injured and abused." 
(iii, 589.) 

In 1729 (2 George II, 24) Parliament passed "An act 
for the more effectual preventing briberj^ and corrup- 
tion in the elections of members to serve in Parliament." 
The elector's oath is as follows : " I, A. B., do swear 

* * * I have not received, * * * directly or 
indirectly, any sum or sums of money, office, place, or 
employment, gift or reward * * * in order to give 
my vote at this election, and that I have not been 
before polled at this election." The presiding officer 
had to administer the oath or forfeit £50, and a bribed 
voter forfeited £500, and was forever disfranchised and 
treated as if he " was naturally dead." (v, 510.) 

In 1734 (7 George II, 16) a stringent act was passed 
'• for the better regulating the election of members to 
serve in the House of Commons for that part of Great 
Britain called Scotland ; and for incapacitating the 
judges of the Court of Session, Court of Justiciary, and 
barons of the Court of Exchequer, in Scotland, to be 
elected or to sit or vote as members of the House of 
Commons." (v, 651.) 

" An act for regulating the quartering of soldiers 
during the time of the elections of members to serve in 
Parliament," passed in 1735, required that, inasmuch as 
^^ all elections ought to be free," all soldiers should be 
removed two miles from the place of election, (v, 681.) 

By " An act for the better regulating of elections," 
&c., passed in 1746 (19 George II, 28), voters are re- 
quired to swear that they have '' a freehold estate * * 

* of the clear yearly value of forty shillings, * * * 
and that such freehold estate has not been granted or 
made to you fraudulently, on purpose to qualify you to 
give your vote." (vi, 312.) 

In 1782 (22 George III, 41) Parliament passed "An 



50 FORTY THOUSAND VOTERS DISFRANCHISED. 

act for the better securing the freedom of elections," 
&c., which disfranchised excise, customs, and postoffice 
employes to the number of about 40,000. A violation 
of the law entailed forfeiture of office and a fine of 
£100. (ix, 230.) 

The passage of this act was the result of corruption 
among the officials named. It remained in force till 
1858, when, on account of the reforms brought about 
by the present British civil service law, an act of re- 
enfranchisement was passed. It is a consolation to 
know that this course has never been necessary in this 
country. 

In 1827 (7 and 8 George IV, 37) Parliament passed 
^' An act to make further regulations for preventing 
corrupt practices at elections," &c., wherein it is de- 
clared that *'if any person shall, either during any 
election, * * * or within six calendar months previ- 
ous to such election, or within fourteen days after it 
shall have been completed, be employed at such election 
as counsel, agent, attorney, poll clerk, flagman, or in 
any other capacity, for the purposes of such election, 
and shall at any time, either before, during, or after 
such election, accept or take, * * * for or in consid- 
eration of or with reference to such employment, any 
sum or sums of money, retaining fee, office, place, or 
employment, * * * such person shall be deemed in- 
capable of voting at such election, and his vote, if given, 
shall be utterly void and of none effect." (xi, 126.) 

The present English election law, passed in 1872, 
which is founded on the Australian election system, is 
perhaps the best law of its kind ever devised. William 
M. Ivins says {'' Machine Politics and Money in Elec- 
tions in New York City," pp. 90, 91, 94, 95, 96) : ''This 
act provides that at every poll at an election the vote 
shall be given by ballot ; that the ballot of each voter 



THE MODEL ELECTION LAW. 51 

shall contain the names and description of all the candi- 
dates for the particular office for which he is voting, 
which ballot-paper has a number printed on the back of 
it, and is attached to a stub, or ' counter foil,' as it is 
called, with the same number printed on the face of the 
stub. * * * All voters are registered before each 
election, and when the voter has registered, he is given 
a registration number. This registration number is 
marked on the stub of the ballot at the time the ballot 
is delivered to him. * * * 

" The following is the form of directions for the guid- 
ance of the voter in voting, which is required by the 
English law to be printed in conspicuous characters and 
placarded in every polling-station and in every compart- 
ment of every polling-station : 

" ' The voter may vote for candidates. The 

voter will go into one of the compartments, and with a 
pencil provided in the compartment, place a cross on 
the right-hand side opposite the name of each candidate 
for whom he votes. The voter will then fold up the 
ballot-paper, so as to show the official mark on the back, 
and leaving the compartment, will, without showing the 
front of the paper to any person, show the official mark* 
on the back to the presiding officer, and then, in the 
presence of the presiding officer, put the paper into the 
ballot-box, and forthwith quit the polling station. If 
the voter inadvertently spoils a ballot paper, he can 
return it to the officer, who will, if satisfied of such 
inadvertence, give him another paper. 

" ' If the voter votes for more than candidates, 

or places any mark on the paper by which he may be 
afterward identified, his ballot-paper will be void and 
will not be counted. 

* Election officers are required to keep the official mark secret, and a 
ballot cast without it is void. 



52 DK. SATTEKLEE'S PLAIIN", TRUTHFUL WOEDS. 

'^ ' If the voter takes a ballot-paper out of the polling- 
station^ or deposits in the ballot-box any other paper 
than the one given him by the officer^ he will be guilty 
of a misdemeanor, and be subject to imprisonment for 
any term, with or without hard labor/ ^^ 

Notwithstanding this admirable law, the elections, on account of the 
immense and corrupt use of money, often miscarried. A remedy was 
sought, and it was found in the Prevention of Corrupt Practices Act of 
1883-84, an act (originated by Sir Henry James) that limits the sum of 
money that may be used for election purposes by a candidate or his 
agent ; defines bribery, treating, and undue influence ; forbids the use 
of hquor saloons for committee-room purposes, &c. The act had almost 
phenomenal results. In 1880, with about 3,000,000 voters in 419 con- 
stituencies, the election expenses exceeded £3.000,000. In 1886, with 
an increased vote, they were only £624.086. In 1880 there were 95 
charges of corruption ; in 1885 there w^ere only 2 ; in 1886 only 1. 

The principles of the two preceding laws should be adapted to all 
American elections. What has been done in Australia and England 
can and must be done in America. It is fortunate for the nation that 
we can profit by Eno^land's 600 years of experience in battling for pure 
elections. Pure elections are the pillars of liberty ! * 

* Every man has a right to barter or sell or exchange a commodity 
that belongs to him ; but no man has a right to barter or exchange or 
sell a trust. If a vote is a trust, then it demands positive as well as 
negative action, for a trustee is responsible not only for what he has 
done but for what he has left undone. If a country appeals to her best 
citizens for assistance in maintaining good government, then it is the 
duty of those citizens to respond to that appeal before all other duties. 
* * * Viewed in the light not only of Christian morality, but of that 
common code of honor which governs the business of the civihzed 
world, the buj-ing of the votes of others, or the selling of one's own, or 
condoning or making hght of, or taking any part however indirect, in 
such transactions, is the kind of fraud which places the participator on 
a level with the lowest criminals in the land. Xo traitor to his country 
is so dangerous in his treason, for he teaches men to betray the holiest 
trust that their country has committed to them. Xo greater enemy to 
the community exists. — Rev. Dr. Henry Y. Satterlee. 

It is the duty of every American to take an active personal interest 
in the welfare of his country. State, and city, and to see that the best 
citizens are elected to offices of honor and trust. — Cardinal Gibbons. 



CHAPTEE IV. 

THE patko:n'age a:n'd merit systems compared. 

The superiority of the Merit Sj^stem shown by various Contrasts. — Pic- 
ture of an extraordinary Officeseeking Drama (page 58). — How the 
President and Congressmen are harassed by Officeseekers. 

Sec. 1754 of the U. S. Eevised Statutes gives pref- 
erence of appointment to office to only such properly 
qualified soldiers and sailors as have been discharged on 
account of *^^ wounds or sickness incurred in the line of 
duty/^ The national civil service law rules are more 
favorable to the veterans than this^ while the laws of 
New York and Massachusetts* give preference to all 
honorably discharged and properly qualified veterans. 

Under the patronage system ^partisanship and inter- 
ference at elections w^ere the surest means of retaining 
an office. Under the merit system they are the surest 
means of losing it. 

Under the patronage system officeholders were al- 
most invariably appointed with regard to politics, and 
usually had to vote with their party or lose their offices. 
Under the merit system they are appointed without 
regard to politics, and can vote as they choose. 

Under the patronage system officeholders, as a rule, 
cannot command that degree of public respect and con- 

* The Massachusetts Civil Service Commissioners say (Third Annual 
Report, p. 22): "The veterans have triumphed by being able to show 
that they possess qualifications equal to or higher than their competit- 
ors. It has been a triumph in a fair field, with no favor, except that 
of preference in case of equality." This speaks well for the Massachu- 
setts soldiers who were educated over a quarter of a century ago. 



54 LOSS OF TIME UNDER PATRONAGE SYSTEM. 

fidence that k essential to good government.* As the 
mode of obtaining office under the merit system is the 
reverse of that of the patronage system, officeholders 
appointed in accordance with its provisions ought to 
command both the respect and confidence of the people. 
They can have self-respect at least ; and self-respect 
begets self-confidence as well as the respect and con- 
fidence of others. 

Under the patronage system nearly all the chief of- 
ficials of the government, outside of as well as in Wash- 
ington, were forced to devote a large part of their time 
to the selection of subordinate officials, of whose qualifi- 
cations, either theoretical or practical, they knew liltle 
or nothing. The merit system has not only stopped 
this waste of valuable time, but it is supplying the pub- 
lic service with officials of proved ability and fitness. 

Under the patronage system an officeholder whose 
tenure depended on the mere caprice of an official supe- 
rior, or perhaps a Ward or some other kind of politician, 
was little better than a slave. Besides, under such cir- 
cumstances, he was constantly tempted to do wrong. 
Under the merit system the conditions of tenure are 
precisely the reverse, and are therefore conducive not 
only of a feeling of freedom, but of self-respect and 
manly independence. 

Again, under the patronage system chief as well as 
subordinate public officials were assessed to raise money 
for partisan purposes, and as a natural consequence the}'- 

* A few years ago the Rev. Dr. Crosby said a person would as soon 
think of admitting tlie small-pox into his house as some New York City 
politicians. The only thing that can be said in extenuation of their of- 
fenses is that the}" are the victims of a corrupt system of politics, and 
that is saying a great deal. We should tight corrupt sj'stems ; not the 
victims of them. Like the physician, we should tight the disease ; not 
the individual afflicted with it. 



INTELLIGENT VERSUS IGNORANT OFFICEHOLDERS. 55 

were sometimes tempted to do wrong in order to reim- 
burse themselves. Under the merit system assessments 
for partisan purposes are not allowed. 

Under the patronage system many honorable and 
meritorious persons were deterred from even attempting 
to enter the public service, because, as a rule, only poli- 
ticians, or the subservient henchmen of politicians, ap- 
plied for office. Under the merit system the rule is 
practically the reverse of this. 

Under the patronage system many of the subordinate 
public officials were incompetent. Under the merit sys- 
ton applicants have to pass a competitive examination, 
and then prove their competency by trial by probation 
before appointment. Therefore all, or practically all, 
are competent. 

Under the patronage system some officeholders did 
not know even the rudiments of the business of the 
offices they held. Some years ago a newspaper corre- 
spondent called at a public office in Washington to get 
some official information. The officeholder whom he 
chanced to meet could not give him a word of the infor- 
mation he desired, but he could and did, so the corre- 
spondent said, tell him precisely how the election was 
going in Ohio the next fall ! Under the merit system 
the case ought to be about the reverse. 

Under the patronage system officeholders whose ten- 
ures depended on the success of their own political party 
naturally favored members of it in preference to mem- 
bers of an opposite party, especially about election time. 
Favoritism is a form of injustice that cannot be wholly 
eradicated. It is an inherent if not necessary fault of 
humanity. A law may restrain a man, but it cannot 
change his nature. Yet in this case the merit system 
will have a beneficial effect at least, for there is one 
reason less for showing favoritism. 



56 THE DANGER OF SWEEPING REMOVALS. 

Under the patronage system the public service was 
injured by sweeping removals from office. Under the 
merit system no sweeping removals are made. The 
injury caused by sweeping removals is of course in 
proportion to the number of offices. As these are con- 
stantly multiplying, the injury, under the patronage 
system, would in the course of time not only be serious, 
but in case of the success of a party with corrupt lead- 
ers, it would sooner or later become a source of absolute 
danger. Under the merit system, with solid, tranquil, 
educated men guarding the thousands of minor but im- 
portant offices, whose tenures depend solely on efficiency 
and fidelity, the country is comparatively safe, with or 
without the President. Further, even if the President 
should remove every chief official in the service, the 
public business would not be much injured, for the sub- 
ordinate officials, owing to security of tenure, can trans- 
act all ordinary business as well during as before or 
after the change of the chief official. 

In 1883 Governor Cleveland sent the name of ex-State 
Senator William H. Murtha of Brooklyn to the Senate 
of New York for confirmation as Emigration Commis- 
sioner. But as Mr. Murtha would not pi-omise patron- 
age in advance, the Senate refused to confirm him. 
Under the merit system this disgraceful action of the 
Senate would not occur, for under it there is no patron- 
age to either promise or bestow. The execution of the 
then new law which was designed to correct abuses at 
Castle Garden, depended on Mr. Murtha's confirmation. 
Therefore a few minutes before the final adjournment 
of the Senate, Governor Cleveland sent a special mes- 
sage to that body urging Mr. Murtha's confirmation, in 
the course of which he said of the then management at 
Castle Garden : " The present management of this very 
important department is a scandal and a reproach to 



GREAT COST OF REVENUE COLLECTIONS. 57 

civilization. Bare-faced robbery has been committed, 
and the poor immigrant who looks to the Institution for 
protection finds that his helplessness and forlorn condi- 
tion afford but a readily seized opportunity for imposi- 
tion and swindling." And yet the Senate of the great 
State of ^'ew York was so debauched by the vicious 
patronage system that it refused to confirm the man 
who would have stopped this imposition and swindling ! 

In 1877 the Jay Commission,* among other things, 
reported to President Hayes that the expense of collect- 
ing customs revenue in the United States was more 
than three times as large as in France, more than four 
times as large as in Germany, and nearly five times as 
large as in Great Britain. The revenue collections in 
this country were then made under the patronage sys- 
tem, while those of the foreign countries named were 
made under the merit system. Again, the Commission 
said, on the authority of the New York Chamber of 
Commerce, that in 1874 it cost the United States about 
$7,000,000 to collect the duties on imports of the value 
of $642,000,000, while in the same year it cost Great 
Britain only $5,000,000 to collect the duties on imports 
valued at $1,800,000,000 ! 

Under the patronage system it was frequently difficult 
to remove incompetent and unworihy officials because 
of the ** influence " of the politicians who vouched for 
them. " The same vicious, extraneous influence," says 
Mr. D. B. Eaton, " which puts them in office, keeps 
them there." Under the merit system the}' can be 

* The Commission was composed of John Jay and Lawrence Tiirnure 
of Xew York and J. H. Robinson of the Department of Justice at Wash- 
ington. Mr. Jay has since served as a Xew York State Civil Service 
Commissioner from 1883 till the fall of 1887, when he and his equally 
faithful colleague, Henry A. Richmond, were removed without fault of 
theirs, Mr. Augustus Schoonmaker having resigned in June, 1887. 



58 DUPLICITY CAUSED BY PATRONAGE SYSTEM. 

readily removed, because there is no power behind the 
throne to protect them. * 

Under the patronage system the President was now 
and then greatly embarrassed on account of some Con- 
gressmen reporting on some applications for office both 
favorably and unfavorably. (Jnder the merit system 
Congressmen are not allowed to sign recommendations 
for office, except as to an applicant's character and resi- 
dence. J. D. Cox says {" North American Review," 
1871, p. 84) : "It is no uncommon thing for one who 
has written a high eulogium on the character and ac- 
quirements of a place-hunter, to write a private note 
begging that Ids formal indorsonent may not be re- 
garded as of any w^eight, or to seek a private interview, 
in which he will state that the person is quite the re- 
verse of the picture drawn of him in the testimonial 
filed." Sometimes, says Mr. Cox, the President and his 
Secretaries are confronted by both the officeseeker and 
his sponsor, while in the drawer of the table at which 
they sit, listening to the latter's mock praises, is the be- 
fore mentioned private note contradicting every word 
uttered. It is not strange that Mr. Cox should say that 
Congressmen in those days (1869-70) often apologized 
for their importunity, nor that an effort was made to 
stop the disgraceful practice. Senator Lyman Trumbull 
introduced a bill in 1869 making it a misdemeanor for 

* The Chairman : The common question among employes is, " Who is 
your influence ? " 

Mr. Graves : That is a standard phrase in the Department, " Who is 
your influence ? " Where persons have very strong influence, they are 
apt, if any difficulty occurs in the Department, to threaten to go and get 
their " influence " and have the matter set right. Manliness and inde- 
pendence are destroyed by such a system. (Senate Report Xo. 576, for 
1882, p. 132.) 

Mr. Edward 0. Graves at the time (1882) had had eighteen years' ex- 
perience in the Treasury Department at Washington. 



THE WHITE HOUSE BESIEGED. 59 

Congressmen to directly or indirectly recommend men 
for office, " except such recommendation be in writing, 
in response to a written request from the President or 
head of a Department asking information, or a Senator 
giving his advice and consent in the manner provided 
by the Constitution." 

The unanimous report of the Senate Committee on 
Civil Service and Retrenchment,* made on May 15, 
1882, by Senator Hawley, both corroborates and supple- 
ments Mr. Cox's statements. The following extracts 
speak for themselves (Senate Report No. 576, for 1882, 
pp. 2, 3) : " It has come to pass that the work of paying 
political debts and discharging political obligations, of 
rewarding personal friends and punishing personal foes, 
is the first to confront each President on assuming the 
duties of his office. * * * Instead of the study of 
great questions of statesmanship, of broad and compre- 
hensive administrative policy, either as it may concern 
this particular country at home, or the relations of this 
great nation to the other nations of the earth, he must 
devote himself to the petty business of weighing in the 
balance the political considerations that shall determine 
the claim of this friend or that political supporter to the 
possession of some office of profit or honor under him. 
* * * The executive mansion is besieged, if not 
sacked, and its corridors and chambers are crowded 
each day with the ever -changing but never-ending 
throng. Every Chief Magistrate, since the evil has 
grown to its present proportions, has cried out for de- 

* The Committee was composed of members of both parties as fol- 
lows : Joseph R. Hawley of Connecticut, Chairman ; George H. Pendle- 
ton of Ohio, Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts, John I. Mitchell of 
Pennsylvania, M. C. Butler of South Carolina, James D. Walker of 
Arkansas, John S. Williams of Kentucky, Edward H. Rollins of New 
Hampshire, and John P. Jones of Nevada. 



60 CONGRESSMEN HAUNTED NIGHT AND DAY. 

liverance. Physical endurance even is taxed beyond its 
power. More than one President is believed to have 
lost his life from this cause. * * * 

" The malign influence of political domination in ap- 
pointments to office is wide-spread, and reaches out from 
the President himself to all possible means of approach 
to the appointing power. It poisons the very air we 
breathe. No Congressman in accord with the dispenser 
of power can wholly escape it. It is ever present. 
When he awakes in the morning it is at his door, and 
w^hen he retires at night it haunts his chamber. It goes 
before him, it follows after him, and it meets him on 
the way. It levies contributions on all the relationships 
of a Congressman's life, summons kinship and friend- 
ship and interest to its aid, and imposes upon him a 
work w^hich is never finished, and from which there is 
no release. Time is consumed, strength is exhausted, 
the mind is absorbed, and the vital forces of the legisla- 
tor, mental as well as physical, are spent in the never- 
ending struggle for offices." 

Representative John J. Kleiner of Indiana declined a 
renomination for Congress in 1886 because of the an- 
noyance of officeseekers. As reported by many daily 
newspapers, he said : " It is no wonder to me that the 
House was charged with inefficiency last session. The 
Democratic members were kept so constantly engaged 
in looking after places for constituents that they had 
not time to give legislative subjects consideration. I 
know that I found it impossible to keep the run of cur- 
rent business. The greatest reform we could bring 
about would be to free Senators and Representatives of 
all responsibility as to the distribution of offices." 

Note. — The above extracts from the Senate Committee's report ap- 
peared originally in a speech of Senator Dawes. (See Congressional 
Eecord, Jan. 24, 1882, p. 1082. Also for his civil service bill.) 



CHAPTER V. 

THE DANGER OF A]S" OFFICEHOLDERS^ ARISTOCRACY. 

The importance of the Subject. — The Cause of and Remedy for Aristoc- 
racies. — Xo danger in Life Tenures when based on Merit. — George 
Wilham Curtis's opinion of them. — Insolence of Office. 

It is feared by some that the civil service law system 
will create an officeholders' aristocracy. This is a mat- 
ter of importance, and is not to be pooh poohed, not- 
withstanding the fact that the same system has not only 
checked the English aristocracy's long monopoly of 
public office, but has, as before said, so purified the 
English civil service as to cause the annullment of the 
act of 1782, an act that disfranchised 40,000 customs, 
postoffice, and other officials for corrupt practices at 
elections. But the fear, it may as well be said first as 
last, so far as officeholders who draw low salaries are 
concerned, is certainly unfounded, notwithstanding of- 
ficeholders are human, and are therefore liable to err. 
The idea of an aristocracy of public inspectors, account- 
ants, weighers, clerks, &c., in this country, is almost 
ridiculous. It is as improbable perhaps as an aristoc- 
racy among soldiers, sailors, or private employes. Mr. 
E. L. Godkin says (" The Danger of an Officeholding 
Aristocracy," p. 13) : "There is no country in which it 
would be so hard for an aristocracy of any kind to be 
built up as this, and probably no class seeking to make 
itself an aristocracy would, in the United States, have a 
smaller chance of success than a body composed of un- 



62 THE REAL AND THE APPARENT ARISTOCRAT. 

ambitious, quiet-minded, unadventurous government of- 
ficers, doing routine work on small salaries, and with 
but little chance or desire of ever passing from the em- 
ployed into the employing class. One might nearly as 
well try to make an aristocracy out of the college pro- 
fessors or public school teachers." Mr. T. A. Jenckes 
says ("Congressional Globe," 3 869, p. 521) : "There is 
not enough in this aristocratical notion to bring out of 
it a new farce of ' High Life below Stairs.' It runs 
itself into the ground without comicality." 

But the question, as before said, is a matter of impor- 
tance, for, as Mr. Godkin says, " Nothing is more diffi- 
cult to eradicate than the remembrance of insulting 
treatment at the hands of an aristocracy of any kind." 
It has therefore a serious as well as a semi-comic aspect. 
The law may sooner or later be applied to officeholders 
who draw high salaries. This would put a different 
face on the matter, for high salaries certainly have 
a tendency to create aristocracies. Aristocracies may 
have their uses in some countries, but we certainly have 
no use for them in this country. They are stern reali- 
ties They are as undemocratic as they are undesirable. 
They are antagonistic to American ideas and institu- 
tions. Therefore it is our duty to study the causes of 
aristocracies, in order that we may guard against them* 
Bat we must learn to discriminate between the real and 
the apparent aristocrat. For example, learned men are 
often denounced as aristocrats because they do not asso- 
ciate with the unlearned. This is a mistake, for it is 
as natural for learned men to associate together as it 
is for the unlearned to do so. Learned men are often 
eminently democratic, as indeed are many rich men. It 
is the driving and selfish capitalist that is mostly to be 
feared. The idle and selfish capitalist is also bad, but 
is of course not so dano-erous. 



THE CAUSE OF ARISTOCRACIES. 63 

What is the real cause of aristocracies ? Aristocra- 
cies are caused by great and broad distinctions between 
people. There are many causes for the distinctions be- 
tween people, but the chief cause is the possession by 
some people of more money and property and conse- 
quently greater power than others. What but money 
causes the aristocracies of monarchical Europe? And 
what but money has planted a pale, sickly, mushroom- 
like variety of aristocracy in the uncongenial soil of 
republican America?* 

* John W. Draper says (" History of the Intellectual Development of 
Europe," i, 252, 253) : " An evil day is approaching when it becomes 
recognized in a community that the only standard of social distinction 
is wealth. That day was soon followed in Rome by its unavoidable 
consequence, a government founded upon two domestic elements, cor- 
ruption and terrorism. No language can describe the state of that cap- 
ital after the civil wars. The accumulation of power and wealth gave 
rise to a universal depravity. Law ceased to be of any value. A suitor 
must deposit a bribe before a trial could be had. The social fabric was 
a festering mass of rottenness. The people had become a populace ; 
the aristocracy was demoniac ; the city was a hell. No crime that the 
annals of human wickedness can show was left unperpetrated — re- 
morseless murders ; the betrayal of parents, husbands, wives, friends ; 
poisoning reduced to a system ; adultery degenerating into incests, and 
crimes that cannot be written. Women of the higher class were so 
lascivious, depraved, and dangerous that men could not be compelled 
to contract matrimony with them ; marriage was displaced by concu- 
binage; even virgins were guilty of inconceivable immodesties; great 
officers of state and ladies of the court, of promiscuous bathings and 
naked exhibitions. In the time of CaBsar it had become necessary for 
the government to interfere, and actually put a premium on marriage. 
* * * They (the women) actually reckoned the years, not by the 
consuls, but by the men they had lived with. To be childless, and 
therefore without the natural restraint of a family, was looked upon 
as a singular felicity. Plutarch correctly touched the point when he 
said that the Romans married to be heirs and not to have heirs. Of 
offenses that do not rise to the dignity of atrocity, but which excite our 
loathing, such as gluttony and the most debauched luxury, the annals 



64 THE WANING ENGLISH ARISTOCKXCY 

These propositions being admitted, then it follows 
that if ever we have an officeholders' aristocracy in this 
country, it will be caused chiefly by money. Therefore 
the subject of officeholders' salaries should receive care- 
ful attention. 

There is too much difference in officeholders' salaries. 
Some are too high and some are too low. * Of course 
all cannot be put on an exact equality, for, among other 
things, an officeholder's expenses must be taken into ac- 

of the times furnish disgusting proofs. It was said, ' They eat that 
they may vomit, and vomit that they may eat.' " 

Professor Draper quotes from Tacitus to prove that his statements 
are not exaggerated. The times described are before, during, and after 
the reign of Juhus Caesar. 

It is related of Caesar that on receiving a letter one day in the Senate 
a fellow-Senator accused him of receiving communications from the en- 
emy. Caesar passed the document over to the Senator. It was a lewd 
letter from the Senator's own sister, and was flung back with the re- 
mark, "" Take it, you sot ! " 

Mr. A. J. Mundella, a member of Parliament,' in a lecture, in 1870, 
said : '' Until long after the passing of the first reform bill, offices 
were the reward of political services, and very frequently of political 
dishonor. * * * i|Ir. Bright characterized our civil and military 
services as a system of out-door relief for the aristocracy." 

This is not complimentary to the English aristocracy ; nor is it en- 
couraging to would-be imitators of it here or elsewhere. It proves, if 
it proves anything, that while money may create an aristocracy, it can- 
not teach it how to use it. The words " political dishonor " may speak 
for themselves ; but they are no more applicable to an aristocracy than 
to any other class of people who are cursed by the patronage system. 
According to James Russell Lowell, the famous speeches of the Prince 
of Wales are written for him by another man ! (See '' Xew York 
World," October 24, 1886, p. 9.) 

Note. — Learning that Mr. Lowell was greatly displeased 'with the 
u World's " article, I wrote to him and asked if the above statement 
was true. I did not receive a reply from him. Therefore I take it 
for granted that Mr. Julian Hawthorne reported Mr. Lowell's words 
correctly. 

*rranklin deprecated high salaries (v, 147) ; Webster also (iv, 183). 



THE EVIL OF HIGH AND LOW SALARIES. 65 

count. But it is wrong to give one man from. $10,000 to 
$50,000 a year, and another, in his way equally capable, 
reliable, and meritorious, only $500. No man with a fam- 
ily can live comfortably in this country on $500 a year. 
The claim sometimes made that competent men cannot 
be induced to accept office unless the salary is high, is 
usually not true. There are plenty of competent men 
who would be glad to fill some offices for a third of 
the present salary, and they could live comfortably and 
honestly too. No officeholder should receive greater 
compensation than the average sum paid for similar ser- 
vices, where there are such, in private business, and he 
should be held to as strict an accountability as to service 
as is the private employe.* It is a high salary and little 
work that make the aristocrat. Extremely high salaries 
are conducive of extravagance, a feeling of superiority,! 
and sometimes of the assumption of unwarrantable priv- 
ileges. Extremely low salaries are conducive chiefly of 
want and a feeling of inferiority. It is bad for the pub- 
lic service when some officials, because of high salaries, 
feel that they are autocrats instead of servants ; but it 

* Erastus Brooks, the veteran editor, who believed " in competitive 
test and standards of the persons appointed to all responsible places," 
writing on October 22, 1883, says (First Report New York State C. S. 
Com., p. 268): "Men in public service should receive no more favors, 
and no better pay, and serve neither more nor less time daring the day 
or year, than is required of qualified and responsible men in the highest 
or comparative grades in commercial, mechanical, and general business 
life." 

f Nothing has so much to do with a man's manners as the manners 
of the society in which he lives. * * * xhe English or German 
official gives himself airs and thinks himself an aristocrat because, as a 
matter of fact, his official superiors are aristocrats, and the government 
is administered in all the higher branches by an aristocracy. -5^ * * 
In any country in which politics is largely managed by an aristocracy, 
the aristocratic view of life is sure to permeate the civil as well as the 
military service, be the terms long or short. — E. L. Godkin. 



66 MERIT LIFE TENURES DEMOCRATIC. 

is worse when others, because of low salaries, feel that 
they are menials, and are sometimes tempted to act dis- 
honestly. 

The way to remedy as well as to prevent an aristoc- 
racy is to remove its cause. Therefore the way to pre- 
vent an officeholders' aristocracy is to pay no extremely 
high or extremely low salaries. There is probably no 
immediate danger, but the principle is none the less 
sound, for aristocracies will disappear exactly in propor- 
tion as the distinctions between people disappear. An 
equitable readjustment of salaries is what is wanted.* 

The fear of an officeholders' aristocracy seems to be 
based chiefly on the life tenures of office that may occur 
under the civil service law system. But the fear, so far 
as life tenures, as such, are concerned, is certainly un- 
founded. Do not life tenures occur under all systems 
and in all governments? But, unless the officeholder is 
eminently qualified to fill his office, is it not seldom that 
they occur in this government? Therefore life tenures, 
when they are solely the reward of merit, are, on the 
whole, democratic instead of aristocratic. Such life 
tenures as these strengthen the government ; and any- 
thing that strengthens republican government is demo- 
cratic. 

But life tenures, even under the civil service law 
system, will probably be the exception rather than the 

* On Jaimarv 24, 1817, on mr)tion of Representative Samuel MeKee 
of Kentucky, tlie following resolution was passed by the national House 
of Representatives : 

Resolved, That the said Committee be instructed to inquire into the 
expediency of equalizing the pay and emoluments of the officers and 
persons employed in the civil, military, and naval departments of the 
government." 

The New York State Civil Service Commission recognizes the need of 
" a judicious readjustment of salaries." (First Report, ISS-i, p. 4.) 



WHY LIFE TENURES WILL BE RAKE. 67 

rule. Changes will occur. The characteristic ambition 
of Americans to better their condition in life will alone 
cause manv resig^nations. Some will resio^n because a 
few years of experience in many public offices qualifies 
an intelligent and ambitious man to discharge the duties 
of better paying stations in private life;* some will 
save their money and resign in order to establish them- 
selves in private business ; some will resign from sheer 
dislike of public life ; some from other causes, and 
some will doubtless be removed. 

George William Curtis says {" Civil Service Reform 
League Proceedings," 1884, pp. 11, 12): "The objec- 
tion which is expressed in the cry of ' life tenure ' and 
* a privileged class ' is one of the most ancient and 
familiar appeals of the spoils system to ignorance and 
prejudice. Whenever it has been proposed to recur to 
the constitutional principle and the early practice by 
treating the public clerk as the private clerk is treated, 
by ordaining that the public business shall be trans- 
acted upon business principles, and that filching politi- 
cians shall be forbidden to turn the public service to 
their private profit, we are told that a life tenure and a 
privileged class are odious and un-American, as if any- 
thing were so odious as a system tending to destroy the 
self-respect of public officers, or anything so really un- 
American as turning out an honest, efficient, and experi- 
enced agent because somebody else wants his place. 
There can indeed be no life tenure in an offensive sense 
so long as the power of removal is unchecked except by 
a sole consideration for justice and the public service ; 
and the retention of a faithful, capable, and tried public 
servant confers no privilege which every such servant 
of every great corporation and of every great or small 

* A fact practically the same as the above is shown in Chapter II, 
page 30. 



68 THE KIND OF COAL-HEAVEES WANTED. 

business house, and of every well-ordered department 
of human industry, does not already enjoy. Of all the 
familiar tricks of the American demagogue none is 
more amusingly contemptible than the effort to show 
that a system which tends to promote a degrading loss 
of self-respect and a cringing dependence upon personal 
favor is peculiarly a manly and American system. It 
is a cry raised most vociferously by those who most 
despise and distrust the people, and as the sure and 
steady progress of reform plainly shows, it no more 
deceives and alarms an intelligent public opinion than 
the ridiculous assertion that civil service reform is a 
system which requires that a man shall pass a satisfac- 
tory examination in astronomy and the higher mathe- 
matics in order to be eligible to appointment as a night- 
watchman in the Custom House.* In the familiar story 

* On page 16 Mr. Curtis says: "The essential point is not to find 
coal-heavers who can scan Virgil correctly, but coal-heavers who, being 
properly qualified for heaving coal, are their own masters and not the 
tools of politicians." 

Mr. Curtis closes his address for 1885 in this lofty, hopeful, and pa- 
triotic strain : " Gentlemen, the stars in their courses fought against 
Sisera. But they fight for us. The desire of good government, of 
honest politics, of parties which shall be legitimate agencies of great 
policies ; all the high instincts of good citizenship ; all the lofty im- 
pulses of American patriotism, are the ' sweet influences ' that favor 
reform. Every patriotic American has already seen their power, 

" ' And by the vision splendid 
Is on liis way attended.' 

*' Sir Philip Sidney wrote to his brother upon his travels, * Whenever 
you hear of a good war, go to it.' That is the call which we have heard 
and obeyed. And a good war it has been, and is. Everywhere indeed 
there are signs of an alert and adroit hostility. They are the shots of 
outposts that foretell the battle. But everywhere also there are signs 
of the advance of the whole line, the inspiring harbingers of victory. 
Never was the prospect fairer. If the shadows still linger, the dawn is 
deepening, — the dawn that announces our sun of Austerlitz." 



ENGLISH VIEW VERSUS AMERICAN VIEW. 69 

the young lawyer was reminded by the judge that the 
court might be supposed to know some law. The 
American demagogue is incessantly taught by the ex- 
perience of this country that the American people may 
be supposed to have some common-sense." 

Mr. Curtis again says (C. S. R. L. Proceedings, 1885, 
p. 22) : " So long as the power of removal remains free, 
and while it is committed to agents appointed by of- 
ficers whom the people elect, a life tenure in any un- 
American or undesirable sense is impossible." 

The power of removal, for cause — and even without 
cause, if the chief officer is willing to take the risk of 
abusing his power — is as free under the civil service law 
system as it is in private business. 

The view taken by the aristocracy of England, in 
1855, of the probable effect of the British civil service 
law was the opposite of that taken now by some Ameri- 
cans as to the probable effect of the American civil ser- 
vice law. The following extract from the Third An- 
nual Report of the United States Civil Service Com- 
mission (p. 31) speaks for itself: "The aristocratic 
classes, with many honorable exceptions, opposed the 
introduction of the merit system on the same ground 
that they opposed popular education at the public ex- 
pense ; that is, that both would weaken their means of 
controlling the government, at the same time that they 
would give greater opportunities and influence to the 
sons and daughters of the common people. 

"In a volume of official papers issued by the British 
government, in 1855, when the subject of introducing 
examinations was under consideration, it is declared 
that ^ The encouragement given to education would no 
doubt be great, but it will all be in favor of the lov^er 
classes of society and not of the higher. * * * ^p. 
pointments now conferred on young men of aristocratic 



70 REMEDY FOR HABITUAL INSOLEXCE OF OFFICE. 

connection will fall into the hands of a much lower 
grade in society. * * * Such a measure will exercise 
the happiest influence on the education of the lower 
classes throughout England, acting by the surest of all 
motives, the desire a man has of bettering himself in 
life.' The volume shows that the examinations were 
opposed by the privileged classes because they foresaw 
that such would be the effects." 

It is an interesting question whether the civil service 
law system will or will not cause an increase in what 
Shakespeare calls " insolence of office," a phase of pub- 
lic life that is a kind of first cousin to an ofiiceholders' 
aristocracy, with this distinction, that insolence is more 
the result of a personal than an official defect of charac- 
ter, and is therefore not so easily cured. " Nothing is 
older in story," says Mr. Godkin, " than the ' insolence 
of oflfice.' We can go back to no time, in the annals of 
the Old World, when the man ' dressed in a little brief 
authority ' was not an object of popular odium." This 
seems to settle the question, if such a question can be 
settled, in favor of the civil service law system, for is it 
not reasonable that the man " dressed in a little brief 
authority," which is a good description of the usually 
precarious tenure of office under the patronage system, 
is more likely to be insolent than the man who holds bis 
office on condition of good behavior and efficient and 
faithful service ? Insolence is not good behavior. As 
before said, the defect is not easily cured, but the rem- 
edy for habitual insolence of office is removal. As a 
rule men of merit are not insolent. It is contrary to 
their nature. 



CHAPTER VI. 

THE PATRONAGE SYSTEM. 

Its practicability only Apparent. — Jackson versus Jackson. — Probable 
causes of his Radical Change. — Marcy's famous Speech and hu- 
morous Letter to Buchanan. — Lincoln versus Lincoln. — His over- 
weening Aml)ition. — The Spoils Doctrine undemocratic and ruin- 
ous. — Appalling Corruption at Washington after the Civil War. — 
The Civil Service Law a Rock to build upon. 

The patronage system of distributing public offices 
was first practiced in this country in the State of New 
York.* But as President Jackson was the first to prac- 

* G. W. Curtis says that in 1801 the spoils system was as much in 
vogue in New York as it ever has been in the country since ; that un- 
der the old Council of Appointment a man could not be an auctioneer 
unless he was on the right side in politics ; that one of the amusing in- 
cidents in the political history of New York is that the charter of the 
Manhattan Bank (one of the chief New York City banks), was procured 
b}^ Aaron Burr in what was really a charter for a water company, the 
trick being ventured to hide tlie fact that the applicants were of the 
wrong side in politics. (Senate Rept. No. 576 (1882) pp. 153, 154.) 

The Council ''became so intolerable that in tlie Convention of 1821 
not one voice was raised to defend it. The vote to abolish it was unan- 
imous." (F. W. Wliitridge, in '' Political Science Quarterly," iv, 285.) 

Mr. Dorman B. Eaton says : '' Unfortunately for the politics of New 
York, one of the first of her great politicians and officers was the most 
adroit and unscrupulous political manipulators this country has pro- 
duced. Aaron Burr was our first partisan despot. * * * Martin 
Van Buren, probably without knowing the true character of Burr, early 
became his admirer and follower. ' He learned his tactics from Aaron 
Burr.' He was so adroit in applying them to his own use, that as early 
as 1808 he got the office of Surrogate of Columbia county as the price 
of his support of Tompkins for Governor. This perliaps is the earliest 



72 JOHN LA.WRENCE ON PATRONAGE. 

tice it nationally, the history of the beginning of the 
system naturally pertains chiefly to him and his admin- 
istration. 

The system, as explained by its advocates, and when 
abstractly considered, is apparently reasonable and prac- 
ticable. For example, its advocates say that when A is 
President, he should have none but his own political 

instance in our politics of an office, especially a judicial office, being 
pledged and delivered for political support." (" Spoils System," &c., 
pp. 4, 6.) 

'• His (Jackson's) election was notoriously the work of Martin Van 
Buren, inspired by Aaron Burr, and with his inauguration was initiated 
a sordidly selfish political system entirely at variance with the broad 
views of Washington and of Hamilton." (" Atlantic Monthly," April, 
1880, p. 537.) 

'' Among the maxims of Colonel Burr for the guidance of politicians, 
one of the most prominent was that the people at elections were to be 
managed by the same rules of discipline as the soldiers of an army; 
that a few leaders were to think for the masses, and that the latter 
were to obey implicitly their leaders, and to move only at the word of 
command. He had therefore great confidence in the machinery of 
party, and that system, of regular nominations in American politics of 
which he may perhaps be considered one of the founders. Educated as 
a military man, and imbibing his early views with regard to governing 
others in the camp, it is not surprising that Colonel Burr should have 
applied the rules of military life to politics." (" Statesman's Manual," 
ii, 1139.) 

Representative John Lawrence of New York appears to have ante- 
dated Aaron Burr several years in the advocacy of the patronage sys- 
tem. In the great debate in the first Congress (1789) on the power of 
removal he said (" Gales & Seaton's Debates," vol. i, pt. i, p. 504): " It 
has been said that if it (the power of removal) is lodged here (in the 
President), it will be subject to abuse; that there may be a change of 
officers, and a complete revolution throughout the whole Executive De- 
partment on the election of every new President. I admit this may be 
the case, and I contend that it should be the case, if the President 
thinks it necessary I contend that every President ought to have 
those men about him in whom he can place the most confidence, pro- 
vided the Senate approve his choice." 



patro:n^age system leads to corruption. 73 

friends in the subordinate as well as the chief offices at 
his disposal ; for in what other way, they ask, can he be 
responsible for the execution of the laws? There is 
besides, they say, another advantage, for his political 
friends have a double incentive to be faithful and effi- 
cient — their own good names as well as that of the 
party in power. But this reasoning is fallacious. First, 
because the system is diametrically opposed to business 
principles ; second, because long and sad experience has 
proved, in this as well as in other nations, that it leads 
to corruption. 

Again, an equitable division of patronage between 
political parties, as was favored by President Jefferson 
and also Governor De Witt Clinton of New York, is 
politically fair, and might lessen the evils of the wholly 
partisan system. Jiut, like the preceding proposition, it 
is not in accordance with sound business principles. 

General Jackson's preaching and President Jackson's 
practicing were very different. General Jackson, writ- 
ing from Washington, in 1804, said (Parton's" Life of 
Jackson," i, 237) : ^' Of all characters my feelings de- 
spise a man capable of cringing to power for a benefit 
or office. Such characters are * * * badly calculated 
for a representative system. * * * Merit alone should 
lead to preferment." The General desired to be Gover- 
nor of Louisiana Territory, but he doubted the propri- 
ety of calling on the President in the capacity of an 
officeseeker. '' Before I would violate my ideas of pro- 
priety," he said, " I would yield up any office in the 
government." Writing to President-elect Monroe, in 
1816, he said (ii, 360): "Everything depends on the 
selection of your ministry. In every selection party and 
party feeling should be avoided. Now is the time to 
tjxterminate the vionster called party spirit. * * * 
The Chief Magistrate of a great and powerful nation 



74 PRESIDENT JACKSON FIGHTS POLITICALLY. 

should never indulge in party feeling." In 1829 Presi- 
dent Jackson practiced almost the reverse of what he 
preached in 1804 and 1816. His most notable departure 
was the removal of hundreds of faithful civil service 
officials, and for purely partisan reasons. 

What caused this change? There may have been 
many causes, but the chief cause was probably the fol- 
lowing. During the campaign of 1828 some newspapers 
abused the General's wife, and even assailed the memory 
of his dead mother."^ This was bad enough, but the 
death of Mrs. Jackson, which was accelerated if not 
caused by campaign abuse, was too much for human 
nature. General Jackson had years before killed Charles 
Dickinson in a duel on account of trouble that probably 
originated in the latter's alleged abuse of Mrs. Jackson. 
He could not now fight liis enemies personally, but he 
could and did fight them politically ;f and under such 
circumstances it was as natural for him to fight them as 
it was for him to fight Dickinson or the British at New 
Orleans. 

Are not these facts alone sufficient to account for the 



* Mrs. Jackson, whom Major Lewis describes as " that good woman,'' 
once, in 1828, found her husband in tears. Pointing to a newspaper 
paragraph, he said : '' Myself I can defend, vou I can defend, but now 
they have assailed even the raemory of ray mother." (iii, 141.) 

Mr. Parton, speaking of Mrs. Jackson, says (iii, 154): "Perhaps, if 
the truth were known, it would be found that she is not the only female 
victim of our indecent party contentions.'' 

fThe '^ Atlantic Monthly," in speaking of the hfe and death of Mrs. 
Jackson, says (April, 1880, pp. 53V, 538): "Her sorrow-stricken hus- 
band came to Washington with a stern determination to punish those 
who had maligned her during the preceding campaign ; and those who 
eulogized her always found favor with him." 

The Washington " Telegraph " said : " We know not what line of 
policy General Jackson will adopt. We take it for granted, however, 
that he will reward his friends and punish his enemies." 



MAJOR LEWIS DIFFERS WITH JACKSON. 75 

change ? In fact does not the General's high character 
preclude almost any other explanation of it? But the 
General's own words are the most convincing. For 
example, shortly after his inauguration he told a promi- 
nent and faithful official, Colonel Thomas L. McKenney, 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, that he was charged 
with being " one of the principal promoters of that vile 
paper. We the People^ in which my wife Rachel was so 
shamefully abused." (iii, 216.) 

Thus did a wrong beget a wrong. Thus did a private 
curse become a public curse. In a word, thus did like 
beget like. Mr. Parton says President Jackson " was a 
sick, unhappy, and perplexed old man, * * * always 
mourning for his dead wife." 

President Jackson's course, w^hich was at war with 
that of all his predecessors in office, and even, as has 
been shown, with his own sentiments as expressed in 
1804 and 1816, was condemnqd by many of his contem- 
poraries, as is shown by extracts from their works in 
this and the two succeeding chapters. 

Major William B. Lewis, the man, says Mr. Parton 
(iii, 224), who contributed the most to General Jack- 
son's election to the presidency, and his most intimate 
and constant companion, wrote to him as follows : '' In 
relation to the principle of rotation * * * I hold it to 
be fraught with the greatest mischief to the country. 
* * * Whenever the impression shall become gen- 
eral that the government is only valuable on account 
of its offices, the great and paramount interests of the 
country will be lost sight of, and the government itself 
ultimately destroyed." 

Another material cause of President Jackson's change 
of policy — namely, the influence over him of Mr. Martin 
Van Buren — is best described in the words of members 
of the United States Senate, who were considering, in 



V6 MR. VAX BUREN CRITICISED. 

1832, the confirmation of the latter gentleman as Minis- 
ter to England. 

Senator Clay of Kentucky said {" Gales & Seaton's 
Debates in Congress," 1831-32, vol. viii, pt. i, p. 1324) : 
^^I have another objection to this nomination. I be- 
lieve * * * that to this gentleman is principally to be 
ascribed the introduction of the odious system of pro- 
scription for the exercise of the elective franchise. I 
understand that it is the system on which the party in 
his own State, of which he is the reputed head, con- 
stantly acts. He was among the first of the Secretaries 
to apply that system to the dismission of clerks in his 
department, known to me to be highly meritorious, and 
among them one who is now a representative in the 
other House. It is a detestable system, drawn from the 
worst periods of the Roman republic, and if it were to 
be perpetuated, * * * our government would finally 
end in a despotism as inexorable as that at Constanti- 
nople." * 

Senator Samuel A. Foot of Connecticut went even 
further in his criticisms of Mr. Van Buren than Senator 
Clay. He said (Same Debates, p. 1328) : " In my opin- 
ion there is not a Senator on this floor, or any other 
careful observer, who has noticed the proceedings of 
this administration from its commencement, who is not 
fully convinced that there had been ' behind the throne 
a power greater than the throne itself/ which has di- 

* Mr. Clay, in a speech delivered on June 27, 1840, relates the fol- 
lowing extraordinary case of court-martial (" Speeches," ii, 203): '' Two 
officers of the army of the United States have been put upon their sol- 
emn trial, on the charge of prejudicing the Democratic party by making 
purchases for the supply of the army from members of the Whig party I 
* * * And this trial was commenced at the instance of a Committee 
of a Democratic Convention, and conducted and prosecuted by them." 

The trial took place at Baltimore, where the Convention met. 



HE PLATTEES PRESIDENT JACKSON. 17 

rected most of its movements. I will not say there is 
legal evidence sufficient to convict a man before a court 
of justice ; but there is enough to produce conviction in 
my mind, and I sincerely believe that General Jackson 
came to this place fully determined to remove no man 
from office but for good cause of removal. I am fully 
convinced that the whole ' system of proscription' owes 
its existence to Martin Van Buren ! that the dissolution 
of the Cabinet was effected by his management, and for 
his benefit ! and that the hand of the late Secretary of 
State may be traced distinctly in another affair, which 
has produced an alienation between the first and second 
officers of the government, and also * * * for the 
great abuse of the patronage of the government !" 

Senator George Poindexter of Mississippi said, among 
other things, that Mr. Van Buren, " whose whole course 
was marked by a systematic tissue of dark and studied 
intrigue," had *' seized on circumstances which pre- 
existed his induction into office, novel in their character 
in this country, but familiar at the court of Louis the 
Fifteenth, in France, and of Charles the Second of Eng- 
land, by means of which he contrived to ' ride upon the 
whirlwind and direct the storm,' and to render the cred- 
ulous* and confiding chief, whose weakness he flattered 
and whose prejudices he nourished, subservient to all 
his purposes, personal and political. * * * Possessed, 
as he was, of the unlimited confidence of General Jack- 
son, he very soon found free access to his ear, and, by 
appropriate advances, led him into excesses and errors 

* David Crockett says (" Life of Martin Van Buren," p. 12): " For a 
man that Bas as much resohition and fight in him as General Jackson, 
there never was one that was so easy to be duped." 

Colonel Crockett served under General Jackson during the Creek In- 
dian war of 1813. His " Life of Martin Van Buren" is unique if not 
unprejudiced and exhaustive. 



78 SENATOR FORSYTH'S TWISTED ARGUMENT. 

fatal to the tranquillity of the country, without affording 
the slightest evidence that he in any manner participated 
in producing the results which he anxiously desired to 
accomplish. The proscriptive policy, pushed, as it was, 
to extremities which the public interest did not seem to 
require, and far beyond the practice of any other Chief 
Magistrate, has been universally attributed to the advice 
and influence of Mr. Van Buren. This system, com- 
bined with the whole patronage of government, was, as 
far as practicable, placed at his discretion, to smooth 
the way to the ulterior object of his ambition." (pp. 
1340, 1341, 1342.) 

Senator John Forsyth of Georgia, who favored Mr. 
Van Buren's confirmation, in reply to Mr. Poindexter, 
said (p. 1346) : '' What, sir, the most artful man in the 
world proclaim to a paltry editor that he acted in the 
manner indicated to escape the storm consequent on the 
dissolution of the Cabinet ! " And yet on the very next 
page he says : *' He is called an artful man — a giant of 
artifice — a wily magician. From whom does he receive 
these opprobrious names ? From open enemies and pre- 
tended friends." 

Senator Stephen D. Miller of South Carolina said (pp. 
1372, 1373) : " Sir, one of the most decided objections I 
have to the confirmation of this appointment is that the 
patronage of the government was exercised with a view 
to make this nominee, at the end of tlie present incum- 
bent's term of office, the President. I believe this power 
was exercised to a criminal extent. * * * I do not 
think tlie power to turn out one man and put in another, 
as a mere arbitrary exercise of executive authority, does 
exist. * * * I think it a violation of the Constitution. 
* * * It is the essence of tyranny." 

Senator Robert Y. Hayne of South Carolina said (p. 
1381) he had no doubt that Mr. Van Buren had ad- 



MR. VAN BUREN PHILOSOPHIZE^ ON PATRONAGE. V9 

vanced " himself at the expense of all who were sup- 
posed to stand in his way ; and, what is worse, at the 
expense of the success of the administration, and at the 
imminent hazard to the best interests of the country." 
He further said that lie believed '' that Mr. Van Buren, 
while Secretary of State, used the influence derived 
from his high office for the purpose of controlling in- 
juriously the domestic and social relations of this com- 
munity;* and that his conduct was in other respects 
inconsistent with the dignity of his station and the 
character of the country." 

Representative Henry A. Wise of Virginia, speaking, 
in 1836, of Mr. Van Buren, said (Same Debates, vol. 
xiii, pt. i, p. 106t)) that he held him '' responsible for 
most mischief that has been done, and most that is now 
doing," and that he was " elected by executive patron- 
age, corruption, and dictation." 

Mr. James Parton, speaking of Martin Van Buren, 
says ("Life of Jackson," iii, 120) : "How are we to 
know anything about a man who was supposed to excel 
all men in concealing his motives and his movements?" 

Again (p. 126) Mr. Parton says that President Van 
Buren, speaking of official patronage, once said : " I 
prefer an office which has no patronage. When I give 
a man an office, I offend his disappointed competitors 
and their friends, and make enemies of the man I re- 
move and his friends. Nor am I certain of gaining a 
friend in the man I appoint, for in all probability he 
expected something better." 

I wrote to Mr. Parton and asked him where he got 

* '^ It is odd enough," wrote Daniel Webster to a personal friend, 
*' that the consequence of this dispute in the sociable and fashionable 
world is producing great political effects, and may very probably deter- 
mine who shall be successor to the present Chief Magistrate." (" At- 
lantic Monthly," April, 1880. 



80 A GOOD WORD FOR MR. YAN BUREN". 

his information concerning Mr. Van Buren's opinion of 
the drawbacks of official patronage. With his permis- 
sion, I give his reply in full. 

Newburyport, Mass., August 24, 1887. 

Dear Sir: Martin Van Buren, I think, was a far more 
respectable human being than many of his more gifted 
contemporaries, such as Webster, Clay, Calhoun, and 
others. The best and fairest view of him is given by 
himself in his work entitled " Inquiry into the Origin 
and Course of Political Parties in the United States," 
N. Y., 1867. He was a good democrat, but fell upon a 
difficult time, inherited a developing system, and had 
very strict personal limitations. I believe it was the 
late Coventry Waddell (the " X. Clark " of Chap, xix, 
vol. iii, of my Jackson), who told me Van Buren's re- 
marks on appointments to office. 

All the men who surrounded Jackson in 1829 knew 
very well that Jackson alone had the courage and har- 
dihood to introduce the system of turning out political 
opponents from minor offices. It was his fell work, and 
his alone. All was done to wreak revenge upon Clay 
for wrongs purely imaginary. If he turned out a post- 
master in Kentucky, he thought he was hitting Henry 
Clay. 

I hope you will put all your force into the work in 
hand. If the people of free countries cannot learn to 
be good employers of labor, freedom is not for man. 
Very truly yours, 

JAMES PARTON. 

Mr. Parton is a stanch opponent of the patronage sys- 
tem, and he devotes much space in his " Life of Jack- 
son " to a scathing denunciation and exposure of it. 
He attributes its origin to Aaron Burr, and says that 
Martin Van Buren "learned his tactics from Burr." 



SENATOR MARCY'S FAMOUS SPEECH. 81 

His portrayal of what he calls the " Burrian Code," is 
an excellent description of the patronage system in its 
worst form. 

It was during the debate on Mr. Van Buren's con- 
firmation that Senator William L. Marcy of New York, 
in reply to Senator Clay, made his famous spoils doc- 
trine speech, the gist of which is as follows (G. & S.'s 
Debates, vol. viii, pt. i, p. 1326) : 

"It may be, sir, that the politicians of the United 
States are not so fastidious as some gentlemen are as 
to disclosing the principles on which they act. They 
boldly preach what they practice. When they are con- 
tending for victory, they avow their intention of enjoy- 
ing the fruits of it. If they are defeated, they expect 
to retire from office. If they are successful, they claim, 
as a matter of right, the advantages of success. They 
see nothing wrong in the rule that to the victor belong 
the spoils of the enemy."* 

Mr. Parton ("Life of Jackson," iii, 377) says that 
Senator Marcy, when writing out his speech, said he 
would willingly recall the last quoted words. President 
Madison says (iv, 357) : " The first, I believe, who pro- 
claimed the right, is now the most vehement in brand- 
ing the practice." I wrote to Mr. Parton and asked 

* Mr. Marcy, whose speech was mostly in reply to Mr. Clay, said that 
Mr. Clay's " own political friends " had practiced the patronage system 
in Kentucky. Mr. Clay said (p. 1356): "It is not practiced in Ken- 
tucky by the State government when in the hands of the opposition to 
this administration. Very lately Governor Metcalfe has appointed to 
one of the three highest judicial stations in the State a supporter of 
this administration. * * * The Governor also renewed the appoint- 
ment, or commissioned several gentlemen opposed to him in politics, as 
State attorneys. And recently th ' Legislature appointed a President of 
one of the banks from the ranks of one of the friends of this adminis- 
tration, and several other officers." 



82 MRS. MARCY VERSUS MR. MARCY. 

him what he thought of Mr. Madison's statement. In 
a letter dated May 4, 1886, he said : '' Mr. Marcy, as I 
understood, did not renounce the doctrine of the spoils, 
but merely regretted the blunt, impolitic words in which 
he expressed the same. He was simply too honest a 
man to alter or recall his words. My impression is that 
he lived and died a spoilsman." 

The word spoils, if not military, is frequently used 
by military men. Therefore its use by the soldier- 
statesman Marcy was perhaps only the result of habit. 
Here is an example of his use of military figures of 
speech (Curtis's " Life of James Buchanan," ii, 36) : 
" This little battery has kept up a brisk fire for you. 
* * * For want of experience you do not know the 
potency of such an adversary. An enemy in the camp 
is more dangerous than one outside of it." Here are 
three military figures of speech in almost as many lines. 

"This little battery," which was "an enemy in the 
camp," was Mrs. Marcy ^ and the gentleman in whose 
behalf she " kept up a brisk fire," and to whom Mr. 
Marcy was writing, was James Buchanan, a bachelor, 
and Mr, Marcy^'s rival for the then coming Democratic 
presidential nomination of 1852. The letter is as hu- 
morous as it is kind and noble. 

In the political lottery of 1852-53 Governor Marcy 
drew the prize of Secretary of State, and it is note- 
worthy that he told Mr. Buchanan some months after 
accepting the office that, on account of officeseekers and 
Cabinet Councils, " he had not been able to devote one 
single hour together to his proper official duties." (ii, 
81.) So his change of mind, if it came at all, must have 
come late in life. 

Senator Marcy was not the first person to distinguish 
himself during the Jackson administration by making 
pointed and figurative spoils doctrine speeches. Gover- 



Ai^OTHER SPOILS DOCTRINE SPEECH. 83 

nor John Keynolds of Illinois relates the following by 
William Kinney of Illinois {'' My Own Times/' p. 185) : 

" Grov. Kinney had been to the city of Washington at the inauguration 
of Gen. Jackson, and had considerable agency at the Federal city in the 
proscription visited on the Whigs of Illinois. It was said he remarked that 
the Whigs should be whipped out of office like dogs out of a meat-house." * 

On page 199 Gov. Reynolds says (inaugural address) : 

" My official care and patronage shall not be exclusively bestowed 
upon a few men, and on a particular section of the State, and proscribe 
the balance. Proscription for opinion's sake is, in my opinion, the worst 
enemy to a republic. It is the birthright of every freeman to express 
his political sentiments frankly and freely at the polls of an election, or 
elsewhere, without the hope of reward or the fear of punishment." 

President Lincoln, like President Jackson, preached 
one thing and practiced another. His administration, 
so far as political parties are concerned, is therefore par- 
allel with and an offset to President Jackson^s. Writing 
to Congressman John T. Stuart of Illinois, on Dec. 17, 
1840, he said (Century Magazine, Jan., 1887, p. 377) : 

" This affair of appointments to office is very annoying — more so to 
you than to me doubtless. I am, as you know, opposed to removals to 
make places for our friends." 

Lincoln, however, unlike Jackson, removed practic- 
ally all of the officeholders. Of course he was justified 
in removing all who were disloyal. With these excep- 
tions, he seems to have regretted his course and to have 
had his early convictions confirmed by experience. In 
1865, pointing toward a group of officeseekers, he said : 
^^ Behold this spectacle ! We have conquered the re- 
bellion ; but here is a greater danger to the country 

* As Gov. Reynolds merely says ^' G-ov. Kinney," I wrote to the Chi- 
cago Historical Society and asked when Mr. Kinney was Governor of 
Illinois. In reply Secretary Albert D, Hager said : " ' Governor Kinney 
of IlHnois ' is a myth. On Dec. 6, 1826, at the time Ninian Edwards was 
inaugurated Governor of Illinois, Wm. Kinney of St. Clair county was 
histalled Lieutenant Governor, and held the position till Dec. 9, 1830." 



84 LAMON'S DARK PICTURE OF LIKC0L:N". 

than was the rebellion/^ Senator Sumner vouched for 
these words to Senator Schurz. Again^ shortly before 
the fall of Eichmond^ Lincoln left Washington for City 
Pointy Va., partly, he said, to be near the important 
military operations then in progress and partly to get 
away from the officeseekers. To the then Gen. Schurz, 
speaking of officeseeking, he said: '^I am afraid tJiat 
thing is going to ruin republican government/^ And 
again. Ward H. Lamon says Lincoln said that if ever 
the government was overthrown, it would be caused by 
^^ the voracious desire of office — this wriggle to live with- 
out toil, from which I am not free myself/^* 

* With Lincoln officeseeking was a disease. Lamon says ('' Life of 
Lincoln," pp. 237, 481, 483): '^ There is no instance where an important 
office seemed to be within his reach and he did not try to get it. * * * 
Notwithstanding his overweening ambition, he had not a particle of sym- 
pathy with the great mass of his fellow-citizens who were engaged in 
similar scrambles for place. When a candidate himself, he thought the 
whole canvass ought to be conducted with reference to his success. He 
would say to a man, ' Your continuance in the field injures me,' and be 
quite sure he had given a perfect reason for his withdrawal. He did 
nothing out of mere gratitude, and forgot tlie devotion of his warmest 
partisans as soon as the occasion for their services was past. What 
they did for him was quietly appropriated as the reward of superior mer- 
it, calHng for no return in kind. * * * it was seldom that he praised 
anybody ; and when he did, it was not a rival or an equal in the strug» 
gle for popularity and power. No one knew better how to ' damn with 
faint praise,' or to divide the glory of another by being the first and 
frankest to acknowledge it. His encomiums were sometuues mere strat- 
agems to catch the applause he pretended to bestow. * * * Fully 
alive to the fact that no qualities of a public man are so charming to 
the people as simphcity and candor, lie made simplicity and candor the 
mask of deep feelings carefully concealed and subtle plans studiously 
vailed from all eyes but one." 

Leonard Swett says ('^ Herndon's Lincoln," iii, 533. 534, 537): ''In 
dealing with men he was a trimmer, and such a trimmer the world has 
never seen. Halifax, who was great in his day as a trimmer, would 
blush by the side of Lincoln ; yet Lincoln never trimmed in principles ; 



SWETT AKD TRUMBULL CORROBORATE LAM0:N^. 85 

A few more words as to the patronage system. 

The doctrine that to the victors belong the spoils, 
which, as before said, was first practiced nationally in 
this country by President Jackson, has probably had 
its day. If it has, it is well. Like the doctrine itself, 
spoils is a bad word. It is synonymous with robbery, 
pillage, destruction ! It is suggestive of the days of 

it was only in his conduct with men. He used the patronage of his of- 
fice to feed the hunger of various factions. * * * He used every force 
to the best possible advantage. He never wasted anything, and would 
always give more to his enemies than he would to his friends ; and the 
reason was because he never had anything to spare, and in the close 
calculation of attaching tlie factions to him, he counted upon the ab- 
stract affection of his friends as an element to be offset against some 
gift with which he must appease his enemies. Hence there was always 
some truth in the charge of his friends that he failed to reciprocate their 
devotion with his favors. * * * Adhesion was what lie wanted; if 
he got it gratuitously, he never wasted his substance paying for it. 

'' One great public mistake of his character, as generally received and 
acquiesced in, is that he is considered by the people of this country as 
a frank, guileless, and unsophisticated man. There never was a greater 
mistake. Beneath a smooth surface of candor and apparent declaration 
of all his thoughts and feelings, he exercised the most exalted tact and 
the wisest discrimination. He handled and moved men remotely as we 
do pieces upon a chess-board. He retained through life all the friends 
he ever had, and he made the wrath of his enemies to praise him. This 
was not by cunning and intrigue, in the low acceptation of the term, but 
by far-seeing reason and discernment. He always told enough only of his 
plans and purposes to induce the belief that he had communicated all ; 
yet he reserved enough to have communicated nothing. He told all that 
was unimportant with a gushmg frankness ; yet no man ever kept his real 
purposes closer, or penetrated the future further with his deep designs.'' 

Lyman Trumbull, in a letter of Oct. 1, 1890, says: "I entirely agree 
in their (Lamon and Swett's) statements as to the ambition, shrewdness, 
cunning, and reticence of Mr. Lincoln ; but I am not prepared to say 
that he was the trimmer Mr. Swett describes him to have been." * * * 

David Davis says that Lincoln was the most reticent, secretive man 
he ever knew. Herndon describes his ambition as overflowing, restless. 
He says Swett's letter makes the Lincoln historical picture more life-like. 
All of the five men were Lincoln's personal as well as political friends. 



86 A SPOILS PANDEMONIUM 

Nero. It is akin to barbarism^ not to civilization. It 
is adapted to war and a description of war times, not to 
peace. If Americans, when talking about public offices, 
would stop to think of the exact meaning of this word, 
it would no longer mar our political vocabulary. In 
private life what chance of success would a man have 
who, when he applied for employment, talked about the 
spoils of private business ? Of course he would have 
none. Then why should such a man have a chance in 
public life ? Is not the spoils system as unreasonable, 
reprehensible, and ruinous in public as in private busi- 
ness ? If it is, then is it not undemocratic ? And being 
ilndemocratic, does it not logically follow that it is un- 
American ? If a system is wrong, is not the true rem- 
edy the application of a precisely opposite system ? Is 
not the civil service law system the precise opposite of 
the patronage system ? If it is, then is it not both demo- 
cratic and American ? But some people say it is neither. 
Can this be possible ? If Washington, the Adamses, 
Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Franklin, Jay, Hamilton, 
Gallatin, Quincy, and the many other statesmen and pa- 
triots whose words of wisdom are quoted in this volume, 
are not specimen democrats and Americans, who are ? 

We now come to a period in the history of the gov- 
ernment when the patronage system reached its natural 
and legitimate conclusion — a spoils pandemonium. It 
began under Lincoln and reached its hight apparently 
under Johnson. Johnson, though hampered by the 
Senate,* made, directly and indirectly, many removals. 

* Lj^man Trumbull says : '' Johnson did not have it in his power to 
make removals. When he attempted it, his nominations were almost 
invariably rejected by the Senate, unless the nominee was the favorite 
and had secured in advance the assurance of support of Senators who 
had sought to convict the President of high crimes and misdemeanors. 
Hence most of Johnson's appointments were really dictated by his po- 
litical adversaries." Compare with Cox's remarks, pages 115, 116. 



DESCRIBED BY JACOB D. COX. 87 

But some of his appointments were caused by resigna- 
tions instead of removals. The resignations were caused 
by dissatisfaction with President Johnson's change of 
policy ; for after his war passions cooled down, he 
chose to stand, as it were, almost between rather than 
on the side of either the Republican or Democratic 
party. And thus was this iron-willed and tried Union 
man enabled, despite the intense turmoil and strife of 
the limes, and despite his naturally combative nature, 
to pursue a comparatively conservative course till the 
passions of the people had also cooled down. Person- 
ally Andrew Johnson was incorruptible ; but the cor- 
ruption among officeseekers during his administration, 
and for some years' afterward, caused as much perhaps 
by the demoralization of the unparalleled civil war that 
had just closed as by the then run-mad patronage sys- 
tem, and aggravated by the complications of reconstruc- 
tion and the President's quarrel with and impeachment 
by Congress, was simply appalling. Much documen- 
tary evidence might be cited, but the testimony of 
one person will suffice. Jacob D. Cox, a distinguished 
Union soldier, who was a State Senator in Ohio before 
the war, Governor of Ohio after the war (1866), and 
Secretary of the Interior in 1869, says ("North Ameri- 
can Review," 1871, pp. 87, 88) : 

" During Mr. Johnson's administration * * * a con- 
dition of things existed which rivals the most corrupt 
era that can be found in the history of any nation. 
Men were known to offer $5,000 for the influence which 
might secure an appointment to a ganger's situation in 
the revenue service, where $1,500 was the limit of the 
pay that could be honestly earned, and when it was 
morally certain that the advent of a new administration 
would terminate the employment within a year. This is 



oo FKANKLIN'S WARNING VOICE. 

simply a type of similar transactions extending through 
many grades of the public service." 

Speaking of the duplicity used to obtain " an appoint- 
ment from one end of the Avenue and a confirmation 
from the other," Mr. Cox says (p. 87) : 

" In many instances two wholly separate sets of recom- 
mendations were procured, one proving that the appli- 
cant was a faithful supporter of the President, the other 
proving him an utter despiser of the presidential policy. 
More than this, it may be easily proven that one or the 
other party was often cognizant of the fraud perpetra- 
ted, and the partisans of either side congratulated each 
other that an appointment or a confirmation had been 
procured by which the other party was completely 
cheated. * * * j|^ ^^g ^ game of * diamond cut 
diamond,' in which the two parties were using all the 
resources and refinements of intrigue to get the start of 
the other in the control of the ofiices."* 

The spoils doctrine has done more perhaps to corrupt 

* Benjamin Franklin, addressing the Constitutional Convention of 
1787 on the subject of salaries, seems to have had a prevision of the 
scenes above described. He said (''Franklin's Works,'" v, 145): "Sir, 
there are two passions which have a powerful influence in the affairs of 
men. Those are * ambition ' and * avarice ' — the love of power and the 
love of money. Separately each of these has great force in prompting 
men to action ; but when united in view of the same object, they have 
in many minds the most violent effects. Place before such men a 
post of ' honor,' that shall at the same time be a place of ' profit,' and 
they will move heaven and earth to obtain it. * * * 

And of what kind are the men who will strive for this profitable pre- 
eminence ? It will not be the wise and moderate, the lovers of peace 
and good order, the men fittest for the trust. It will be the bold and 
the violent, the men of strong passions and indefatigable activity in 
their selfish pursuits. These will thrust themselves into your govern- 
ment and be your rulers." 



THE EVILS OF SPOILS SCHEMES INSIDIOUS. 89 

American politics than all other causes combined. Its 
«vils, which are reflected in the darkest pages of the 
world's history, are insidious. This fact has just been 
well illustrated, for what did the general public know, 
at the time, of the corruption described by Mr. Cox? 
Again, who but the principals and their accomplices 
would know of the corruption of New York's fugitive 
(1884) Aldermen, if the facts had not been published? 
Further, spoils and insidious spoils schemes are not con- 
:fined to public business. Many are private, or semi- 
private ; such, for example, as the numerous ^'rings'' 
and monopolies throughout the country, the corruption 
of many of which has been exposed by newspapers dur- 
ing the past twenty-five years. 

But, as before said, this bad doctrine, which for full 
:fifty years hung over the nation like the black clouds 
that precede as well as attend the coming storm, but no 
blacker than the picture of partisan patronage just por- 
trayed, has probably had its day. And again, as before 
said, if it has, it is well, for fifty years more of such 
corruption would imperil the safety of the nation.* 
Fortunately a welcome, timely, and salutary change 
has come. The beclouded skies are slowly but surely 
clearing, and the outlook is hopeful. A great political 
storm is subsiding and is being succeeded by a political 
sunshine that not only makes the dangers through which 
we have passed plainer, but is teaching us how to avoid 
them in the future. 

Our course is plain. The civil service law, in order 
to make it a complete success, must be enforced and 
perfected and its scope gradually increased. Its en- 
forcement will naturally lead to its perfection, and its 

* Doubts may well be entertained whether our government could sur- 
vive the strain of a continuance of this system. — Grover Cleveland. 



90 SOMETHING BETTER THAN OFFICEHOLDING. 

perfection to its increase of scope. As before said, the 
law has made a good beginning. It must also make a 
good ending. The increase of its usefulness must not 
cease till it has utterly destroyed the political dragon 
that has done so much to degrade American politics. 
Safety itself demands that, no matter what the circum- 
stances may be, a repetition of the scenes described by 
Mr. Cox shall be rendered impossible. This, notwith- 
standing it requires the practical abolition of the pat- 
ronage system, is not as difficult as it seems. When 
business men and business men only, without regard to 
politics, fill all non-political public offices, the patronage 
system will be practically dead, and the complete reform 
of the civil service will be a question of only a few 
years. 

The civil service law promises to gradually accom- 
plish this result. It will then have been carried to its 
legitimate conclusion. And it is well. There is some- 
thing higher, better, and more important for Americans 
than ordinary officeholding.* The time and talent here- 
tofore spent in striving for office can hereafter be more 
usefully devoted to studying the exact nature of public 
grievances and to originating corrective measures for 
them. This is noble, patriotic, and useful work, for it 
subserves the interests of the people as a body. Ameri- 
cans who are not already qualified, should qualify them- 
selves for this work In short, they should imitate the 
statesmen whose wise words and examples are given in 
the succeeding as well as other chapters of this volume. 

* The support which has been given to the present administration in 
its efforts to preserve and advance this reform * * * should con- 
firm our belief that there is a sentiment among the people better than a 
desire to hold office, and a patriotic impulse upon which may safely rest 
the integrity of our institutions and the strength and perpetuity of our 
government. — Groyer Cleveland. 



CHAPTER VII. 

LEADING STATESMEis^'S PRINCIPLES. 

The Merit System both Preached and Practiced by the six first Presi- 
dents (forty years). — Powerful blows at the Patronage System. — 
A profound disquisition on its Evils by William Paley of England 
(1785). — James Wilson on Patronage and Official Appointments. 

President Washington's three cardinal rules were 
(" Writings," ix, 479) : 1. He would not be under en- 
gagements to any person. 2. He would not be influ- 
enced by " ties of family blood." 3. Three things were 
to be considered : (a) Fitness, (b) The " comparative 
merits and sufferings in service." (c) The equal distri- 
bution of appointments among the States. 

It is noteworthy that the civil service law is practic- 
ally the same as the three last requirements. It is there- 
fore Washingtonian. 

President John Adams went into office with the " de- 
termination to make as few removals as possible — not 
one from personal motives, not one from party consid- 
erations" (ix, 47). But he would not countenance " mis- 
conduct in office," and he removed " several officers at 
Portsmouth " because their " daily language," reported 
to him, implied " aversion if not hostility to the govern- 
ment." 

President Jefferson's principles are expressed in thirty- 
three words, thus (iv, 391) : " Good men, in whom there 
is no objection but a difference of political principle, 
practiced only as far as the right of a private citizen 



92 JEFFERSON, MADISON, MONEOE, J. Q. ADxVMS. 

will justify, are not proper subjects of removal." Re- 
ferring to removals from office, Jefferson says (iv, 409) : 
^^ I had foreseen, years ago, that the first Republican 
President * * * would have a dreadful operation to 
perform." The Marshals removed by him were charged 
with packing juries. When urged by a representative 
of the Tammany Society of Baliimore to remove Feder- 
alists from office, the philosopher said (Parton's "Life 
of Jefferson," p. 611) : '^ What is the difference between 
denying the right of suffrage and punishing a man for 
exercising it by turning him out of office ?" 

President Madison, writing to Edward Coles, August 
29, 1834, said (iv, 356) : "You call my attention, with 
much emphasis, to the principle * * * that offices 
were the spoils of victory. * * * I fully agree in all 
the odium you attach to such a rule. * * * The prin- 
ciple could not fail to degrade any administration." 

President Monroe says (Gilman's " Monroe," p. 202) : 
^' No person at the head of the government has, in my 
opinion, any claim to the active partisan exertions of 
those in office under him." 

President John Quincy Adams, not only refused to 
remove political opponents, but he even refused to re- 
move a naval officer who had been concerned in an 
unexecuted project to insult one of his (Adams's) polit- 
ical friends. He says (Morse's "Adams," p. 180): "I 
have been urged to sweep away my opponents and pro- 
vide for my friends. I can justify the refusal to adopt 
this policy only by the steadiness and consistency of my 
adherence to my own. If I depart from this in one in- 
stance, I shall be called upon to do the same in many. 
An invidious and inquisitorial scrutiny into the personal 
dispositions of public officers will creep through the 
whole Union, and the most selfish and sordid passions 
will be kindled into activity to distort the conduct and 



TYLER, BUCHANAN, JOHNSON. 93 

misrepresent the feelings of men whose places may be- 
come the prize of slander upon them."* 

President Tyler was op2)osed to making removals on 
account of political opinions. In his first annual mes- 
sage he said he had used the power only in cases of 
unfaithfulness, incompetency, and partisanship that led 
to undue influence over elections. He further said 
j (Benton's Debates, xiv, 375) : "I shall cordially concur 
in any constitutional measures for regulating and re- 
straining the power of removal." 

James Buchanan, in discussing in the Senate, in 1839, 
a bill to prevent the interference of Federal officers with 
elections, said (Curtis's "Buchanan," i, 395): "Now, 
sir, if any freak of destiny should ever place me in one 
of these executive departments * * * I shall tell you 
the course I would pursue. I should not become an 
inquisitor of the political opinions of the subordinate 
officeholders. * * * For the highjer and more respon- 
sible offices, however, I would select able, faithful, and 
well tried political friends. * * * With General 
Washington, I believe that any other course ' would be 
a sort of political suicide.' " f 

President Johnson says (Appendix to Cong. Globe, 
1867, p. 4) : "The unrestricted power of removal from 
office is a very great one to be trusted even to a Magis- 
trate chosen by the general suffrage of the whole peo- 
ple, and accountable directly to them for his acts. It is 
undoubtedly liable to abuse, and at some period of our 
history perhaps has been abused." 

* Washington, says Mr. James Parton, made 9 removals, J. Adams 9, 
Jefferson 89, Madison 5, Monroe 9, and J. Q. Adams 2. Total, 73. J. 
C. Calhoun (ii, 438) says J. Adams made 10 removals and Jefferson 42. 
President Jackson's removals, in eight years, aggregated nearly 1,000. 

f Washington's Writings, xi, 75. On page 781 qf the same volume he 
speaks of " governmental suicide." 



04 GRANT, HAYES, TILDEN. 

President Grant was not long in perceiving the need 
of reform in the civil service. In his 2nd annual mes- 
sage he says (Cong. Globe, 1870, p. 9) : "I would re- 
spectfully call your attention to * * * a reform in 
the civil service of the country. I would have it go 
beyond the mere fixing of the tenure of office of clerks 
and employes, * * * I would have it govern * * * 
the manner of making all appointments. There is no 
duty which so much embarrasses the Executive and 
heads of Departments as that of appointments. * * * 
The present system does not secure the best men, and 
often not even fit men for public place." 

President Hayes denounced the patronage system and 
advocated " a return to the principles and practices of 
the founders of the government " in both his letter of 
acceptance and his inaugural address. He also de- 
nounced the farming out of appointments among Con- 

* The following " plank " from the national Democratic *' platform '' 
of 187G favors the requirement of '' proved competency" in filling pub- 
lic offices, which is precisely what the competitive examination system 
has accomplished. It is statesman-like and is in harmony with the 
present civil service law : 

*' Reform is necessary in the civil service. Experience proves that 
efficient, economical conduct of the governmental business is not possi- 
ble if its civil service be subject to change at every election ; be a prize 
fought for at the ballot-box ; be a brief reward of party zeal, instead of 
posts of honor, assigned for proved competency, and held for fidelity in 
the public employ ; that the dispensing of patronage should neither be 
a tax upon the time of all our public men nor the instrument of their 
ambition." 

Mr. Tilden, in his letter of acceptance, favors the " organization of a 
better civil service system, under the tests, wherever practicable, of 
proved competency and fidelity." It is noteworthy that he repeats the 
words " proved competency." It is clear therefore what his course 
would have probably been had the Electoral Commission declared him 
elected President instead of Haves. 



GARFIELD AND ARTHUR. 95 

gressmen, saying : " The offices in these cases have 
become not merely rewards for party services, but re- 
wards for services to party leaders." 

President Garfield says (Cong. Record, 1881, p. 3) : 
" The civil service can never be placed on a satisfactory 
basis until it is regulated by law. For the good of the 
service itself, for the protection of those who are in- 
trusted with the appointing power against the waste of 
time and obstruction to the public business, caused by 
the inordinate pressure* for place, and for the protec- 
tion of incumbents against intrigue and wrong,] I shall, 
at the proper time, ask Congress to fix the tenure of the 
minor offices of the several Executive Departments, and 
to prescribe the grounds upon which removals shall be 
made during the terms for which incumbents have been 
appointed." 

President Arthur favored civil service reform in his 
letter of acceptance of the nomination for Vice-Presi- 
dent as well as in two annual messages. He found the 

* We press such appointments upon the Departments ; we crowd the 
doors ; we fill the corridors ; Senators and Representatives throng the 
offices and bureaus until the public business is obstructed; the patience 
of officers is worn out, and sometimes, for fear of losing their places by 
our influence, they at last give way, and appoint men, not because they 
are fit for the position, but because we ask it. — Garfield's Speech in 
Congress, 1870. 

Let it once be fully understood that continuance in office depends 
solely upon the faithful and efficient discharge of duties, and that no 
man will be removed to make place for another, and the reform will be 
half accomplished. — Garfield at Athens, Ohio, 1879. 

To reform this service is one of the highest and most imperative 
duties of statesmanship. — Garfield in "Atlantic Monthly," July, 
1877, p. 61. 

f The italics are mine. The civil service law does not make suffi- 
cient provision " for the protection of incumbents against intrigue and 
wrong ; " neither does it ** prescribe the grounds upon which removals 
shall be made." (See introduction to Chapter YIII.) 



96 PRESIDENT CLEVELAND'S DECIDED VIEWS. 

" inordinate pressure for place " too great to bear, and 
further that it diverts the President's " time and at- 
tention from the proper discharge of other duties no 
less delicate and responsible, and which, in the very 
nature of things, cannot be delegated to other hands. '^ 
Among other things, he said : " Original appointments 
should be based upon ascertained fitness. The tenure 
of office should be stable. Positions of responsibility 
should, as far as practicable, be filled by the promotion 
of worthy and efiicient ofliicers." 

President Cleveland has proved himself a civil service 
reformer in deed as well as in word, not only as Presi- 
dent, but as Governor of New York. In his inaugural 
address he says (Cong. Record, 1885, p. 3) : "The peo- 
ple demand reform in the administration of the govern- 
ment and the application of business principles to public 
affairs. As a means to this end civil service reform 
should be in good faith enforced. Our citizens have 
the right to protection from the incompetency of public 
employes who hold their places solely as the reward of 
partisan service, and from the corrupting influence of 
those who promise and the vicious methods of those 
who expect such rewards. And those who worthily 
seek public employment, have the right to insist that 
merit and competency shall be recognized instead of 
party subserviency, or the surrender of honest political 
belief." 

Again, in his second annual message, President Cleve- 
land says (Cong. Record, Dec. 7, 1886, p. 11) : "The 
continued operation of the law relating to our civil ser- 
vice has added the most convincing proofs of its neces- 
sity and usefulness. It is a fact worthy of note that 
every public ofticer who has a just idea of his duty to 
the people, testifies to the value of this reform. Its 
stanchest friends are found amonor those who under- 



MORTGAGING EXECUTIVE PATRONAGE. 97 

Stand it best, and its warmest supporters are those who 
are restrained and protected by its requirements. 

" The meaning of such restraint and protection is not 
appreciated by those who want places under the gov- 
ernment, regardless of merit and efficiency, nor by those 
who insist that the selection for such places should rest 
upon a proper credential showing active partisan work. 
They mean to public officers, if not their lives, the only 
opportunity afforded them to attend to public business, 
and they mean to the good people of the country the 
better performance of the work of their government. 

'' It is exceedingly strange that the scope and nature 
of this reform are so little understood, and that so many 
things not included within its plan are called by its 
name. When cavil yields more fully to examination, 
the system wmU have large additions to the number of 
its friends. 

" Our civil service reform may be imperfect in some 
of its details ; it may be misunderstood and opposed ; 
it may not always be faithfully applied ; its designs 
may sometimes miscarry through mistake or willful in- 
tent ; it may sometimes tremble under the assaults of 
its enemies or languish under the misguided zeal of im- 
practicable friends ; but if the people of this country 
ever submit to the banishment of its underlying princi- 
ple from the operation of their government, they will 
abandon the surest guarantee of the safety and success 
of American institutions." 

Representative James A. Bayard of Delaware (after- 
ward United States Senator), the grandfather of Secre- 
tary of State Thomas F. Bayard, to whose patriotic and 
disinterested exertions is largely due Thomas Jefferson's 
election to the presidency in 1801, was decidedly op- 
posed to *' mortgaging the patronage of the Executive," 

to use his own words. His views on the civil service 
5 



98 MR. bayard's honorable conduct. 

problem are expressed in a deposition^* made on April 
3, 1806, ''in a cause depending in the JSupreme Court 
of the State of New York, between James Gillespie, 
plaintiff, and Abram Smith, defendant." Mr. Bayard 
was a Federalist, but in the long contest (thirty-six bal- 
lots) for the presidency in the House of Representatives 
between the two great Republicans, Thomas Jefferson 
and Aaron Burr, was inclined, with the rest of his party 
(Federal), to support Burr, as being less opposed to 
them than Jefferson. But, after consultation and cor- 
respondence with Alexander Hamilton, Burr's personal 
character became better known to Mr. Bayard. There- 
fore, in order to keep Burr out of the presidency, and 
to prevent a failure to elect a President, and a conse- 
quent disruption of the new government, it was decided 
to put an end to the contest by the election of Jefferson. 
This was accomplished by Mr. Bayard, who held the 
vote of one State, casting a blank ballot. f But before 

* The deposition is adduced as evidence in the course of a " Vindica- 
tion of the hite James A. Bayard," by his son, Senator James A. Bay- 
ard of Delaware, and may be found, with much other documentary evi- 
dence, in the Congressional Globe for January 31, 1855, page 137. Mr. 
Bayard's vindication of his father from the chaige of falsehood made 
against him by Mr. Jefferson in his " Anas ' papers (ix, 209), is com- 
plete and overwhelming. Mr. Jefferson's charge was undoubtedly made 
under a misunderstanding of the facts of the case; and something may 
also be attributed perhaps to the adroitness of Senator Smith (whose 
deposition appears on page 100) in drawing him out. 

f Mr. Bayard, in order to avoid even the suspicion of impure motives 
in giving, as he said, ^' the ' turn ' to the election," declined an appoint- 
ment as Minister to France, tendered to him by President Adams in Feb- 
ruary, 1801, and to which he had been confirmed by the Senate, because 
it '' would be held on the tenure of Mr. Jeffersdivs pleasure." He said : 
*' My ambition shall never be gratified at the expense of a suspicion." 

Note.— I am indebted to Secretary of State T. F. Bayard for the 
minute details concerning his grandfather's course and change of senti- 
ment in the presidential election of 1801. 



WHAT MR. BAYARD WANTED. 99 

this was done, it was thought proper to secure Mr. 
Jefferson's engagement in certain important political 
matters, which are explained in the following extract 
from the deposition of Mr. Bayard : 

'*! stated to Mr. Nicholas* that if certain points of 
the future administration could be understood and ar- 
ranged with Mr Jefferson, I was authorized to say that 
three States would withdraw from an opposition to his 
election. He asked me what those points were. I an- 
swered : First, sir, the support of public credit ; sec- 
ondly, the maintenance of the naval system ; and lastly, 
that subordinate public officers, employed only in the 
execution of details established by law, shall not be 
removed from office on the ground of their political 
character, nor without complaint against their conduct. 
I explained myself, that I considered it not only rea- 
sonable, but necessary, that offices of high discretion 
and confidence should be filled by men of Mr. Jeffer- 
son's choice. I exemplified by mentioning, on the one 
hand, the offices of the Secretaries of States, Treasury, 
foreign Ministers, &c., and on the other the Collectors 
of ports, &c. Mr. Nicholas answered me, that he con- 
sidered the points as very reasonable ; that he was sat- 
isfied that they corresponded with the views and inten- 
tions of Mr. Jefferson, and [that he] knew him well. 
That he was acquainted with most of the gentlemen 
who would probably be about him and enjoying his 
confidence, in case he became President, and that if I 
would be satisfied with his assurance, he could solemnly 
declare it as his opinion that Mr. Jefferson, in his ad- 
ministration, would not depart from the points I had 
proposed." t 

* Representative John Nicholas of Virginia. 

f Mr. Bayard's deposition is corroborated by a deposition of United 



100 MR. SMITH CORROBORATES MR. BAYARD. 

Representative Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts, on 
January 30, 1811, made a very original and unique 
speech on the subject of officeholding and the appoint- 
ment of Congressmen to office. 

" Early in the session," says Mr. Edmund Quincy 
("Life of Josiah Quincy," p. 219), '^ Mr. Macon* of 
North Carolina moved the following amendment to the 
Constitution : 

" ' Hesolved, That no Senator or Representative shall 
be appointed to any civil office, place, or emolument, 
under the authority of the United States, until the ex- 
piration of the presidential term in which such person 
shall have served as a Senator or Representative.' 

States Senator Samuel Smith of Maryland, who was also a witness in 
the case of Gillespie vs. Smith, and who was requested by Mr. Bayard, 
in 1801, to inquire of Mr. Jefferson personally concerning the political 
topics named (p. 99), and to bring a direct reply the next day. Senator 
Smith says (Appendix to Cong. Globe, vol. xxxi, p. 138): "I did so. 
And the next day (Saturday) told him that Mr. Jefiferson had said that 
he did not think that such officers ought to be dismissed on political 
grounds only, except in cases where they had made improper use of 
their offices to force the officers under them to vote contrary to their 
judgment. That as to Mr. McLane, he had already been spoken to in 
his behalf by Major Eccleston, and from the character given him by 
that gentleman, he considered him a meritorious officer ; of course that 
he would not be displaced, or ought not to be displaced. I further 
added that Mr. Bayard might rest assured (or words to that effect), 
that Mr. Jefferson would conduct, as to those points, agreeably to the 
opinions I had stated as his." 

* Nathaniel Macon, born in North Carolina, 1757 ; served as a private 
in the Revolutionary War, having declined a commission. He was in 
the House and Senate frjom 1791 to 1828, the longest term of congres- 
sional service, I believe, on record. He was Speaker from 1801 to 
1807; and president pro tem. of the Senate from 1825 to 1828. Died 
1837.— E. Quincy. 

It is noteworthy that Mr. Macon's proposed amendment, which was 
again presented and urged in 1826, is in substance the same as that 
of Representative Tucker in the first Congress. (See note, page io3.) 



MR. QUINCY'S GREAT SPEECH. 101 

" Mr, Quincy moved that the following proposition 
be added to it : 

" ' And no person standing to any Senator or Rep- 
resentative in the relation of father, brother, or son, by 
blood or marriage, shall be appointed to any civil office 
under the United States, or shall receive any place, 
agency, contract, or emolument from or under any de- 
partment or officer thereof.' " 

The following are extracts from Mr. Quincy's speech, 
as reported by his son : 

" Upon this subject of offices my sentiments may per- 
haps be too refined for the present condition of human 
nature. And I am aware, in what I am about to say, 
that I may run athwart political friends as well as 
political foes. Such considerations as these shall not, 
however, deter me from introducing just and high 
notions of their duties to the consideration of the 
members of the Legislature. I hold, sir, the accept- 
ance of an office of mere emolument, or which is 
principally emolument, by a member of Congress from 
the Executive, as unworthy his station, and incompati- 
ble with that high sense of irreproachable character 
which it is one of the choicest terrestrial boons of vir- 
tue to attain. For while the attainment of office is 
to members of Congress the consequence solely of co- 
incidence with the Executive, he who has the office 
carries on his forehead the mark of having fulfilled 
the condition. And although his self-love may denom- 
inate his attainment of the office to be the reward of 
merit, the world, which usually judges acutely on these 
matters, will denominate it the reward of service. * * '^ 

"Such is the opinion which, in my judgment, ought 
to be entertained of the mere acceptance of office by 
members of Congress. But as to that other class of 



102 EXCORIATING PBOFESSIONAL OFFICESEEKERS. 

persons, who are open, notorious solicitors of office, 
they give occasion to reflections of a very different na- 
ture. This class of persons in all times past have 
appeared, and (for I say nothing of times present) in 
all times future will appear, on this and the other 
floor of Congress, creatures who, under pretense of 
serving the people, are in fact serving themselves ; 
creatures who, while their distant constituents — good, 
easy men, industrious, frugal, and unsuspicious — dream, 
in visions, that they are laboring for their country's 
welfare, are in truth spending their time mousing at 
the doors of the palace or the crannies of the depart- 
ments, and laying low snares to catch for themselves 
a-nd their relations every stray office that flits by them. 
For such men, chosen into this high and responsible 
trust, to whom have been confided the precious desti- 
nies of this people, and who thus openly abandon their 
duties, and set their places and their consciences to 
sale, in defiance of the multiplied, strong, and tender 
ties by which they are bound to their country, I have 
no language to express my contempt. I never have 
seen, and I never shall see, any of these notorious 
solicitors of office, for themselves or their relations, 
standing on this or the other floor, bawling and bully- 
ing, or coming down with dead votes in support of 
executive measures, but I think I see a hackney labor- 
ing for hire in a most degrading service ; a poor, earth- 
spirited animal, trudging in his traces, with much at- 
trition of the sides and induration of the membranes, 
encouraged by this special certainty, that, at the end 
of his journey, he shall have measured out to him his 
proportion of provender. 

" But I have heard that the bare suggestion of such 
corruption was a libel upon this House and upon this 
people. I have heard that we were in this country so 



AFTER man's OFFICE BEFORE CORPSE IS COLD. 103 

virtuous that we were above the influence of these 
allurements ; that beyond the Atlantic, in old govern- 
ments, such things might be suspected, but that here 
we were too pure for such guilt, too innocent for such 
suspicions. Mr. Chairman, I shall not hesitate, in spite 
of such popular declamation, to believe and follow the 
evidence of my senses and the concurrent testimonies 
of contemporaneous beholders. I shall not, in my esti* 
mation of character, degrade this people below, nor 
exalt them far above, the ordinary condition of culti- 
vated humanity. And of this be assured, that every 
system of conduct or course of policy which has for 
its basis an excess of virtue in this country beyond 
what human nature exhibits in its improved state else- 
where, will be found on trial fallacious. Is there on 
this earth any collection of men in which there exists a 
more intrinsic, hearty, and desperate love of office or 
place — particularly of fat places ? Is there any country 
more infested than this with the vermin that breed in 
the corruptions of power? Is there any in which place 
and official emolument more certainly follow distin- 
guished servility at elections, or base scurrility in the 
press ? And as to eagerness for the reward, what is 
the fact? Let now one of your great officeholders, a 
collector of the customs, a marshal, a commissioner of 
loans, a postmaster in one of your cities, or any officer, 
agent, or factor for your territories or public lands, or 
person holding a place of minor distinction, but of 
considerable profit, be called on to pay the last great 
debt of nature. The poor man shall hardly be dead ; 
he shall not be cold ; long before the corpse is in the 
coffin, the mail shall be crowded to repletion with let- 
ters and certificates, and recommendations and repre- 
sentations, and every species of sturdy, sycophantic 
solicitation by which obtrusive mendicity seeks charity 



104 UNSURPASSED WORD PAINTINGS. 

or invites compassion. Why, sir, we hear the clamor 
of the craving animals at the treasury-trough here in 
this capitol. Such running, such jostling, such wrig- 
gling, such clambering over one another's backs, such 
squealing because the tub is so narrow and the com- 
pany so crowded ! No, sir, let us not talk of stoical 
apathy toward the things of the national treasury, either 
in this people or in their Representatives or Senators. 

" But it will be asked (for it has been asked), Shall 
the Executive be suspected of corrupting the national 
Legislature? Is he not virtuous? Without making 
personal distinctions or references, for the sake of 
argument it may be admitted that all Executives for 
the time being are virtuous — reasonably virtuous, Mr. 
Chairman — flesh and blood notwithstanding. And 
without meaning in this place to cast any particular 
reflections upon this or upon any other Executive, this 
I will say, that if no additional guards are provided, 
and now after the spirit of party has brought into so 
full activity the spirit of patronage, there never will 
be a President of these United States, elected by means 
now in use, who, if he deals honestly with himself, 
will not be able, on quitting his presidential chair, to 
address it as John Falstaff addressed Prince Hal : ' Be- 
fore I knew thee, I knew nothing ; and now I am but 
little better than one of the wicked.' The possession 
of that station under the reign of party will make a 
man so acquainted with the corrupt principles of hu- 
man conduct ; he will behold our nature in so hungry 
and shivering and craving a state, and be compelled 
so constantly to observe the solid rewards daily de- 
manded by way of compensation for outrageous patri- 
otism, that if he escape out of that atmosphere with- 
out partaking of its corruption, he must be below or 
above the ordinary condition of mortal nature. Is it 



A GOOD OFFICE FOR A GOOD OFFICE. 105 

possible, sir, that he should remain altogether unin- 
fected? What is the fact? The Constitution prohib- 
its the members of this and of the other branch of 
the Legislature from being electors of the President 
of the United States. Yet what is done ? The prac- 
tice of late is so prevalent as to have grown almost 
into a sanctioned usage of party. Prior to the presi- 
dential terms of four years, members of Congress, hav- 
ing received the privileged ticket of admission, as- 
semble themselves in a sort of electoral college, on the 
floor of the Senate or of the House of Representatives. 
They select a candidate for the presidency. * To their 
voice, to their influence, he is indebted for his eleva- 
tion. So long as this condition of things continues, 
what ordinary Executive will refuse to accommodate 
those who in so distinguished a manner have accom- 
modated him? Is there a better reason in the world 
why a man should give you, Mr. Chairman, an office 
worth two or three thousand dollars a year, for which 
you are qualified, and which he could give as well as 
not, than this — that you had been greatly instrumental 
in giving him one worth five and twenty thousand, for 
which he was equally qualified ? It is in vain to con- 
ceal it. So long as the present condition of things 
continues, it may reasonably be expected that there 
shall take place regularly betw^een the President of the 

* This system continued till 1824, when William H. Crawford, who 
was nominated in accordance with it, ran behind both Adams and Jack- 
son. In 1828 Jackson and Adams ran withoat any formal nomination. 
The first national Convention was held by the Democratic party in Bal- 
timore in 1832, when Jackson and Van Bnren were nominated. The 
Whigs held their first national Convention in Harrisburg in December, 
1839, when General Harrison and John Tyler were nominated. In New 
York and Pennsylvania the caucus system was superseded by State Con- 
ventions between 1820 and 1830. Mr. Quincy helped to kill "King 
Caucus," as the system was sometimes called. 



106 WHAT MR. QUINCY'S FATHER SAID. 

United States and a portion of both Houses of Congress 
an interchange, strictly speaking, of good offices."* 

Mr. Quincy's speech, which may be found in full in 
Gales & Seaton's "Debates" for 1810-1811, beginning 
at page 843, closed as follows : 

"The principle for which I contend, and which is 
the basis both of the original amendment and of my 
proposition, is this : Put it out of the power of the 
Executive to seem to pay any of the members of Con- 
gress, by putting it out of their power to receive. 
' Avoid the appearance of evil.' We have been taught 
to pray, 'Lead us not into temptation.' They who 
rightly estimate their duties may find in public life no 
less necessity than in private life frequently to repeat 
this aspiration."* 

Josiah Quincy, Jr., father of the author of the fore- 
going remarkable speech, who died just before the Rev- 
olutionary War (1775), but whose able pen helped to 
gain American independence, says that " quam diu se 
bene gessermt^'' (during good behavior), is "a regula- 
tion which ought to be the tenure of all ofiices of public 
trust." (" Life of J. Quincy, Jr.," p. 443.) 

Senator John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, in 1835, 
in a " Report on the extent of Executive Patronage," 
said (Cralle's "Calhoun," v, 152) : "Were a premium 
offered for the best means of extending to the utmost 
the power of patronage ; to destroy the love of coun- 
try, and to substitute a spirit of subserviency and man- 
worship ; to encourage vice and discourage virtue ; 

* Josiah Quincy (born Feb. 4, 1772, died July 1, 1864) "first laid 
down the law (1822) * * * that the publication of the truth, with 
a good intention, and for a justifiable end, is not libelous. This ruling 
excited much censure at the time, out is now the acknowledged rule of 
law in this country and in England." (Am. Cyclopedia, xiv, 154.) 



THE PROBLEM IN A NUTSHELL. 107 

and, in a word, to prepare for the subversion of lib- 
erty and the establishment of despotism, no scheme 
more perfect could be devised." 

Again, in 18-40, in a speech in the Senate, Mr. Cal- 
houn said (iv, 302) : " The presidential election is no 
longer a struggle for great principles, but only a great 
struggle as to who shall have the spoils of office." 

Senator John Holmes of Maine, speaking of " Exec- 
utive power of Removal," explained the civil service 
problem in a nutshell. He said (G. & S.'s " Debates," 
1829-30, vol. vi, pt. i, p. 389) : " The ability and fidel- 
ity of the officer in office would be better evidence 
than ten thousand recommendations in favor of the 
candidate who would supersede him. * * * The 
longer a faithful officer is in, the better will his experi- 
ence enable him to perform the duties." 

Secretary of State Thomas F. i^ayard, who has per- 
haps seen as much of the evils of the machine in poli- 
tics as any man in this country, says ('^ Dartmouth 
Oration," 1882) : '• We see * * * hungry seekers for 
office, savage with delay and disappointment, and furi- 
ous for success. * * * From such scenes and contro- 
versies men of dignity, refinement, and self-respect nat- 
urally shrink, * * * and places that should be filled 
by men possessing qualities that win and deserve pri- 
vate and public confidence, are filled by adroit, schem- 
ing, unblushing manipulators, who scoff at personal 
dignity and self-respect, and avow themselves ' prac- 
tical politicians.' * * * Personal independence, indi- 
vidual conscience, fidelity to honest conviction, weigh 
nothing and can avail nothing to the man enlisted in 
the spoils system of politics." * 

* The views of many other statesmen of the present day might be 
given, but they would make a small volume of themselves. The views 
of a few have already been given here and there. They are typical 



108 PATEOXAGE IS POVVEE. 

William Paley, D.D., writing (about 1785) of "The 
British Constitution," says (" Moral and Political Phil- 
osophy," p. 205) : " When the Constitution conferred 
upon the Crown the nomination to all employments in 
the public service, the authors of this arrangement 
were led to it by the obvious propriety of leaving to a 
master the choice of his servants, and by the manifest 
inconveniency of engaging the National Council, upon 
every vacancy, in those personal interests which attend 
elections to places of honor and emolument. Our an- 
cestors did not observe that this disposition added an 
influence to the regal oflice which, as the number and 
value of public employments increased^"^ would super- 
sede in a great measure the forms and change the char- 
acter of the ancient Constitution. They knew not, 
what the experience and reflection of modern ages have 
discovered, that patronage universally is power ; that 
he who possesses in a sufficient degree the means of 
gratifying the desires of mankind after wealth and dis- 
tinction, by whatever checks and forms his authority 
may be limited or disguised, will direct the manage- 
ment of public affairs. Whatever be the mechanism of 
the political engine, he will guide the motion. * * * 
Changes ought not to be adventured upon without a 
comprehensive discernment of the consequences — with- 
out a knowledge as well of the remote tendency as of 
the immediate design." 

In speaking of the checks and balances of the British 
Constitution, Doctor Paley says (p. 211) : " The King's 
choice of his Ministers is controlled by the obligation 
he is under of appointing those men to offices in the 

cases, and ought therefore to suffice. Many '' leading statesmen's prin- 
ciples " appear in the succeeding chapter in preference to this because 
they treat of the power of removal. (See pages 210 to 216.) 
* The italics are mine. Compare with page 66. 



INFLUENCE OF FAVORITISM SUBDUED. 109 

state who are found capable of managing the affairs of 
bis government with the two Houses of Parliament. 
Which consideration imposes such a necessity upon the 
Crown as hath in a great measure subdued the influ- 
ence of favoritism ; insomuch that it is become no 
uncommon spectacle in this country to see men pro- 
moted by the King to the highest offices and richest 
preferments which he has in his power to bestow, who 
have been distinguished by their opposition to his per- 
sonal inclinations." 

In speaking of plans for " an equal or a reformed 
representation," he says (pp. 215, 216): ^' One conse- 
quence, however, may be expected from these projects, 
namely, ' less flexibility to the influence of the Crown.^ 
And since the diminution of this influence is the de- 
clared and perhaps the sole design of the various 
schemes that have been produced, whether for regu- 
lating the elections, contracting the duration, or for 
purifying the constitution of Parliament by the ex- 
clusion of placemen and pensioners, it is obvious to 
remark that the more apt and natural as well as the 
more safe and quiet way of attaining the same end 
would be by a direct reduction of the patronage of the 
Crown, which might be effected to a certain extent 
without hazarding further consequences. Superfluous 
and exorbitant emoluments of office may not only be 
suppressed for the present, but provisions of law be 
devised which should for the future restrain within 
certain limits the number and value of the offices in 
the donation of the King. * * * It is the nature 
of power always to press upon the boundaries which 
confine it." * 

* It is noteworthy that so profound a thinker as Dr. Paley should 
favor woman suffrage. Speaking of the right of representation, he says 
(p. 214): " We waive a controversy with those writers who insist upon 



110 PATRONAGE THE BOX OF PANDORA. 

James Wilson, LL.D., one of the framers of the na- 
tional Constitution,* and afterward an Associate Jus- 
tice of the United States Supreme Court, in the course 
of a lecture entitled a " Comparison of the Constitution 
of the United States with that of Great Britain," thus 
expatiates concerning the evils of patronage {" Lectures 
on Law," i, 446) : *' We are now arrived, in our pro- 
gress, at another fountain, from which, in Great Brit- 
ain, the waters of bitterness have plentifully flowed — 
I mean the fountain of office. * * * Offices of trust 
and profit are scattered, with a lavish hand, among 
those by whom a return, very dangerous to the liber- 
ties of the nation, may be made, and from whom such 
a return is but too often expected. This is the box of 
Pandora, which has been opened on Britain. To its 
poisonous emanations have been owing the contamina- 
ted and contaminating scenes of venality, of prostitu- 
tion, and corruption which have crowded and disgraced 
her political theater. To the same efficacy liave been 
owing the indiscriminate profligacy and universal de- 
generacy which have been diffused through every chan- 
nel into which the treasures of the public have pro- 
cured admission." 

representation as a ' natural ' light. We consider it so far only, as a 
right at all, as it conduces to public utility ; that is, as it contributes to 
the establishment of good laws, or as it secures to the people the just 
administration of these laws. These effects depend upon the disposition 
and abilities of the national counselors. * -x- -sf if thjg right be 
* natural,' no doubt it must be equal, and the right, we may add, of one 
sex as well as of the other. AVhereas every plan of representation that 
we have heard of begins by excluding the votes of women, thus cutting 
off, at a single stroke, one-half the public from a right which is as- 
serted to be inherent in all ; a right too, as some represent it, not only 
universal, but inalienable, and indefeasible, and imprescriptible." 

* Washington called Mr. W^ilson " as able, candid, and honest a mem- 
ber as was in the Convention." (Bancroft's His. of the Const., ii, 241.) 



JUSTICE WILSON'S CIVIL SEKVICE KULES. Ill 

In another lecture, entitled ^- Of aovernment " (i, 401-2), Justice Wil- 
son lays down fundamental rules for guidance in appointments to office : 
''The appointment to offices is an important part of the executive au- 
thority. Much of the ease, much of the reputation, much of the energy, 
and much of the safety of the nation depends on judicious and impartial 
appointments. But are impartiality and fine discernment hkely to pre- 
dominate in a numerous executive body? In proportion to their own 
number will be the number of their friends, favorites, and dependents. 
An office is to be filled. A person nearly connected by some of the fore- 
going ties with one of those who are to vote hi filling it, is named as a 
candidate. His patron is under no necessity to take any part, particu- 
larly responsible, in his appointment. He may appear even cold and in- 
different on the occasion. But lie possesses an advantage, the value of 
which is well imderstood in bodies of this kind. Every member who 
gives, on his account, a vote for his friend, will expect the return of a 
similar favor on the first convenient opportunity. In this manner a re- 
ciprocal intercoiu'se of partiality, of interestedness, of favoritism, perhaps 
of venality, is estabhshed; and in no particular instance is there a prac- 
ticability of tracing the poison to its source. Ignorant, vicious, and pros- 
tituted characters are introduced into office ; and some of those who 
voted, and procured others to vote for them, are the first and loudest in 
expressing their astonishment that the door of admission was ever opened 
to men of their infamous description. * * * Those who possess talents 
and virtues, which would reflect honor on office, will be reluctant to 
appear as candidates for appointments. If they should be brought into 
view, what weight will virtue, merit, and talents for office have in a 
balance held and poised b}^ partiality, intrigue, and chicane ? 

'' The person who nominates or makes appointments to office should 
be known. His own office, his own character, liis own fortune should 
be responsible. He should be alike imfettered and unsheltered by coun- 
selors. No constitutional stalking-horse should be provided for him to 
conceal his turnings and windings, when they are too dark and too 
crooked to be exposed to public view. Instead of the dishonorable in- 
tercourse which I have alreadj^ mentioned, an intercourse of a very dif- 
ferent kind should be established — an intercourse of integrity and dis- 
cernment on the part of the magistrate who appoints, and of gratitude 
and confidence on the part of the people who will receive the benefit of 
his appointments. Appointments made and sanctioned in this highly 
respectable manner will, like a fragrant and beneficent atmosphere, dif- 
fuse sweetness and gladness around those to whom they are given. 
Modest merit will be beckoned to in order to encourage her to come 
forward. Bare-faced impudence and unprincipled intrigue wiU receive 
repulse and disappointment, deservedly their portion." 



CHAPTER VIII. 

THE POWER OF REMOVAL.* 

A remedy for its Mistakes and Abuses. — The Power discussed in tlie 
first Congress (1789). — The Decision tlien made criticised by Ben- 
ton, Webster, and others. — The 4- Years' Term Law (note). 

The debate in the first Congress on the power to 
remove public officials was one of great interest and 
importance, and was besides very instructive. A bill 
was introduced in the House creating ^^The Depart- 

* On July 27, 1842, a Select Committee of the House, Garrett Davis 
chairman, reported as to '' the cause, manner, and circumstances of tlie 
removal of Henr}^ H. Sylvester, late a clerk in the Pension Office." It 
favored the repeal of tlie 4-years' law ; also the giving of written reasons 
for removals, that tlie removed officer might have '' an opportunity to 
arraign his superior for an abuse of power, both before the country and 
Congress." It denounced secret removals as '' unjust, impolitic, and im- 
moral." '*No removal should ever take place except when the public 
weal requires it." It further says (H. Repts. Xo. 945, 27th Cong., 2d 
Sess., vol. iv, p. 4): '' Your committee know no portion of the American 
population which is more oppressed and enslaved in will and spirit than 
the subordinates in the executive departments ; none among whom there 
is more mental suffering, arisiug from a constant dread of being visited 
with the petty proscription of some small tyrant, 'clothed with (sic) a 
little brief authority,' by which they and theii families are to be de- 
prived of their support. It was the duty of Mr. Spencer * * * to 
have protected such a subordinate as Sj'lvester." 

On page 6 of this powerful and most admirable report the committee 
says : " The practice of treating all the offices of this great government 
as 'the spoils of victor}^,' and, with the rise and fall of contending par- 
ties, the ejection of a large multitude of experienced, honest and capable 
incumbents, to make room for needy mercenaries, who entered the polit- 
ical conflict without any principle or love of countr3% but impelled wholly 
by a hope of plunder, is the greatest and most threatening abuse that 
has ever invaded our sj^stem. It makes the President the great feuda- 



"a:n^ inviolable eight." 113 

ment of Foreign Affairs^' (State Department), the Sec- 
retary of which was, in the words of the bill, ^^to be re- 
movable by the President of the United States/^* The 
discussion was on striking out the last quoted words. 
The majority claimed that the President alone had the 
power of removal, while the minority claimed that the 
consent of the Senate was necessary ; that is, in the 
case of officers confirmed by the Senate. 

Judged by the light of nearly a century of experi- 
ence, it is plain that both sides were partly right and 
partly wrong. The forefathers, who were legislating 
for less than four million of people, were constructing 
a political chart to guide and protect future gener- 
ations, and it is not strange that they should have 
made a few mistakes. While it is clear, as pointed 
out by the majority, that the President should have 

tory of the nation, and all offices fiefs^ whose tenure is suit and service 
to him. It is because all those fiefs are at his sovereign will, to be con- 
tirraed or granted anew after each presidential election, that the whole 
country is kept perpetually convulsed by that oft-recurring and all- 
absorbing event." 

The report of the Moreiiead Committee on Retrenchment, made June 
15, 1844, is chiefly devoted to the evils of executive patronage and the 
abuse of the power of removal. Speaking of the latter subject, the com- 
mittee proclaims the following incontrovertible truth (S. Docs. No. 399, 
28th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. vii, p. 31): ''A citizen of the United States 
who accepts a public trust, however obscure his birth or humble his em- 
ployment, has an inviolable right to be protected in the faithful discharge 
of his duties from the violence or the menaces of arbitrary power." 

On page 55 the committee recommends the passage of a civil service 
law (the first of its kind, so fiar as 1 know, ever made in Congress), as 
follows : " That a law ought to be passed, prescribing regulations as re- 
gards the qualifications, the appointment of persons to office, * * * and 
declaring the disquah fications or the reasons which will be considered 
in law sufficient to authorize the President, the heads of departments, 
and courts of law to suspend, dismiss, or remove persons from office." 

* The motion to establish the above and other Executive Departments 
was made originally by Mr. Boudinot, in a speech, on May 19, 1789. 



il4 A PROPOSED BOARD OF APPEALS. 

the power of removal, it is equally clear, as pointed 
out by the minority, that there should be a cheek to 
prevent him or anybody else from abusing it. Fur- 
ther, the President and his chief officials are as liable 
to make mistakes as other men. Of all public men 
they should be the first to correct a mistake or to 
right a wrong, and thus set an example for others to 
follow. 

We should give officeholders, chief as well as sub- 
ordinate, all the protection we can from mistakes, dis- 
likes, fits of passion, jealousy, prejudices, caprices, in- 
trigues, &c. But what kind of protection can we give 
them? It appears to me that, under the civil service 
law system, a Board of Appeals should be established, 
which could be increased in number as the number of 
offices and the scope of the law increase, before w^hich 
all reasonable complaints could be heard, and that where 
the complaint is sustained, the aggrieved official should 
be reinstated wdth full pay.* It is required by Rule 
16 that the Civil Service Commissioners shall perform 
the work of this proposed Board. But as the Commis- 

* There is a remedy lor every distemper in government, if the people 
are not wanting to themselves. For a people wanting to themselves, 
there is no remedy. — James Wilson. 

Napoleon was a despot, it is said. Yet he never dismissed any one 
from public office without an inquiry and report of facts, and rarely 
ever without hearing the accused functionary ; never when the questions 
involved were civil or administrative. — Napoleonic Ideas. By Louis 
Napoleon. 

But Napoleon, who was a statesman as well as a soldier, sometimes 
dismissed officials without much ceremony, " ' You cannot find me 
guilty of dishonesty,' observed the minister, Barbe-Marbois, on receiving 
his dismissal. ' I had rather,* replied Napoleon, * that you had shown 
yourself dishonest than a fool. There is a limit to one ; there is none 
whatever to the other.' " (Crowe's " History of France," v, 147.) 

Napoleon was right in one respect at least, namely, that fools are not 
proper persons to fill public offices 



RESTRAINT THE BODY-POLITIC SAFETY-VALVE. 115 

sioners are already overworked, the proposition is not 
practical. The functions of this proposed Board would 
resemble in one respect those of the Supreme Court of 
the United States, for one of the most important func- 
tions of the Supreme Court is to correct the mistakes 
of the legislative and executive departments. Again, 
having had nothing to do with the nomination, confir- 
mation, or appointment of officers, it would, like the 
Supreme Court, be free of prejudice. Such a Board 
would be at least a partial check on the President and 
all other chief officials, and would aid in preventing 
some future Jackson or Lincoln from throwing the 
official machinery of government out of gear. This is 
well, for restraint, in public as well as in private life, 
is the safety-valve of the body-politic. 

The minority, as before said, were certainly right 
about the necessity of a check to prevent the Presi- 
dent from abusing the power of removal. But the 
senatorial check they proposed, however practical it 
may have been then, is certainly not practical now, 
for, on account of the great increase of business, the 
Senate has hardly time now to look after confirmations, 
much less removals. Further, the exact check they 
proposed was incorporated in the Tenure of Office Act 
of 1866-67,* and was found in practice to be unsatis- 
factory. One example of its inefficacy will suffice. J. 
D. Cox, in an article in the North American Review 
for January, 1871 (p. 87), in speaking of the corrup- 
tion at Washington after the demoralizing civil war, 
and incidentally of the Tenure of Office Act, says that 
** dishonest (official) incumbents were plundering the 
people under the shelter of a Tenure of Office Act, 
which seemed to be skillfully adapted to remove every 

* Repealed in 1887. 



116 GREAT USE AND POWER OF THE SENATE. 

trace of responsibility from both the appointing and 
confirming powers. The Republicans in Congress were 
complaining that the President refused to remove men 
who were indicted or convicted in the courts, and the 
friends of the President retorted that the Senate refused 
to consent to the removal of others who were proven to 
be plunderers of the treasury on the like evidence." * 

Again, the minority were certainly right about it 
being the intention of the framers of the Constitution 
that the Senate should be a check on the President, 
and also (which was admitted by the majority) that 
its duties are sometimes executive and sometimes ju- 
dicial, and that it is to this extent blended with both 
the executive and judicial departments The Senate, 
so far as the removal of an ofticer confirmed by it is 
concerned, is at all times a more or less perfect check 
on the President, because he has to depend on it for 
the confirmation of a successor. The Senate, in fact, as 
it is almost self-evident was the intention of the framers 
of the Constitution, exercises great power. It should 
therefore be composed of experienced and trained states- 
men only. No mere politician should enter its cham- 
ber. And it would be better, far better, that its mem- 
bers should all be as poor as Socrates, than that one of 
them should be chosen on account of his wealth, or be 
even charged with buying his election. Bad men may 
get into the Senate ; but the people who, on account 
of this fact, howl for its abolition, would destroy the 
equilibrium of the government. They might as well, 
for the same reason, ask for the abolition of either the 
House of Representatives or the United States Supreme 
Court. The proper remedy is purification. 

* See the remarkable prediction of Representative Ames, page 125. 
Mr. Madison (page 117) also indulges in some lamentable forebodings, 
and under the patronage system their realization is not impossible. 



THE NEED AND USE OF RESPONSIBILITY. 117 



SPEECHES IN FAVOR OF REMOVAL BY THE PRESIDENT 

ALONE. * 

James Madison of Virginia said (pp. 462, 463, 496, 
498, 581) : " It is evidently the intention of the Con- 
stitution that the first Magistrate should be responsi- 
ble for the executive department. So far therefore as 
we do not make the officers who are to aid him in 
the duties of that department responsible to him, he 
is not responsible to his country. Again, is there no 
danger that an officer, when he is appointed by the 
concurrence of the Senate, and has friends in that body, 
may choose rather to risk his establishment on the favor 
of that branch than rest it upon the discharge of his 
duties to the satisfaction of the executive branch, which 
is constitutionally authorized to inspect and control his 
conduct? And if it should happen that the officers 
connect themselves with the Senate, they may mutu- 
ally support each other, and for want of efficacy re- 
duce the power of the President to a mere vapor ; in 
which case his responsibility would be annihilated, and 
the expectation of it unjust. The high executive of- 
ficers, joined in cabal with the Senate, would lay the 
foundation of discord, and end in an assumption of the 
executive power, only to be removed by a revolution in 
the government. I believe no principle is more clearly 
laid down in the Constitution than that of responsi- 
bility. * * * 

* The salient points only of this debate are given. They are taken 
from vol. i of " The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the 
United States, compiled from authentic materials, by Joseph Gales, Sr." 
The speeches, divided pro and con, are given in the order of their de- 
livery ; but those who spoke twice or three times, have their remarks 
combined in one speech. Repetitions of arguments, either by the same 
or different speakers, have, as far as practicable, been omitted. 



118 REMOVAL AN EXECUTIVE POWER. 

" Is the power of displacing an executive power ? I 
conceive that if any power whatsoever is in its nature 
executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and 
controlling those who execute the laws. If the Con- 
stitution had not qualified the power of the President 
in appointing to office, by associating the Senate with 
him in that business, would it not be clear that he would 
have the right, by virtue of his executive power, to 
make such appointment ? Should we be authorized, in 
defiance of that clause in the Constitution, ' The exec- 
utive power shall be vested in a President,' to unite 
the Senate with the President in the appointment to 
office ? * * * If it is admitted that we should not, 
I think it may be disputed whether we have a right 
to associate them in removing persons from office, the 
one power being as much of an executive nature as 
the other ; and the first only is authorized by being 
excepted out of the general rule established by the 
Constitution, in these words : ' The executive power 
shall be vested in a President.' * * * 

" The doctrine, however, which seems to stand most 
in opposition to the principles I contend for is that the 
power to annul an appointment is, in the nature of 
things, incidental to the power which makes the ap- 
pointment. I agree that if nothing more was said in 
the Constitution than that the President, by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate, should appoint 
to office, there would be great force in saying that the 
power of removal resulted, by a natural implication, 
from the power of appointing. But there is another 
part of the Constitution no less explicit than the one 
on which the gentleman's doctrine is founded. It is 
that part which declares that the executive power shall 
be vested in a President of the United States. The 
association of the Senate with the President in exer- 



GOOD OFFICERS SHOL'Ln NOT BE REMOVED. ]19 

cising that particular function is an exception to this 
general rule ; ana exceptions to general rules, I con- 
ceive, are ever to be taken strictly.* But there is an- 
other part of the Constitution which inclines, in my 
judgment, to favor the construction I put upon it — 
the President is required to take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed. If the duty to see the laws faith- 
fully executed be required at the hands of the Execu- 
tive Magistrate, it would seem that it was generally in- 
tended he should have that species of power which is 
necessary to accomplish that end. * * * Now if the 
officer, when once appointed, is not to depend upon 
the President for his official existence, but upon a dis- 
tinct body (for where there are two negatives required, 
either can prevent the removal), I confess I do not see 
how the President can take care that the laws be faith- 
• fully executed. * * * 

" The danger then consists merely in this : the Presi- 
dent can displace from office a man whose merits re- 
quire that he should be continued in it. What will 
* * * operate to prevent it (this abuse of power) ? 

♦Daniel Webster says (iv, 193): '' The error of this argument lies in 
this. It supposes the power of removal to be held by the President 
under the general grant of executive power. Now it is certain that the 
power of appointment is not held under that general grant, because it 
is particularly provided for, and is conferred, in express terms, on the 
President and Senate. If therefore the power of removal be a natural 
appendage to the power of appointment, then it is not conferred by the 
GENERAL WORDS granting executive power to the President, but is con- 
ferred by the special clause which gives the appointing power to the 
President and Senate. •»• * * if exceptions to a general rule are to 
be taken strictly, when expressed, it is still more clear, when they are 
not expressed at all, that they are not to be implied except on evident 
and clear grounds ; and as the general power of appointment is conf ss- 
edly given to the President and Senate, no exception is to be implied in 
favor of one part of that general power, namely, the removing part, un- 
less for some obvious and irresistible reason." 



120 WHEN IMPEACHMENT IS JUSTIFIABLE. 

In the first place, he will be impeachable by this House, 
before the Senate, for such an act of maladministration, 
for I contend that the wanton removal of meritorious 
officers would subject him to impeachment and removal 
from his own high trust. * * * Can he accomplish 
this end ? No. He can place no man in the vacancy 
whom the Senate shall not approve. 

*^ If there is any point in which the separation of 
the legislative and executive powers ought to be main- 
tained with greater caution, it is that which relates to 
officers and offices. The powers relative to offices are 
partly legislative and partly executive. The Legisla- 
ture creates the office, defines the powers, limits its 
duration, and annexes a compensation. This done, the 
legislative power ceases. They ought to have nothing 
to do with designating the man to fill the office. That 
I conceive to be of an executive nature." 

John Vining of Delaware said (pp. 465, 511): "If 
this power is not in the President, it is not vested in 
any body whatever. It cannot be within the legisla- 
tive power of the Senate, because it is of an adverse 
nature. It caimot be within the executive power of 
the Senate, because they possess none but what is ex- 
pressly granted by the Constitution. * * * 

"I take it that the best principle is that he who is 
responsible for the conduct of the officer, ought to have 
the power of removing him. * * * Perhaps it might 
be equally right that the responsible person should have 
the appointment of those who are to aid him. But 
this case is qualified by an express stipulation in the 
Constitution, and therefore must be submitted to. 

" The argument of convenience is strong in favor 
of the President, for this man (Secretary F. A.) is an 
arm or an eye to him. He sees and writes his secret dis- 
patches. He is an instrument over which the President 



SENATE LESS INTERESTED THAN PRESIDENT. 121 

ought to have a complete command. * * * If the Pres- 
ident removes a valuable officer, which seems to be the 
great danger the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. 
Smith) apprehends, it would be an act of tyranny which 
the good sense of the nation would never forget. But 
if the Senate turns out a good man, they might be re- 
elected by the Legislatures. The Senate may remove 
a good officer without feeling any injury. They are 
not feelingly sensible of the advantages arising from 
his labors, because they do not act in concert with him ; 
while the President, by such a removal, deprives him- 
self of a valuable and necessary aid. When a good 
officer is obtained, the President has every motive of 
justice, self-interest, and public good to retain him in 
his situation. None of these motives operate, or but 
faintly operate, upon the Senate." 

On page 570 Mr. Vining, in reply to Mr. Jackson, 
speaks of the danger '* of denying the Executive a due 
proportion of power." This, he said, was the case in 
both Sweden and Poland. "In Sweden," he said, "the 
limited power of the King was nearly annihilated by 
an aristocracy." The King, " for the security of his 
nation," and with the assent of the nation, had been 
compelled " to assume all the powers of despotism." 
Of Poland he said : " The object of the Poles has been 
to guard against what was called the encroachments 
of the throne. ' It is not,' said they but a century ago, 
^ a master that we want, it is only a chief.' Some went 
further, and asserted that a free people w^anted no chief 
at all." Of our own government he said : " If by legis- 
lative encroachment we weaken the executive arm, we 
render it incapable of performing the functions assigned 
it by the Constitution, and subject it to become an easy 
prey to the other branches of the government." 

Elias Boudinot of New Jersey said (pp. 468, 409, 527, 
6 



122 THE SENATE MAY THWART THE PRESIDENT. 

528) : '^ Let us examine whether it (the power of re- 
moval) belongs to the Senate and President. Certain- 
ly, sir, there is nothing that gives the Senate this right 
in express terms. But they are authorized, in express 
words, to be concerned in the appointment. And does 
this necessarily include the power of removal? If the 
President complains to the Senate of the misconduct of 
an officer, and desires their advice and consent to the 
removal, what are the Senate to do ? Most certainly 
they will inquire if the complaint is well founded. To 
do this they must call the officer before them to answer. 
Who then are the parties ? The supreme executive of- 
ficer against his assistant ; and the Senate are to sit as 
judges, to determine whether sufficient cause of removal 
exists. Does not this set the Senate over the head of 
the President? But suppose they shall decide in favor 
of the officer. What a situation is the President then 
in, surrounded by officers with whom, by his situation, 
he is compelled to act, but in whom he can have no 
confidence ; reversing the privilege given him by the 
Constitution, to prevent his having officers imposed 
upon him who do not meet his approbation ! 

" But I have another more solid objection, which 
places the question in a more important point of view. 
The Constitution has placed the Senate as the only 
security and barrier between the House of Representa- 
tives and the President. Suppose the President has 
desired the Senate to concur in removing an officer, 
and they have declined. Or suppose the House has 
applied to the President and Senate to remove an of- 
ficer obnoxious to them, and they determine against the 
measure. The House can have recourse to nothing but 
an impeachment, if they suppose the criminality of the 
officer will warrant such procedure. Will the Senate 
then be that upright court which they ought to ap- 



WHY TriE SENATE SHOULD BE UNPREJUDICED. 123 

peal to on this occasion, when they have prejudged your 
cause? I conceive the Senate will be too much under 
the control of their former decision to be a proper body 
for this House to apply to for impartial justice. As 
the Senate are the dernier resort, and the only court 
of judicature which can determine on cases of impeach- 
ment, I am for preserving them free and independent, 
both on account of the officer and this House. I there- 
fore conceive that it was never the intention of the 
Constitution to vest the power of removal in the Presi- 
dent and Senate ; but as it must exist somewhere, it 
rests on the President alone. * * * 

" The President nominates and appoints. He is fur- 
ther expressly authorized to commission all officers. 
Now does it appear from this distribution of power that 
the Senate appoints ? Does an officer exercise powers 
by authority of the Senate ? No. I believe the Presi- 
dent is the person from whom he derives his authority. 
He appoints, but under a check. It is necessary to 
obtain the consent of the Senate. But after that is 
obtained, I ask who appoints? Who vests the officer 
with authority ? Who commissions him ? The Presi- 
dent does these acts by his sole power, but they are ex- 
ercised in consequence of the advice of another branch 
of the government. If therefore the officer receives his 
authority and commission from the President, surely 
the removal follows as coincident. * * * The Con- 
stitution vested* all executive power in the President. 
The power of designating and appointing officers to 
execute the laws was in its nature executive. Conse- 
quently the President would appoint ex officio^ if he 
had not been limited by the express words of the Con- 
stitution. Hence he (Mr. Boudinot) inferred, ex officio, 
he would remove without limitation. 

* The four closing sentences are reported in the second person. 



]24 SUSPENSION A NUGATORY POWER. 

'• Gentlemen say they have a sufficient remedy for 
every evil likely to result from connecting the Senate 
with the President. This they propose to do by allow- 
ing the power of suspension. This does not answer 
the end, because there is a possibility that the officer 
may not be displaced after a hearing before the Sen- 
ate. * * * Yf^Q l^a(j better at once give a power 
that would answer two valuable purposes, than one alto- 
gether nugatory. In the first place, it (removal) would 
entirely separate the legislative and executive depart- 
ments, conformably to the great principles of the Con- 
stitution ; and, in the second place, it would answer the 
end of government better, and secure real benefits to 
the Union." 

Fisher Ames of Massachusetts said (pp. 474, 475, 476, 
477, 540) : " The executive powers are delegated to the 
President with a view to have a responsible officer to 
superintend, control, inspect, and check the officers nec- 
essarily employed in administering the laws. The only 
bond between him and those he employs is the confi- 
dence he has in their integrity and talents. When that 
confidence ceases, the principal ought to have power to 
remove those whom he can no longer trust with sefety. 
* * * The powers of the President are defined in the 
Constitution. But it is said that he is not expressly 
authorized to remove from office. If the Constitution 
is silent also with respect to the Senate, the argument 
may be retorted. If this silence proves that the power 
cannot be exercised by the President, it certainly proves 
that it cannot be exercised by the President by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate. The power 
of removal is incident to government. But not being 
distributed by the Constitution, it will come before the 
Legislature, and, like every other omitted case, must be 
supplied by law. 



HOW SENATE MAY CAUSE SERIOUS TROUBLE. 125 

* "The attempt to blend the executive and legislative' 
departments in exercising the power of removal is such 
a mixing as ought not to be carried into practice on 
arguments grounded on implication. And the gentle- 
man from Virginia (Mr. White's) reasoning is wholly 
drawn from implication. He supposes, as the Consti- 
tution qualifies the President's power of appointing to 
office by subjecting his nominations to the concurrence 
of the Senate, that the qualification follows of course 
in the removal. 

" Another reason occurs to me against blending these 
powers. An officer who superintends the public reve- 
nue will naturally acquire a great influence. If he ob- 
tains support in the Senate, upon an attempt of the 
President to remove him, it will be out of the power 
of the House, when applied to by the first Magistrate, 
to impeach him with success, for the very means of 
proving charges of malconduct against him will be 
under the power of the officer. All the papers neces- 
sary to convict fiim may be withheld while the person 
continues in his office. Protection may be rendered 
for protection ; and as this officer has such exten- 
sive influence, it may be exerted to procure the re- 
election of his friends. These circumstances, in addi- 
tion to those stated by the gentleman from New Jersey 
(Mr. Boudinot), must clearly evince to every gentleman 
the impropriety of connecting the Senate with the Pres- 
ident in removing from office. * 

* On page 542 Mr. Ames says : " If the Senate are to possess the 
power of removal, they will be enabled to hold the person in office, let 
the circumstances be what they may that point out the necessity or pro- 
priety of his removal. It creates a permanent connection. It will 
nurse faction. It will promote intrigue to obtain protectors and to 
shelter tools. Sir, it is infusing poison into the Constitution. * * * 
There is ruin in it. It is tempting the Senate with forbidden fruit." 



126 PRESIDENT'S EXECUTIVE POWER ILLUSTRATED. 

*• But why should we connect the Senate in the re- 
moval ? Their attention is taken up with other impor- 
tant business, and they have no constitutional authority 
to watch the conduct of the executive officers, and there- 
fore cannot use such authority with advantage. If the 
President is inclined to shelter himself behind the Sen- 
ate with respect to having continued an improper per- 
son in office, we lose the responsibility, which is our 
greatest security. The blame among so many will be 
lost. * * * 

^^ It must be admitted that the Constitution is not 
explicit on the point in contest. Yet the Constitution 
strongly infers that the power is in the President alone. 
It is declared that the executive power shall be vested 
in the President. Under these terms all the powers 
properly belonging to the executive department of the 
government are given, and such only taken away as are 
expressly excepted. If the Constitution had stopped 
here, and the duties had not been defined, either the 
President had had no powers at all, or he would acquire 
from that general expression all the powers properly 
belonging to the executive department. * * * 

" The President * * * is the agent. The Senate 
may prevent his acting, but cannot act themselves. It 
may be difficult to illustrate this point by examples 
which will exactly correspond. But suppose the case 
of an executor, to whom is devised land, to be sold 
with the advice of a certain person, on certain condi- 
tions. The executor sells, with the consent and on the 
conditions required in the will. The conditions are 
broken. May the executor re-enter for the breach of 
them ? Or has the person with whom he was obliged 
to consult in the sale any power to restrain him ? The 
executor may remove the wrongful possessor from the 
land, though perhaps by the will he may hold it in trust 



SENATE NOT INSPECTORS OF OFFICERS. 127 

for another person's benefit. In this manner the Presi- 
dent may remove from office ; though, when vacant, he 
cannot fill it without the advice of the Senate." 

Thomas Hartley of Pennsylvania said (pp. 479, 480, 
481): "This is an office of considerable importance. 
j* * * In all commercial countries it will require men 
of high talents to fill such an office, and great respon- 
sibility. It is necessary to connect the business in such 
a manner as to give the President a complete command 
over it ; so in whatever hands it is placed, or however 
modulated, it must be subjected to his inspection and 
control. * * * 

" Another reason why the power of removal should 
be lodged with the President rather than the Senate 
arises from their connection with the people. The Pres- 
ident is the representative of the people in a near and 
equal manner. He is the guardian of his country. The 
Senate are the representatives of the State Legislatures ; 
but they are very unequal in that representation. Each 
State sends two members to that House, although their 
proportions are as ten to one. Hence arises a degree 
of insecurity to an impartial administration. But if 
they possessed every advantage of equality, they can- 
not be the proper body to inspect into the proper be- 
havior of officers, because they have no constitutional 
powers for this purpose." 

John Lawrence of New York said (pp. 483, 484) : 
" It has been stated as an objection that we should 
extend the powers of the President, if we give him 
the power of removal ; and we are not to construe the 
Constitution in such way as to enlarge the executive 
power to the injury of any other ; that as he is limited 
in the power of appointment by the control of the Sen- 
ate, he ought to be equally limited in the removal. If 
there be any weight in this argument, it applies as forci- 



128 CONSISTENCY AND PRESIDENTIAL EEMOYALS. 

bly against vesting the power conjointly in the President 
and Senate ; because if we are not to extend the powers 
of the Executive beyond the express detail of duties 
found in the Constitution, neither are we at liberty to 
extend the duties of the Senate beyond those precise 
points fixed in the same instrument. Of course if w^e 
cannot say the President alone shall remove, we cannot 
say the President and Senate may exercise such power. 

" It is admitted that the Constitution is silent on this 
subject. But it is also silent with respect to the ap- 
pointments it has vested in the Legislature. The Con- 
stitution declares that Congress may by law vest the ap- 
pointment of such inferior officers as they think proper 
in the President alone, in the courts of law, or heads 
of departments, yet says nothing with respect to the 
removal. * * * jj^ those cases in which the Consti- 
tution has given the appointment to the President, he 
must have the power of removal for the sake of con- 
sistency ; for no person will say that if the President 
should appoint an inferior officer, he should not have 
the power to remove him when he thought proper, if 
no particular limitation w^as determined by the law." 

Representative George Clymer of Pennsylvania said 
(pp. 489, 490) : " I am clear that the Executive has 
the power of removal as incident to his department ; 
and if the Constitution had been silent with respect 
to the appointment, he would have had that power 
also. The reason perhaps why it was mentioned in 
the Constitution was to give some further security 
against the introduction of improper men into office. 
But in cases of removal there is not such necessity for 
this check. What great danger would arise from the 
removal of a worthy man, when the Senate must be 
consulted in the appointment of his successor? Is it 
likely they will consent to advance an improper char- 



]^R. BENSON'S ADMIRABLE ILLUSTRATION. 129 

acter? The presumption therefore is that he would 
not abuse this power ; or, if he did, only one good 
man would be changed for another. If the President 
is divested of this power, his responsibility is destroyed. 
You prevent his efficiency, and disable him from af- 
fording that security to the people which the Consti- 
tution contemplates. * * * ^pj^e Executive must 
act by others. But you reduce him to a mere shadow 
when you control both the power of appointment and 
removal. If you take away the latter power, he ought 
to resign the power of superintending and directing 
the executive parts of government into the hands of 
the Senate at once, and then we become a dangerous 
aristocracy, or shall be more destitute of energy than 
any government on earth." 

Egbert Benson of New York said (pp. 505, 506, 507) : 
" I will not repeat what has been said to prove that 
the true construction is that the President alone has the 
power of removal, but will state a case to show the 
embarrassment which must arise by a combination of 
the senatorial and legislative authority in this particu- 
lar. I will instance the officer to which the bill re- 
lates. To him will necessarily be committed negotia- 
tions with the ministers of foreign courts. This is a 
very delicate trust. The supreme executive officer, in 
superintending this department, may be entangled with 
suspicions of a very delicate nature relative to the trans- 
actions of the officer, and such as from circumstances 
would be injurious to name. Indeed he may be so 
situated that he will not, cannot, give the evidence of 
his suspicion. Now, thus circumstanced, suppose he 
should propose to the Senate to remove the Secretary 
of Foreign Affairs. Are we to expect the Senate 
will, without any reason being assigned, implicitly 
submit to his proposition? They will not. Suppose 



130 SENATE ONLY A CONSTITUTIONAL CHECK. 

he should say he suspected the man's fidelity. They 
would say we must proceed further, and know the rea- 
son for this suspicion. They would insist on a full 
communication. Is it to be supposed that this man 
will not have a single friend in the Senate who will 
contend for a fair trial and a full hearing? The Presi- 
dent then becomes the plaintiff and the Secretary the 
defendant. The Senate are sitting in judgment be- 
tween the Chief Magistrate of the United States and 
a subordinate officer. Now I submit to the candor of 
the gentlemen whether this looks like good government. 
Yet in every instance when the President thinks proper 
to have an officer removed, this absurd scene must be 
displayed. How much better, even on principles of 
expediency, will it be that the President alone have the 
power of removal. 

" It has been warmly contended that the power of 
removal is incidental to the power of appointment. It 
may be true in general, but upon examination we shall 
find there is a distinction in this case from what the 
general principle supposes. If the President and Senate 
are to be considered as one body, deliberating together 
on the business of appointments, every individual of 
which participates equal powers, the reasoning that has 
been urged will hold good. But I take it for granted 
that they are two distinct bodies, and can only give a 
simple afiirmative or negative. No member of the Sen- 
ate has power to offer an original proposition. In short, 
the moment we depart from this simple idea that the 
provision in the Constitution is intended for any other 
purpose but to prevent the President from introducing 
improper persons into oftice, we shall find it difiicult to 
form any certain principle upon which they ought to 
act, and our opinions and deliberations will be discord- 
ant and distracted." 



ME. SEDGWICK'S PERTINENT INQUIRIES. 131 

Mr. Benson further said that ^^ if we declare in the 
bill that the officer shall be removable by the President, 
it has the appearance of conferring the power upon 
him." Therefore, in order to avoid even an apparent 
conference of power, and to do nothing more than de- 
clare the House's ^^ sentiments upon the meaning of 
a constitutional grant of power to the President," he 
moved as a substitute for the words " to be removable 
by the President," the following: "whenever the said 
officer shall be removed by the President." Mr. Madi- 
son, who appreciated Mr. Benson's delicate legislative 
distinction, seconded the latter's motion. The amend- 
ment was adopted by a vote of 30 to 18. 

Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts said (pp. 522, 
523) : " What is to be the consequence if the Senate 
are to be applied to (for permission to remove an of- 
ficer) ? If they are to do anything in this business, I 
presume they are to deliberate, because they are to ad- 
vise and consent. If they are to deliberate, you put 
them between the officer and the President. They are 
then to inquire into the causes of removal. The Presi- 
dent must produce his testimony. How is the question 
to be investigated ? Because, I presume, there must be 
some rational rule for conducting this business. » Is the 
President to be sworn to declare the whole truth, and 
to bring forward facts ? Or are they to admit suspi- 
cion as testimony ? Or is the word of the President to 
be taken at all events? If so, this check is not of the 
least efficacy in nature. But if proof be necessary, 
what is then the consequence ? Why, in nine cases out 
of ten, where the case is very clear to the President 
that the man ought to be removed, the effect cannot 
be produced, because it is absolutely impossible to pro- 
duce the necessary evidence. Are the Senate to pro- 
cesd without evidence? Some gentlemen contend not. 



132 SEPARATE POWERS THE ONLY SAFETY. 

Then the object will be lost. Shall a man, under these 
circumstances, be saddled upon the President who has 
been appointed for no other purpose but to aid the 
President in performing certain duties ? * * * If 
he is, where is the responsibility? * * * Without 
you make him responsible, you weaken and destroy the 
strength and beauty of your system. What is to be 
done in cases which can only be known from a long 
acquaintance with the conduct of an officer?" 

On page 582 Mr. Sedgwick says there are a thousand 
circumstances, exclusive of impeachments, which may 
demand removal from office, of which the President 
alone is the proper judge. 

Richard Bland Lee of Virginia said (pp. 525, 526) : 
"It is laid down as a maxim in government by all 
judicious writers that the legislative, executive, and 
judicial powers should be kept as separate and distinct 
as possible, in order to secure the liberties of the people. 
And this maxim is founded on the experience of ages ; 
for we find that however governments have been estab- 
lished, however modified in their names or forms, if 
these powers are blended in or exercised by one body, 
the effects are ever the same — the public liberty is de- 
stroyed. * * * 'Y]jQ framers of the Constitution 
* * * divided our government into three principal 
branches, with express declarations that all legislative 
power shall vest in one, all executive in another, and 
the whole judicial in a third. * * * 

" It is our duty to vest all executive power belonging 
to the government where the Convention intended it 
should be placed. It adds to the responsibility of the 
most responsible branch of the government ; and with- 
out responsibility we should have little security against 
the depredations and gigantic strides of arbitrary power. 
It is necessary to hold up a single and specific object to 



THE PUBLIC MUST HAVE SOMEBODY TO WATCH. 133 

(he public jealousy to watch. Therefore it is necessary 
to connect the power of removal with the President, 
The Executive is the source of all appointments. Is his 
responsibility complete unless he has the power of re- 
moval ? * * * If the power of removal is vested 
in the Senate, it is evident, at a single view, that the 
responsibility is dissipated, because the fault cannot be 
fixed on any individual. Besides the Senate are not 
accountable to the people. * * * ]g^|^ eyen if they 
were, they have no powers to enable them to decide 
with propriety in the case of removals, and therefore 
are improper persons to exercise such authority." 

Benjamin Goodhue of Massachusetts said (pp. 533, 
534) : " It has long been an opinion entertained of the 
people of America that they would not trust the gov- 
ernment with the power of doing good lest it should 
be abused. * * * 'pj^g question on the present 
occasion seems to stand on nearly the same ground — 
whether we shall trust the power of doing good lo the 
Executive Magistrate, or deprive him of it for fear he 
may abuse it. * * * The only security which the 
Constitution means to give us is to call the officers of 
government to account if they abuse their powers, and 
not to cramp their exercise so as to make them inef- 
ficient. * * * 

" It has been said that the power would be more safe 
in the hands of the Senate than in that of the President. 
But I do not view it in that light. * * * It would 
be a very inconvenient and useless power for them to 
be possessed of. It is in nothing similar to the power 
they have in appointments. There they are really use- 
ful by their advice, because it is more probable that 
the Senate may be better acquainted with the charac- 
ters of the officers that are nominated than the Presi- 
dent himself. But after their appointments such knowl- 



134 REMOVING SOMETIMES A SEPARATE POWER. 

edge is little required. The officer is placed under the 
control of the President, and it is only through him that 
the improper conduct of a person in a subordinate situ- 
ation can be known." 

Thomas Scott of Pennsylvania indulged in a semi- 
facetious speech, but he made one good point when he 
said (p. 533) : ^^ Is anything more plain than that the 
President, above all the officers of government, both 
from the manner of his appointment and the nature of 
his duties, is truly and justly denominated the man of 
the people ? Is there any other person who represents 
so many of them as the President ? He is elected by 
the voice of the people of the whole Union. The Sen- 
ate are the representatives of the State sovereignties. 
* * * Yet this body is held up as more nearly 
related to the people than the President himself." 

Abraham Baldwin of Georgia said (pp. 557, 558, 
559) : "Gentlemen who undertake to construe, say they 
see clearly that the power which appoints must also 
remove. Now I have reviewed this subject with all 
the application and discernment my mind is capable of, 
and have not been able to see any such thing. There 
is an agency given to the President in making appoint- 
ments, to which the Senate are connected. But how it 
follows that the connection extends to the removal, 
positively I cannot see. They say that it follows as 
a natural, inseparable consequence. This sounds like 
logic. But if we consult the premises, perhaps the 
conclusion may not follow. The Constitution opposes 
this maxim more than it supports it. The President 
is appointed by electors chosen by the people them- 
selves, or by the State Legislatures. Can the State 
Legislatures, either combined or separate, effect his re- 
moval ? No. But the Senate may, on impeachment 
by this House. The judges are appointed by the Presi^ 



THE RESTRAINING POWER OF IMPEACHMENT. 1:^5 

dent, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
But they are only removable by impeachment. The 
President has no agency in the removal. Hence, 1 
say, it is not a natural consequence that the power 
which appoints should have the power of removal also. 
We may find it necessary that subordinate ofiicers 
should be appointed in the first instance by the Presi- 
dent and Senate. I hope it will not be contended that 
the President and Senate shall be applied to in all cases 
when their removal may be necessary. * * * j ^jjg, 
pute the maxim altogether ; for though it is sometimes 
true, it is often fallacious. But by no means is it that 
kind of conclusive argument which they contend for. 

" But what is the evil of the President being at lib- 
erty to exercise this power of removal ? Why we 
fear that he will displace not one good officer only, but, 
in a fit of passion, all the good officers of the govern- 
ment ; by which, to be sure, the public would suffer. 
* * * I believe he could not turn out so many but 
that the Senate would still have some choice out of 
which to supply a good one. But even if he was to 
do this, what would be the consequence ? He would 
be obliged to do the duties himself, or, if he did not, 
we would impeach him and turn him out of office as he 
had done others. I must admit though that there is a 
possibility of such an evil ; but it is a remote possibility 
indeed. * * * Checked and surrounded as his powers 
are, I see little cause for apprehension." 

Peter Sylvester of New York said (p. 561) : "I lay 
it down as a positive case that the President is invested 
with all executive power necessary to carry the Consti- 
tution and the laws passed in pursuance thereof into 
full effect, so far as these powers are unchecked and 
uncontrolled by express stipulations in the Constitution. 
If the exceptions with respect to appointments had not 



136 THE ADVOCATES OF SUSPENSION. 

been made, the President would have had that power 
as well as the power of removal. In the first his power 
is eclipsed by the interference of the Senate, but in the 
last the manifestation is clear. Both these powers be- 
ing inherent in the executive branch of the government, 
must remain there." 

SPEECHES IN FAVOR OF REMOVAL BY THE PRESIDENT 
AND SENATE. 

Alexander White of Virginia, who made the motion 
to strike out the words *' to be removable by the Presi- 
dent," said (pp. 467, 517) : "It was objected that the 
President could not remove an officer unless the Senate 
was in session, but yet the emergency of the case might 
demand an instant dismission. I should imagine that 
no inconvenience would result on this account, because, 
on my principle, the same power which can make a 
temporary appointment can make an equal suspension.* 
The powers are apposite to each other. 

" The gentleman (Mr. Madison) says we ought not 
to blend the executive and legislative powers further 
than they are blended in the Constitution. I contend 
we do not. There is no expression in the Constitution 
which says that the President shall have the power of 
removal from office. But the contrary is strongly im- 
plied, for it is said that Congress may establish offices 
by law, and vest the appointment, and consequently the 
removal, in the President alone, in the courts of law, 
or heads of departments. Now this shows that Con- 
gress are not at liberty to make any alteration by law 
in the mode of appointing superior officers, and conse- 

* The practicability of suspension in lieu of removal was also advoca- 
ted by Messrs. Jackson, Sherman, Page, Stone, and Tucker. Mr. Bou- 
dinot, as has already been shown, thought it would be too indecisive. 



THE DANGER IN AN AMBITIOUS PRESIDENT. 137 

quently that they are not at liberty to alter the manner 
of removal. 

" It has been said if the concurrence of the Senate 
be necessary, they may refuse to concur when a removal 
is proper. * * * \ye are to presume the Senate 
will do their duty. * * * g^^ shall we, because 
the Senate may do wrong, give the President the power 
to act without them ? Is it contended that the Presi- 
dent has any superior agency in this business because 
he nominates ? We may as well contend, on the same 
principle, that because this House has the exclusive 
power of originating money bills, we may repeal a law 
of that nature without the consent of the Senate." 

William Smith of South Carolina said (pp. 457, 458, 
508) : *' I imagine, sir, we are declaring a power in 
the President which may hereafter be greatly abused. 
* * * We ought to * * * contemplate this power 
in the hands of an ambitious man, who might apply 
it to dangerous purposes. If w^e give this power to 
the President, he may, from caprice, remove the most 
worthy men from office. * * * 

" Another danger may result. If you desire an of- 
ficer to be a man of capacity and integrity, you may 
be disappointed. A gentleman possessed of these qual- 
ities, knowing he may be removed at the pleasure of 
the President, will be loath to risk his reputation on 
such insecure ground. As the matter stands in the 
Constitution, he knows if he is suspected of doing any- 
thing wrong he shall have a fair trial, and the whole of 
his transactions be developed by an impartial tribunal. 
He will have confidence in himself when he knows he 
can only be removed for improper behavior. But if he 
is subjected to the whim of any man, it may deter him 
from entering into the service of his country ; because, 
if he is not subservient to that person's pleasure, he 



138 ALEXANDER HAMILTON ON REMOVALS. 

may be turned out, and the public may be led to sup- 
pose for improper behavior. This impression cannot be 
removed, as a public inquiry cannot be obtained. Be- 
sides this, it ought to be considered that the person who 
is appointed will probably quit some other office or 
business in which he is occupied. Ought he, after mak- 
ing this sacrifice in order to serve the public, to be 
turned out of place without even a reason being as- 
signed for such behavior ? Perhaps the President does 
not do this with an ill intention. He may have been 
misinformed ; for it is presumable that a President may 
have around him men envious of the honors and emol- 
uments of persons in office, who will insinuate suspi- 
cions into his honest breast that may produce a re- 
moval. Be this as it may, the event is still the same 
to the removed officer. The public suppose him guilty 
of malpractices. Hence his reputation is blasted, his 
property sacrificed. I say his property is sacrificed, 
because I consider his office as his property. He is 
stripped of this and left exposed to the malevolence of 
the world, contrary to the principles of the Constitution, 
andvcontrary to the principles of all free governments, 
which are that no man shall be despoiled of his prop- 
erty but by a fair and impartial trial. 

*^ Gentlemen say we ought not to suppose such an 
abuse of power in the President. Hut the Constitution 
wisely guards against his caprice in the appointment, 
and why should we abate the security in cases of re- 
moval?"* 

* Representative Smith made the following quotation from General 
Alexander Hamilton (" The Federalist," Hallowell Ed., p. 358): '' It has 
been mentioned as one of the advantages to be expected from the co- 
operation of the Senate in the business of appointments, that it would 
contribute to the stability of the administration. The consent of that 
body would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint. A change 



TENURE DURING GOOD BEHAVIOR. 139 

On page 471 Mr. Smith says: "It will not be con- 
tended that the State governments did not furnish the 
late Convention with the skeleton of this Constitution. 
I have turned over the Constitutions of most of the 
States. In some instances I find the Executive Magis- 
trate suspends, but none of them have the right to re- 
move officers." On page 459 he says that in order "to 
test and decide the constitutionality of the question of 
removal, a removed officer could apply to a court of 
justice for a mandamus to be restored to his office, and 
that the court would settle it. As to the tenure of sub- 
ordinate officers, he said they could " be regulated by 
law." But as to the removal of chief officials, he said 
that inasmuch as the Constitution prescribed impeach- 
ment only, it " contemplated only this mode." Messrs. 
Page and Huntington also believed in removal by im- 
peachment. Impeachment for removal, except where 
required by the Constitution, is of coarse impracticable 
nowadays, even for the Secretary of State, which cor- 
responds to the then (1789) proposed Secretary of For- 
eign Affairs. Messrs. Smith, Page, and Stone favored 
the holding of offices during good behavior. Other 
Representatives were opposed to this principle, and yet 

of the Chief Magistrate therefore would not occasion so violent or so 
general a revolution in the officers of the government as might be 
expected if he were the sole disposer of offices. Where a man in any 
station has given satisfactory evidence of his fitness for it, a new Presi- 
dent would be restrained from attempting a change in favor of a person 
more agreeable to him by the apprehension that a discountenance of 
the Senate might frustrate the attempt, and bring some degree of dis- 
credit upon himself. Those who can best estimate the value of a steady 
administration, will be most disposed to prize a provision which con- 
nects the official existence of public men with the approbation or disap- 
probation of that body, which, from the greater permanency of its own 
composition, will in all probability be less subject to inconstancy than 
any other member of the government." 



1J:0 REMOVAL A QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY. 

they feared that worthy men would be removed from 
office. In this respect their arguments were both in- 
consistent and contradictory. 

Benjamin Huntington of Connecticut said (p. 459) : 
*' I think the clause ought not to stand. It was well 
observed that the Constitution was silent respecting the 
removal otherwise than by impeachment. I would like- 
wise add that it mentions no other cause of removal 
than treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misde- 
meanors. It does not, I apprehend, extend to cases of 
infirmity or incapacity. Indeed it appears hard to me 
that after an officer has become old in an honorable ser- 
vice, he should be impeached for this infirmity. * * * 
It was said if the President had this authority, it would 
make him more responsible for the conduct of the of- 
ficer. But if we have a vicious President, who inclines 
to abuse this power, which God forbid, his responsi- 
bility will stand us in little stead. Therefore that idea 
does not satisfy me that it is proper the President 
should have this power." 

Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts said (pp. 472, 473, 
502, 574) : " Some gentlemen consider this as a ques- 
tion of policy. But to me it appears a question of 
constitutionality, and I presume it will be determined 
on that point alone. 

" The best arguments I have heard urged on this 
occasion came from the honorable gentleman from Vir- 
ginia (Mr. Madison). He says the Constitution has 
vested the executive power in the President, and that 
he has a right to exercise it under the qualifications 
therein made. He lays it down as a maxim that the 
Constitution vesting in the President the executive 
power, naturally vests him with the power of appoint- 
ment and removal. Now I would be glad to know from 
that gentleman by what means we are to decide this 



THE SENATE'S SALUTARY STABILITY. 141 

question. Is his maxim supported by precedent drawn 
from the practice of the individual States? The direct 
contrary is established. In many cases the Executives 
are not in particular vested with the power of appoint- 
ment. And do they exercise that power by virtue of 
their office ? It will be found that other branches of 
the government make appointments. How then can 
gentlemen assert that the powers of appointment and 
removal are incident to the executive department of 
government? To me it appears at best but problem- 
atical. Neither is it clear to me that the power that 
appoints naturally possesses the power of removal. 

'' It has been argued that if the power of removal 
vests in the President alone, it annuls or renders nuga- 
tory the clause in the Constitution which directs the 
concurrence of the Senate in the case of appointments. 
It behooves us not to adopt principles subversive of 
those established by the Constitution. 

" It has been frequently asserted, on former occa- 
sions, that the Senate is a permanent body, and was 
so constructed in order to give durability to public mea- 
sures. If they are not absolutely permanent, they are 
formed on a renovating principle, which gives them a 
salutary stability. This is not the case either with the 
President or House of Representatives. * * * j^ 
appears to me that a permanency was expected in the 
magistracy,* and therefore the Senate were combined 
in the appointment to office. But if the President alone 
has the power of removal, it is in his power at any 
time to destroy all that has been done. It appears to 
me that such a principle would be destructive of the 
intention of the Constitution, expressed by giving the 
power of appointment to the Senate. It also subverts 
the clause which gives the Senate the sole power of 

* This could not be unless a President were elected term after term. 



142 MR. GERRY FEARS THE PRESIDENT. 

trying impeachments, because the President may re- 
move the officer in order to screen him from the effects 
of their judgment on an im23eachment. Why should 
we construe any part of the Constitution in such a 
manner as to destroy its essential principles, when a 
more consonant construction can be obtained ? * * * 

'^ It has been said by my colleague that these officers 
are the creatures of the law. But it seems as if we 
were not content with that. We are making them the 
mere creatures of the President. They dare not exer- 
cise the privilege of their creation, if the President 
shall order them to forbear, because he holds their 
thread of life. His power will be sovereign over them, 
and will soon swallow up the small security we have 
in the Senate's concurrence to the appointment ; and 
we shall shortly need no other than the authority of 
the supreme executive officer to nominate, appoint, con- 
tinue, or remove. * * * 

" It is said that the President will be subject to im- 
peachment for dismissing a good man. This in ray 
mind involves an absurdity. How can the House im- 
peach the President for doing an act which the Leg- 
islature has submitted to his discretion ? 

" The Senate and this House may think it necessary 
to inquire why a good officer is dismissed. The Presi- 
dent will say : * It is my pleasure. I am authorized by 
law to exercise this prerogative. I have my reasons 
for it, but you have no right to inquire them of me.' 
This language may be proper in a monarchy ; but in 
a republic every action ought to be accounted for." 

Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire said (pp. 4T8, 
479) : " Surely a law passed by the whole Legislature 
cannot be repealed by one branch of it. So I conceive 
in the case of appointments it requires the same force 
to supersede an officer as to put him in office. I ac- 



EXECUTIVE POWER NOT ALL PRESIDENT'S. 143 

knowledge that the clause relative to impeachment is 
for the benefit of the people. It is intended to enable 
their representatives to bring a bad officer to justice 
who is screened* by the President. But I do not con- 
ceive, with the honorable gentleman from South Caro- 
lina (Mr. Smith), that it by any means excludes the 
usual ways of superseding officers. 

'' When an important and confidential trust is placed 
in a man, it is worse than death to him to be displaced 
witliout cause. His reputation depends on the single 
will of the President, who may ruin him on bare sus- 
picion. Nay, a new President may turn him out on 
mere caprice, or in order to make room for a favorite. 
This contradicts all my notions of propriety. Every- 
thing of this sort should be done with due deliberation. 
Every person ought to have a hearing before he is pun- 
ished." 

James Jackson of Georgia said (pp. 487, 488, 489, 
530, 531, 555) : "If this power is incident to the ex- 
ecutive branch of government, it does not follow that 
it vests in the President alone, because he alone does 
not possess all executive powers. The Constitution has 
lodged the power of forming treaties, and all executive 
business, I presume, connected therewith, in the Presi- 
dent ; but it is qualified by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, provided two-thirds of the Sen- 
ate agree therein. The same has taken place with re- 
spect to appointing officers. * * * J^ j^ay be wrong 
that the great powers of government should be blended 
in this manner. But we cannot separate them. The 
error is adopted in the Constitution. ^ ^ ^ 

" Behold the baleful influence of the royal preroga- 
tive when officers hold their commissions during the 
pleasure of the Crown ! At this moment, see the King 
of Sweden aiming at arbitrary power, shutting up the 



144 PRESIDENT AND SENATE CHECK EACH OTHEi:. 

doors of his Senate, and compelling, by force of arms, 
his shuddering councilors to acquiesce in his despotic 
mandates.* I agree that this is the hour in which we 
ought to establish our government. But it is an hour 
in which we should be wary and cautious, especially 
in what respects the Executive Magistrate. With the 
present, I grant, every power may be safely lodged. 

* * * May not a man with a Pandora's box in his 
breast come into power and give us sensible cause to 
lament our present confidence and want of foresight ? 

* * * 1 think this power too great to be safely 
trusted in the hands of a single man, especially in the 
hands of a man who has so much constitutional power. 

* * * I cannot agree to extend this power, because 
I conceive it may at some future period be exercised 
in such a way as to subvert the liberties of my country. 

* * * If the President has the power of removing 
all officers who may be virtuous enough to oppose his 
base measures, what would become of the liberties of 
our fellow-citizens 9 * * * 

" I differ with gentlemen who say that the Senate 
have no part of the executive power, or that the Presi- 
dent has no part of the legislative authority. I con- 
sider them as checks upon each other, to prevent the 
abuse of either. And it is in this way the liberties of 
the people are secured. I appeal for the truth of this 
sentiment to the writings of JPublius, f 

" I call upon gentlemen once more to * * * prove 
to me that it was not the intention of this Constitu- 
tion to blend the executive and legislative powers. If 
these are the principles of the Constitution, why will 

* Compare with Mr. Vining's remarks, page 121. Also see the ad- 
mirable Swedish civil service regulations of the present day, page 186. 
The contrast between Sweden in 1789 and 1888 is remarkable. 

f Alexander Hamilton. 



MR. PAGE'S HIGH OPINIOX OF THE SENATE. 145 

gentlemen contend for the independency of each branch 
of the government?" 

John Page of Virginia said (pp. 490-1, 519-20, 55] y 
552) : ^* I venture to assert that this claufe^e of the bill 
contains in it the seeds of royal prerogative. If gen- 
tlemen lay such stress on the energy of the government, 
I beg them to consider how far this doctrine may go. 
Everything which has been said in favor of energy in 
the Executive, may go to the destruction of freedom, 
and establish despotism. This very energy, so much 
talked of, has led many patriots to the Bastile, to the 
block, and to the hajter. If the Chief Magistrate can 
take a man away from the head of a department with- 
out assigning any reason, he may as well be invested 
with power, on certain occasions, to take away his ex- 
istence. But will you contend that this idea is con- 
sonant with the principles of a free government, where 
no man ought to be condemned unheard, nor till after 
a solemn conviction of guilt, on a fair and impartial 
trial ? * * * If gentlemen had been content to say 
that the President might suspend, I should second the 
motion, and afterward the officer might be removed by 
and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 

" The framers of the government had confidence in 
the Senate, or they would not have combined them 
with the Executive in the performance of his duties. 
* * * Some gentlemen contend that the Senate are 
a dangerous and aristocratic body. But I contend that 
they are a safe and salutary branch of the government, 
representing the republican Legislatures of the individ- 
ual States, and intended to preserve the sovereignty and 
independence of the State governments, which they are 
more likely to do than the President, who is elected by 
the people at large. A popular President, influenced 
by the sentiments of his electors, may be induced to 



146 FOURFOLD CHECKS ON THE PRESIDENT. 

believe that it would be best for the general interest 
that those governments were destroyed. But as long 
as we have that body independent of him, and secured 
in their authority, we may defy such impotent attempts. 
They will watch his conduct and prevent the exercise 
of despotic power. But if they are weakened and strip- 
ped of their essential authority, they will become weak 
barriers against the strides of an uncontrolled power. 
If you take from them their right to check the Presi- 
dent in the removal of officers, they cannot prevent the 
dismission of a faithful servant who has opposed the 
arbitrary mandates of an ambitious President. The 
principles laid down in the Constitution clearly evince 
that the Senate ought not only to have a voice in the 
framing of laws, but ought also to see to their execu- 
tion. * * * I myself shall never be satisfied unless 
I see fourfold checks upon the President. It (the clause 
in the bill) will inevitably lead to the establishment of 
those odious prerogatives which we, by an arduous con- 
flict, have been endeavoring to get rid of. 

" Indecision, delay, blunders — nay, villainous actions 
in the administration of government — are trifles com- 
pared to legalizing the full exertion of a tyrannical 
despotism. Good God ! What ! authorize in a free 
republic, by law too, by your first act, the exertion 
of a dangerous royal pi'erogative in your Chief Magis- 
trate ! What ! where honor and virtue ought to be 
the support of your government, will you infuse and 
cherish meanness and servility in your citizens, and in- 
solence and arbitrary power in your Chief Magistrate, 
when you know that thousands of virtuous citizens are 
dissatisfied with your government because they think 
they see the seeds of monarchy in it ? And two whole 
States have refused to unite with you because they 
think your government dangerous to their liberties ! 



** A MONSTROUS DOCTRINE. " 147 

Will you openly, before their faces, in a solemn act of 
Congress, insert words which fully justify their opin- 
ions and fears ? * * * 

" It is said the officers ought to be commissioned 
durante bene placito^ et ne dure se beiie gesserint^ a 
monstrous doctrine. As to inferior officers, who, we 
are told, must also be impeached. Congress have a con- 
stitutional right to empower the President to appoint, 
and, I suppose, to remove also ; not that the power nec- 
essarily follows appointments." 

Roger Sherman of Connecticut said (pp. 491, 492, 
538, 576) : '* It is a general principle in law as well as 
reason that there shall be the same authority to remove 
as to establish * * * unless there are express ex- 
ceptions made. * * * It is so in legislation, where 
the several branches whose concurrence is necessary to 
pass a law, must concur in repealing it. Just so I take 
it to be in cases of appointment ; and the President alone 
may remove when he alone appoints, as in the case of 
inferior officers to be established by law. * * * I 
have not heard any gentleman produce an authority 
from law or history which proves that w^here two 
branches are interested in the appointment, one of them 
has the power of removal. I remember that the gen- 
tleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Sedgwick) told us that 
the two Houses, notwithstanding the partial negative 
of the President, possessed the whole legislative power. 
But will the gentleman infer from that that because 
the concurrence of both branches is necessary to pass 
a law, a less authority can repeal it ? This is all we 
contend for. 

" If gentlemen would consent to make a general law 
declaring the proper mode of removal, I think we should 
acquire a greater degree of unanimity, which, on this 
* During good pleasure, and not during good behavior. 



148 " A JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS OF MEN. " 

occasion, must be better than carrying the question 
against a large minority." 

Michael Jenifer Stone of Maryland said (pp. 4^3, 
495, 564, 66Q, 567, 568, 569) : " If the Constitution had 
given no rule by which officers were to be appointed, 
I should search for one in my own mind. But as the 
Constitution has laid down the rule, I consider the mode 
of removal as clearly defined as by implication it can 
be. It ought to be the same as that of the appointment. 
What quality of the human mind is necessary for the 
one that is not necessary for the other ? Information, 
impartiality, and judgment in the business to be con- 
ducted are necessary to make a good appointment. Are 
not the same properties necessary for a dismission ? 

"I cannot subscribe to the opinion that the executive, 
in its nature, implies the power to appoint the officers 
of government. Why does it imply it ? The appoint- 
ment of officers depends upon the qualities that are nec- 
essary for forming a judgment on the merits of men i"^ 
and the displacing of them, instead of including the 
idea of what is necessary for an executive officer, in- 
cludes the idea necessary for a judicial one. Therefore 
it cannot exist, in the nature of things, that an execu- 
tive power is either to appoint or displace the officers 
of government. Is it a political dogma ? Is it founded 
in experience ? If it is, I confess it has been very long 
wrapped up in mysterious darkness. * * * It is 
very forcible to my mind that the Constitution has con- 
fined his (the President's) sole appointment to the case 
of inferior officers. * * * 

" Now I would ask, in all cases where the integrity 

* Mr. Stone cut very close to the civil service law, for the examiners, 
by the aid of competitive examinations, form " a judgment on the merits 
of men." The law is the fulfillment of his prophecy, namely, " I believe 
the people can apply a remedy," &c. (p. 149). 



BALANCE BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND SENATE. 149 

and confidence is the same, whether it is more likely 
that one man should do right and exercise his power 
with propriety than a number of men with the aid of 
each other's deliberations ? Is it more likely that a 
number of men should do wrong than one man ? * * * 
It would be more difficult for a majority to be obtained 
in a body composed of members of thirteen independ- 
ent States in favor of despotic measures than might 
justly be expected from the caprice or want of judg- 
ment in a single individual. Is it likely the danger 
would be so great? I apprehend it is not. * * * 

" If the evils we apprehend should absolutely arise 
from our determination, I do not conceive, with some 
other gentlemen, that we are inevitably ruined. I be- 
lieve the people can apply a remedy ; and I have no 
doubt but they have sense and resolution enough for 
that purpose. * * * 

" I suppose it is necessary to keep up the balance be- 
tween the Executive Magistrate and the Senate. What 
is this balance? It is laid down in the Constitution 
that the President shall nominate and the Senate ap- 
prove. We are bound then to carry this balance 
throughout all the subjects to which it relates. If the 
President has the sole power of removal, you destroy 
the power of the Senate. And though you do not ex- 
pressly put the power of appointment in the President 
alone, yet you put it there effectively, because he may 
defeat, by removal, the joint appointment. Will this 
be giving the proper balance which the Constitution 
directs ? No. It will be directly the reverse. 

"If all executive power is vested in the President, 
what right has this House to prescribe him rules to in- 
terfere in forming executive officers? The Executive 
can better form them for itself. * * * 

"If I look to the constitution or ijature of things, I 



150 AN APPOINTMENT AN IMPLIED CONTRACT. 

should be led to conclude that the body choosing agents 
has the power of dismissing them, because the power 
naturally lodges in those who have the interest and 
management of the concern. The executive business 
of this officer is under the superintendence and man- 
agement of the Senate as well as the President. Trea- 
ties with foreign nations must be conducted by the 
advice of the Senate, and concluded with their consent. 
Hence results a necessity in that body having a concern 
in the choice and dismissal of the Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs. I do not see any other sure or safe bottom 
on which the question can be determined. 

" In the nature of things, in all appointments, there 
is an implied contract ; on the part of the officer that 
he will perform the service, and on the part of those 
who appoint him that he shall have an adequate re- 
ward. In the engagement of the officer, qualities com- 
mensurate with the duties are required. In the reward, 
the dignity of the station and the qualities of the of- 
ficer ought to be estimated. And although in this en- 
gagement an officer may dispense of certain forms of 
trial, yet he can never surrender a natural right — he 
cannot engage to be punished without being guilty, or 
dismissed without being useless. It has been well ob- 
served that the appointment ought to cease when the 
causes of it no longer exist. But it is equally clear 
that it ought to continue as long as the reasons re- 
main. And although in public and private life it may 
be proper to discharge an agent without divulging the 
reason, yet clearly a good reason ought to precede the 
dismission, because otherwise you do an act of injus- 
tice by a breach of contract. * * * 

" It has been judged by some gentlemen a dreadful 
affair that the President should become a party before 
the Senate. It would degrade his dignity. It was said 



LIBERTY EXALTS THE HUMAN SPECIES. 151 

the judiciary would be pleased if this weighty question 
could be taken off their hands. To what a hight do 
gentlemen exalt that character in their own minds ! 
How far above the level of the people, when they con- 
sider it derogatory to his dignity to institute an exam- 
ination into the conduct of an officer next to himself in 
rank ! when they consider it almost above human na- 
ture to determine a question of right between the Presi- 
dent and a great officer of the United States. If gen- 
tlemen have an idea that this character is to have such 
a degree of elevation above the community, it is time 
to think of restraining his power.* On what does power 
depend ? Not on the strength of arm, but opinion. If 
gentlemen will exalt a character above themselves, call 
him what you will, he will be possessed of monarchy. 

" We have expended our treasure, our blood, and our 
time to very little purpose if we do not think that lib- 
erty and safety exalt the human species. From the 
meanest to the highest rank in life, the propriety of 
conduct arises from the security and independence of 
situation. * * * 

" If a man is a candidate for an office held by the 
tenure of will and pleasure, he must examine his soul 
and see if there are qualities in him to enable him to 
cringe and submit to the arbitrary mandate of the Pres- 
ident. If he finds these qualities in his disposition, he 
is suited for the business. But if the Constitution is 
to be justly administered, and he finds himself disposed 

* Mr. Stone, so far as I know, is the first American to make this sug- 
gestion. It is fitting that the author of such a clear, profound, and pro 
phetic argument should have this honor. A worthy President is entitled 
to the support, good-will, and even love of the people,, but he is no better 
as a man than any other worthy citizen. Further, respectful criticism 
of the President's official acts is always in order, even by officeholders. 
Intelligent criticism is often useful. 



152 PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS. 

to sacriiice to the pleasure of the Chief Magistrate, 
although he possesses qualities which suited him for 
his employment, yet he is unfit for the office." 
'Thomas Tudor Tucker of South Carolina said (pp. 
584, 585) : "I am embarrassed on this question, as the 
yeas and nays are called, because the vote is taken in 
such a manner as not to express the principles upon 
which I vote. In the Committee of the Whole I voted 
for striking out the words that are now proposed to 
be struck out, and my reason was I ^vas doubtful 
whether it was proper to vest, on this occasion, the 
power in the President alone. It appears to me that 
the power is not necessarily vested in the President by 
the Constitution ; neither in the President and Senate. 
I find no words that fix this power precisely in any 
branch of the government. It must, however, by im- 
plication be in the Legislature, or it is nowhere until 
the Constitution is amended. * * * I apprehend a 
law is necessary in every instance to determine the ex- 
ercise of the power. In some cases it may be proper 
that the President alone should have it. I am not clear 
in 'my own mind what general rule, if any, can be 
estiiblished on this subject. Perhaps in other cases it 
may be lodged with; the President and Senate; or it 
may be given to the heads of departments. But who- 
sdeyer is invested with it, it must be in consequence 
of Bi law V a-nd the Legislature have a right to vest it 
where they^pleasel" ' ^ 

Mr. Tucker closed his speech by saying, among other 
things, that perhaps it would be out of order to change 
the word remove to suspend. * 

* Mr. Tucker, some weeks after the close of the debate, moved the 
consideration of numerous amendments to the Constitution, among them 
the following (p. 702)': '' Art. ii. Sec. 4, clause 3. At the end add the:5e 
words: He shall also have power to suspend from his office, for a time 



JOHN ADAMS'S MISTAKE (NOTE). 153 

Thomas Sumter of South Carolina said (p. 591) : 
" This bill appears to my mind so subversive of the 
Constitution, and in its consequences so destructive to 
the liberties of the people, that 1 cannot consent to let it 
pass without expressing my detestation of the principle 
it contains. I do it in this public manner in order to 
fulfill what I think to be my duty to my country, and 
to discharge myself of any concern in a matter that I 
do not approve."* 

The bill passed the House by a vote of 29 to 22, and 
went to the Senate on the 14th of July. As before 
said, the words " to be removable by the President," 
had been amended to read : " whenever the said prin- 
cipal officer shall be removed from office hy the Presi- 
dent of the United States, the chief clerk shall, during 
the vacancy, have charge and custody," &c. It was 
moved to strike out the italicized words. The debate 
lasted nearly four days, only one day less than that in 
the House. The vote was a tie (9 to 9), but as Vice- 
President Adams f voted in the negative, the words 
stood. The Senate's action was disinterested if not 

not exceeding twelve months, any officer whom he shall have reason to 
think unfit to be intrusted with the duties thereof ; and Congress may 
by law provide for the absolute removal of officers found to be unfit for 
the trust reposed in them." 

Also the following : *' Art. i, Sec. 6, clause 2. Amend to read thus : 
No person having been elected, and having taken his seat as a Senator 
or Repre.^entative, shall, during the time for which he was elected, be 
appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States." 

* The world owes Mr. Sumter more than is apparent in the above 
remarks. Twice during the five days^ debate he appealed to the House 
to postpone calling the yeas and nays in order to give the subject a 
full and free discussion. 

f Mr. Adams thought the Senate ought not to confirm appointments, 
as it would lessen the responsibility of the President, turn public atten- 
tion to and excite ambition in the Senate, &c. (Works, vi, 433.) 



154 SIJ/iPLE AND COMPOUND POWERS. 

patriotic, for it delegated a power to the President 
which by implication at least belonged to itself and 
the President. The Senate sat with closed doors from 
1789 till 1795, "with a single exception, through all leg- 
islative as well as executive transactions." But Vice- 
President Adams kept notes for at least one day (July 
15), and it is to him that the world is indebted for the 
following glimpse of what must have been a very in- 
structive debate (*^ Works of John Adams," vol. iii, 
pp. 408 to 412). 

NOTES OF ONE DAY'S DEBATE IN THE SENATE. 

Charles Carroll of Maryland : " The executive power 
is commensurate with the legislative and judicial pow- 
ers. 

" The rule of construction of treaties, statutes, and 
deeds. 

" The same power which creates must annihilate. 
This is true where the power is simple, but when com- 
pound, not. 

" If a Minister ia suspected to betray secrets to an 
enemy, the Senate not sitting, cannot the President dis- 
place nor suspend ? 

" The States-General of France demanded that offices 
should be during good behavior. 

" It is improbable that a bad President should be 
chosen ; but may not bad Senators be chosen ? 

"Is there a due balance of power between the exec- 
utive and legislative, either in the general government 
or State governments? 

'^ Montesquieu. English liberty will be lost when the 
legislative shall be more corrupt than the executive. 
Have we not been witnesses of corrupt acts of Legis- 
latures, making depredations? Rhode Island yet per- 
severes." 



EQUILIBRIUM OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWER. 3 55 

Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut : ^' We are sworn to 
support the Constitution. 

" There is an explicit grant of power to the President 
which contains the power of removal. The executive 
power is granted ; not the executive powers hereinafter 
enumerated and explained. 

" The President, not the Senate, appoints ; they only- 
consent and advise. 

" The Senate is not an executive council ; has no 
executive power. 

" The grant to the President express, not by impli- 
cation." 

Pierce Butler of South Carolina : " This power of re- 
moval would be unhinging the equilibrium of power in 
the Constitution. 

" The Stadtholder withheld the fleet from going out, 
to the annoyance of the enemies of the nation. 

" In treaties, all powers not expressly given, are re- 
served. Treaties to be gone over, clause by clause, by 
the President and Senate together, and modeled. 

" The other branches are imbecile ; disgust and 
alarm ; the President not sovereign ; the United States 
sovereign, o/ people or Congress sovereign. 

" The House of Representatives would not be in- 
duced to depart, so well satisfied of the grounds." 

Senator Ellsworth again : ^' The powers of this Con- 
stitution are all vested ; parted from the people, from 
the States, and vested, not in Congress, but in the 
President. 

" The word sovereignty is introduced without deter- 
minate ideas. Power in the last resort. In this sense 
the sovereign executive is in the President. 

" The United States will be parties to a thousand 
suits. Shall process issue in their name versus or for 
themselves? 



156 THE PRESIDENT NOT ABOVE THE LAW. 

' "The President, it is said^ may be put to jail for 
debt." 

Richard Henry Lee of Virginia : " United States 
merely figurative, meaning the people." 

William Grayson of Virginia : " The President is 
not above the law ; an absurdity to admit this idea 
into our government. Not improbable that the Presi- 
dent may be sued. Christina II of Sweden committed 
murder. France excused her. The jurors of our lord, 
the President, present that the President committed 
murder. A monarchy by a side wind. You make him 
vindex injuriarum.^ The people will not like ^ the ju- 
rors of our lord, the President,' nor ^ the peace of our 
lord, the President,' nor his dignity ; his crown will 
be left out. Do not wish to make the Constitution a 
more unnatural, monstrous production than it is. The 
British Court is a three-legged stool ; if one leg is 
longer than another, the stool will not stand. 

" Unpalatable ; the removal of officers not palatable. 
We should not risk anything for nothing. Come for- 
ward like men, and reason openly, and the people will 
hear more quietly than if you attempt side winds. 
This measure will do no good, and will disgust." 

Senator R. H. Lee again : ** The danger to liberty 
greater from the disunited opinions and jarring plans 
of many than from the energetic operations of one. 
Marius, Sylla, Coesar, Cromwell trampled on liberty 
with armies. 

" The power of pardon ; of adjourning the Legisla- 
ture. 

" Power of revision sufficient to defend himself. He 
would be supported by the people. 

" Patronage gives great influence. The interference 
more nominal than real. 

* An avenger ol injury. 



ENGLISH LIBERTY OWING TO JURIES. 157 

" The greater part of power of making treaties in the 
President. 

'^ The greatest power is in the President ; the less 
in the Senate. 

" Cannot see responsibility in the President or the 
great officers of state. 

" A masked battery of constructive powers would 
complete the destruction of liberty. 

" Can the Executive lay embargoes, establish fairs 
{sic), tolls, &c.r 

" The Federal government is limited ; the legislative 
power of it is limited ; and therefore the executive and 
judicial must be limited. 

" The Executive not punishable but by universal con- 
vulsion, as Charles I. 

" The legislative in England not so corrupt as the 
executive. 

" There is no responsibility in the President or min- 
istry. 

^^ BlackstoJie, The liberties of England owing to 
juries. The greatness of England owing to the genius 
of that people. 

" The Crown of England can do what it pleases, 
nearly. 

". There is no balance in America to such an Exec- 
utive as that in England. 

** Does the executive arm mean a standing army ? 

"Willing to make a law that the President, if he 
sees gross misconduct, may suspend pro tempore,'*^ 

William Paterson of New Jersey : " Laments that 
we are obliged to discuss this question ; of great im- 
portance and much difficulty. 

" The executive coextensive with the legislative. Had 
the clause stood alone, would not there have been a dev- 
olution of all executive power ? 



158 NO POWERS WITHOUT PROPEK BALANCES. 

" Exceptions are to be construed strictly. This is an 
invariable rule." 

Senator Grayson again : " The President has not a 
continental interest, but is a citizen of a particular State. 
A K. of E. otherwise ; K. of E. counteracted by a large, 
powerful, rich, and hereditary aristocracy. Hyperion 
to a satyr. 

" Where there are not intermediate powers, an alter- 
ation of the government must be to despotism. 

''Powers ought not to be inconsiderately given to 
the Executive without proper balances. 

" Triennial and septennial Parliaments made by cor- 
ruption of the Executive. 

"Bowstring.* General Lally. f Brutus's power to 
put his sons to death. 

" The power creating shall have that of uncreating. 
The Minister is to hold at pleasure of the appointer. 

"If it is in the Constitution, why insert it in the 
law? Brought in by a side wind, inferentially. 

" There will be every endeavor to increase the consol- 
idatory powers ; to weaken the Senate and strengthen 
the President. 

" No evil in the Senate participating with the Presi- 
dent in removal." 

George Read of Delaware : " The President is to 
take care that the laws be faithfully executed. He is 
responsible. How can he do his duty or be responsible, 
if he cannot remove his instruments ? 

" It is not an equal sharing of the powder of appoint- 

* A Turkish instrument of death. 

f Thomas A. Lally, a French soldier, who distinguished himself in 
1757-58 by making a plucky but unsuccessful expedition against Eng- 
land's East Indian possessions, was born in Romans, Dauphiny, in 1702 
and beheaded in Paris in 1766. Through the efforts of his son, the 
trial was revised and the sentence finally reversed in 1778. 



A QUESTION OF EXPEDIENCY, 159 

ment between the President and Senate. The Senate 
are only a check to prevent impositions on the Presi- 
dent. 

" The Minister an agent, a deputy to the great Ex- 
ecutive. 

" Difficult to bring great characters to punishment 
or trial. 

" Power of suspension." 

William S. Johnson of Connecticut : '' Gentlemen 
convince themselves that it is best the President should 
have the power, and then study for arguments. 

" Exceptions. Not a grant. Vested in the Presi- 
dent would be void for uncertainty. Executive power 
is uncertain. Powers are moral, mechanical, material. 
Which of these powers ? What executive power ? The 
land ; the money ; conveys nothing. What land ? what 
money ? 

*' Unumquodque dissolvitur eodem modo quo ligatur.* 

" Meddles not with the question of expediency. 

" The executive wants power by its duration and its 
want of a negative, and power to balance. Federalist,'^'^ 

Senator Ellsworth asked : " What is the difference 
between a grant and a partition ? " 

Ralph Izard of South Carolina : " Cujus est insti- 
tuere, ejus est abrogare."f 



Senator Thomas H. Benton of Missouri, in the report 
of the Select Committee on amending the Constitution 
of the United States, made on March 1, 1826, in speak- 
ing of the construction put upon the Constitution by 
the first Congress, says it yielded to the President *^ the 
kingly prerogative of dismissing officers without the 

* A thing is loosed by the same means by which it is bound. 

f He who has the power to institute, has also the power to abrogate. 



160 THE FOUR-YEARS' TENURE OF OFFICE LAW. 

formality of a trial." (Appendix to Gales & Seaton's 
"Debates," 1826, vol. ii, pt. ii, p. 132.) 

Daniel Webster, in a speech in the Senate, in 1835, 
on "The Appointing and Removing Power," said (Ev- 
erett's Webster, iv, 184, 185, 196): "1 do not mean 
to deny, and the bill does not deny, that the President 
may remove officers at will, because the early decision 
adopted that construction, and the laws have since uni- 
formly sanctioned it. The law of 1820,* intended to 

, * The four-years' tenure of office law, the first section of which (prac- 
tically the whole law) is as follows : 

*' That from and after the passage of this act all district attorneys, 
collectors of customs, naval officers, and surveyors of the customs, navy 
agents, receivers of public moneys for lands, registers of the land offices, 
paymasters in the army, the apothecary general, the assistant apotheca- 
ries general, and the commissary general of purchases, to be appointed 
under the laws of the United States, shall be appointed for the term of 
four years ; but shall be removable from office at pleasure." 

In 1836 all postmasters drawing an annual salary of 81,000 or more 
were also included in the provisions of the four-years' law. 

Thomas Jefferson, writing to James Madison on November 29, 1820, 
says of this law (vii, 190): "It saps the constitutional and salutary 
functions of the President, and introduces a principle of intrigue and 
corruption which will soon leaven the mass, not only of Senators, 
but of citizens. It will keep in constant excitement all the hungry cor- 
morants for office ; render them, as well as those in place, sycophants 
to their Senators ; engage these in eternal intrigue to turn out one and 
put in another, in cabals to swap work, and make of them, what all ex- 
ecutive directories become, mere sinks of corruption and faction.'' 

In reply Mr. Madison says : " The law terminating appointments at 
periods of four years is pregnant with mischiefs. * * * If the error 
be not soon corrected, the task will be very difficult, for it is of a nature 
to take a deep root." 

John Quincy Adams, who was till about 1 805 an independent Feder- 
alist, and afterward an independent Republican, says (Morse's Adams, 
p. 179): "Efforts had been made by some of the Senators to obtain 
different nominations, and to introduce a principle of change or rotation 
in office at the expiration of these commissions, which would make the 



ORIGINATED FOR CAMPAIGN PURPOSES. 161 

be repealed by this bill, expressly affirms the power. 
* * * At the same time, after considering the ques- 

government a perpetual and unintermitting scramble for office. A more 
pernicious expedient could scarcely have been devised * * * I de- 
termined to renominate every person against whom there was no com- 
plaint which would have warranted his removal." 

Senator Samuel L. Southard of New Jersey, who, like Webster and 
others, advocated the repeal of the law, says (G. & S.'s Debates, 1835, 
vol. xi, pt. i, pp. 421, 422): " The law, as it stood, placed every man 
who was not above being bribed by office, in the market, feeling and 
acting on the principle that he was to support the man who would keep 
him in office. Pass the bill before the Senate and the result will be 
far different. Each officeholder would be independent, and would look 
solely to a faithful discharge of his duty for his contmuance in office. 
As the law now stood * * * each one not inflaenced by pure mo- 
tives, would say to the Executive: * Will you retain me in office if I 
support you ? ' " 

Mr. George William Curtis says (Senate Report No. 576, for 1882, p. 
154): " The law of 1820 * * * was introduced in the Senate by a 
friend of William H. Crawford of Georgia [Mahlon Dickerson], who was 
a presidential candidate, and it was introduced, as John Quincy Adams, 
who was then in Washington and in the Cabinet, specifically states, for 
the purpose of helping Mr. Crawford in his campaign." 

Mr. Curtis further says, in one of his annual civil service addresses at 
Newport, R. I., that the bill was drawn by Mr. Crawford himself. 

Mr. Dorman B. Eaton says (" The Term and Tenure of Office," pp. 
24, 28): ''In that year (1820) Wilham H. Crawford, Secretary of the 
Treasury, was a presidential candidate, and Van Buren, who was to 
come into the Senate in 1821 (even then an aspirant for the presidency), 
was Crawford's supporter. They were unsurpassed for their skillful use 
of patronage. Both were able to see that if the terms of the inferior 
officers were reduced to four years, there would be more patronage to 
dispose of. * * * The four-years' law, for which the only apology 
was the pretended need of bringing inferior officers to a more frequent 
and strict account before the people, was followed by 297 defaulting 
collectors, receivers, &c., reported by the Secretary of the Treasury to* 
the House on March 30, 1838." 

But while Mr. Crawford was probably the power behind the throne, 
and while the law may have been intended by him and a few others for 
campaign purposes only, there were probably but few statesmen of that 



162 UNSUSPECTING STATESMEN ENI RAPPED. 

tion again and again within the last six years, 1 am very 
willing to say that, in my deliberate judgment, the 
original decision was wrong. I cannot but think that 
those who denied the power in 1789 had the best of 
the argument. * * * I believe it to be within the just 
power of Congress to reverse the decision of 1789 " * 

day who were aware of the fact. A few defalcations set the sensitive 
statesmen of 1820 to thinking about a remedy, and it may be that 
they were all caught in Mr. Crawford's four-years' law trap. However 
this may be, the defalcations spoken of by Mr. Eaton show that the too 
sensitive statesmen of 1820 made a mistake; in fact, that they got out 
of the frying-pan into the fire. 

Daniel Webster, in the course of his powerful speech on the appoint- 
ing and removing power, testifies to the conscientiousness of some of 
the statesmen of 1820. He desired to repeal the four-years' hw, but 
he says : *' I agree that it has in some instances secured promptitude, 
diligence, and a sense of responsibility. These were the benefits which 
those who passed the law expected from it, and these benefits have in 
some measure been realized.'' 

Senator David Barton of Missouri says (G. & S.'s Debates, 1830, yol. 
vi, pt. i, pp. 464, 465) : " The legislator of 1820 naturally asked himself 
what term and tenure of office would attain the desired public security. 

* * * The evil of the old law was that, while the government was 
plodding through some tedious process of law% * * * the defaulter 
could embezzle our funds * * * and escape to Texas, &;c., before 
the process had ascertained whether there was lawful cause for removal 
or not." 

Representative Ames, speaking in the first Congress of the slow pro- 
cess of removal by impeachment, predicted this precise result. He 
said : " While we are preparing the process, the mischief will be perpe- 
trated, and the offender will escape." 

* In a speech at Worcester, Mass., in 1832, Mr. Webster thus criti- 
cised President Jackson's official nominations and the patronage system 
(i, 262) '. " Within the last three years more nominations have been 
rejected on the ground of 'unfitness' than in all the preceding forty 
years of the government. And these nominations, you know, sir, could 
not have been rejected but by votes of the President's own friends. 

* * * In some not a third of the Senate, in others not ten votes, and 
m others not a single vote cuuld be obtained. * * * ^11 this, sir, 



MR. WEBSTER'S STATESMAN-LIKE WORDS. 163 

Henry Clay says (Colton's " Speeches of H. Clay," 
ii, 20) : " No one can carefully examine the debate in 
the House of Representatives in 1789 without being 
struck with the superiority of the argument on the 
side of the minority, and the unsatisfactory nature of 
that of the majority. How various are the sources 
whence the power is derived ! Scarcely anj'- two of 
the majority agree in their deduction of it." 

John C. Calhoun says (ii, 430) : '* I was struck, on 
reading the debate, with the force of the arguments 
of those who contended that the power (of removal) 
was not vested by the Constitution in the Executive. 

is perfectly natural and consistent. The same party selfishness which 
drives good men out of office will push bad men in. Political proscrip- 
tion leads necessarily to the filling of offices with incompetent persons, 
and to a consequent mal-execution of official duties. And in my opin- 
ion, sir, this principle, * * * unless the public shall effectually 
rebuke and restrain it, will entirely change the character of our govern- 
ment." 

Again, in his speech on the appointing and removing power, Mr. Web- 
ster thus philosophizes concerning the evils of patronage (iv, 180, 183): 
" The unlimited power to grant office and to take it away gives a com- 
mand over the hopes and fears of a vast multitude of men. It is gener- 
ally true that he who controls another man's means of living controls 
his will. Where there are favors to be granted there are usually enough 
to solicit for them ; and when favors once granted may be withdrawn at 
pleasure, there is ordinarily little security for personal independence of 
character. The power of giving office thus affects the fears of all who 
are in and the hopes of all who are out. Those who are * out ' endeavor 
to distinguish themselves by active political friendship, by warm per- 
sonal devotion, by clamorous support of men in whose hands is the 
power of reward ; while those who are ' in ' ordinarily take care that 
others shall not surpass them in such qualities or such conduct as are 
most likely to secure favor. They resolve not to be outdone in any of 
the works of partisanship. The consequence of all this is obvious. 

" Men in office have begun to think themselves mere agents and ser- 
vants of the appointing power, and not agents of the government or the 
country." 



164 OPINIOXS OF CALHOUN AND KENT. 

To me they appeared to be far more statesman-like 
than the opposite arguments, and to partake much 
more of the spirit of the Constitution." 

Again, in speaking of the powers of the President, 
Mr. Calhoun says (i, 219, 220): "I do not add the 
power of removing officers, the tenure of whose office 
is not fixed by the Constitution, which has grown into 
practice ; because it is not a power vested in the Presi- 
dent by the Constitution, but belongs to the class of 
implied powers, and, as such, can only be rightfully 
exercised and carried into effect by the authority of 
Congress." 

Chancellor James Kent, speaking of the decision of 
the Congress of 1789, says ("Commentaries," i, 344): 
" This question has never been made the subject of 
judicial discussion ; and the construction given to the 
Constitution in 1789 has continued to rest on this loose, 
incidental, declaratory opinion of Congress, and the 
sense and practice of government since that time. It 
may now be considered as firmly and definitively set- 
tled, and there is good sense and practical utility in 
the construction. It is, however, a striking fact in the 
constitutional history of our government that a power 
so transcendent as that is, which places at the disposal 
of the President alone the tenure of every executive 
officer appointed by the President and Senate, should 
depend upon inference merely, and should have been 
gratuitously declared by the first Congress in opposition 
to that high authority of the Federalist,* and should 
have been supported or acquiesced in by some of those 
distinguished men who questioned or denied the power 
of Congress even to incorporate a national bank." 

Joseph Story, LL.D., says ("Exposition of the Con- 
stitution," N. Y. Ed., 1881, p. 175) : "If we connect 
* Alexander Hamilton. 



JEFFEKSON ON THE SENATE'S POWERS. 165 

this power of removal * * * with another power, 
which is given in the succeeding clause, to fill up va- 
cancies in the recess of the Senate, the chief guards 
intended by the Constitution over the power of appoint- 
ment may become utterly nugatory. A President of 
high ambition and feeble principles may remove all 
officers, and make new appointments in the recess of 
the Senate ; and if his choice should not be confirmed 
by the Senate, he may reappoint the same persons in 
the recess, and thus set at defiance the salutary check 
of the Senate in all such cases." 

Senator George H. Williams of Oregon says (Sup- 
plement to Cong. Globe, 1868, p. 458) ; " Concerning 
the decision of 1789, * * * j^^ j^g^y i^^ ^^[^ ^^^^^ j^. 

was brought about by the arguments of James Madison 
in the House and the casting vote of Vice-President 
Adams in the Senate, both of whom at the time ex- 
pected to fill the executive office, and both of whom, 
it has been said, looked upon a contrary decision as 
expressing a want of confidence in the then adminis- 
tration of Washington.* Experience has demonstrated 
its mischievous and corrupting tendencies and effects." 

* The same reasons may have influenced Thomas Jefferson also. At 
the request of President Washington he wrote an ** opinion whether the 
Senate has a right to negative the * grade ' he (the President) may think 
it expedient to use in a foreign mission as well as the ' person ' to be 
appointed," in the course of which he said (" Works of John Adams/' 
iii, 576): ''The Senate is not supposed by the Constitution to be ac- 
quainted with the concerns of the executive department. It was not 
intended that these should be communicated to them ; nor can they 
therefore be qualified to judge of the necessity which calls for a mission 
to any particular place, or of the particular grade, more or less marked, 
which special and secret circumstances may call for. All this is left to 
the President. They are only to see that no unfit person is employed." 

The original manuscript of this Opinion was found among President 
Adams's papers. As he was Washington's successor in office, the latter 
probably gave it to him for reference. It is not in Jefferson's own works. 



166 THE CRITICS SOMEWHAT PREJUDICED. 

Representative Chilton Allan of Kentucky says (G. 
& S.'s Debates, 1833-34, vol. x, pt. iii, pp. 3354-56) : 
" The first fatal error that crept into our system of 
government was the power conferred in 1789 upon the 
President to remove public officers — a power given to 
the popularity of President Washington, and which he 
never abused — a power that remained harmless in the 
statute book for forty years. This power has been 
called up from its long slumber. It has displayed its 
character. * * * 'pj^g power of removal for opinion's 
sake at once saps the foundation of republican govern- 
ment and introduces the spirit of monarchy. * * * 
This power of removal, in its origin, was not intended 
to go further than to the removal of officers for whose 
conduct the President is immediately responsible. But 
of late the broad ground is taken that he can command 
and remove those for whose conduct he is not respon- 
sible.". 



The foregoing criticisms of the decision of the first 
Congress express the prejudice rather than the deliber- 
ate judgment of the critics. President Jackson's whole- 
sale removals created such a profound impression on 
the statesmen of his day, that even Mr. Webster ad- 
mitted that they may have biased his judgment. This 
must have been true, for otherwise how could such a 
statesman fail to commend the profound arguments of 
the majority in the great debate, some of which experi- 
ence has proved to be true? 

The American people are possessed of an inherent fear 
of monarchical power. But they came by it honestly, 
for it is hereditary, having been transmitted down from 
the forefathers. In further proof of this fact, let the 
following extra.cts from the speeches and writings of 
President Jackson's contemporaries speak for them- 



THE PRESIDENT TOO BUSY FOR MISCHIEF. 167 

selves. They do not all refer directly to the power of 
removal, but, like the preceding criticisms, they show 
the same fear and dislike of monarchical power and the 
same prejudice caused by President Jackson's removals. 
The speakers all feared and some predicted direful 
future results. They were greatly alarmed at the pros- 
pect of a corrupt President. A corrupt President would 
be a calamity. But the President is so beset as it were 
by constitutional checks, the most potent perhaps being 
the power of impeachment, that no permanent injury 
need be feared unless the people as well as the Presi- 
dent become corrupt. Besides the constitutional checks, 
the President nowadays is so engaged in the transaction 
of legitimate business that he has but little time to con- 
coct conspiracies. Further, political conspiracies, com- 
paratively speaking, are rare in this country. They 
are in fact opposed to the genius of American institu- 
tions. But in spite of all this, the wise words of the 
far-seeing statesmen of 1789 and 1829 cannot be too 
carefully weighed or too much heeded 

Senator David Barton of Missouri says (G. & S.'s 
Debates, 1829-30, vol. vi, pt. i, pp. 368, 462) : " He 
denied that in any cases, except the Cabinet officers, 
the Federal officers were ever intended to be rendered 
the servile creatures of the Executive, * * * but 
were intended to be freemen, looking to the faithful 
performance of their duties and to the protection of 
the Senate and the laws for their offices. It was fit 
that the officers of a despot should live or die by the 
breath of their master. That suited such form of gov- 
ernment. Not so in a republic — a government of law. 
* * * If this abuse of the offices be tolerated, his- 
tory will tell posterity that a combination of aspirants 
destroyed the constitutional liberties of the United 
States by the usual gradations of tyranny and bribery, 



168 REMOVALS MUST NOT SUBSERVE AMBITIOX. 

as was feared and deprecated by the Father of his 
Country ! " 

Senator George M. Bibb of Kentucky, speaking of 
President Jackson's '^Protest,"* and of the power of 
removal, says ('Debates/' 1833-34, vol. x, pt. ii, pp. 
1499, 1513): *' The power of removal of officers, al- 
though not expressly limited by the Constitution to 
any particular specified causes, is yet qualified and reg- 
ulated by the public uses and benefits for which it was 
conferred, and is abused and perverted when exercised 
^Q * * * subserve selfish ambition. * * * jj^ 
(the President) makes and unmakes at his pleasure. 
' This is my will, and that is your duty. I take the 
responsibility. Obey me, or I dismiss you, and supply 
your place by one whose opinions are well known to 
rae.' Can it be true ? Does any free man believe that 
all officers, subject to removal, are also subject to the 
order and direction of the President in the exercise of 
the duties and trusts which their offices impose, and 
which they are bound by oath to execute faithfully ? 
Is the President the sole interpreter of the Constitution 
and laws for them? * * * This prerogative power 
far exceeds any possessed by the King of England, for 
there it is an established maxim that ' no man shall 
dare assist the Crown in contradiction to the laws of 

* President Jackson's " Protest," which was really an arirument in 
defense of his course in removins: the deposits in the United States 
Bank, was broufrht out by the following resolution, which was intro- 
duced by Senator Clay : 

Resolved, Thnt the President, in the late executive proceedings in 
relation to the public revenue, has assumed upon himself authority and 
power not conferred by the Constitution and laws, but in derogation of 
both. 

This resolution was expunged from the journal January 16, ISST, by 
a vote of 24 to 19. 



THE LAWS ABOVE THE COMMANDS OP MEN. 169 

the land.' * * * They (the writers of the Protest) 
might have learned from the speeches and writings of 
the wise and virtuous of ancient and modern times that 
no government is well constituted ' unless the laws pre- 
vail above the commands of men.'"* 

Representative George McDuffie of South Carolina 
says (Debates, vol. x, pt. iii, pp. 3454, 3455) : *' I have 
deemed it important to speak thus distinctly on the dis- 
missing power, because I have a deep and solemn con- 
viction that if Congress does not interpose, speedily and 
effectually interpose on this subject, the day is not dis- 
tant when this government will sink into deep corrup- 
tion and absolute monarchy. * * * jf j^^ bring all 
the offices of this government into the political market 
as the legitimate 'spoils of victory;' if every aspirant 
to the presidential office inscribes on his banner this 
celebrated motto to animate his partisans, is not the 
whole mass of the offices and patronage of your gov- 
ernment converted into a mighty fund of corruption, 
sufficient to purchase an imperial crown, and which 
no human contrivance can permanently resist ? Mr. 
Speaker, the immense patronage of this government, 
tinder this new doctrine of the absolute right of every 
new President to discharge all the incumbents from 
office at his mere will and pleasure, to make way for 
his partisans, is a power I would not trust in the hands 
of an angel, if there were an angel in human form." 

* Senator Bibb further says : " One of the great securities for liberty 
consists in the division of the powers of government. Thus safety in 
legislation is consulted by havitig many Senators and many Representa- 
tives. Safety in the judicial department is consulted by having a plu- 
rality of judges. So the safety in the executive department consists in 
distributing the powers into numerous compartments, subjecting each 
officer to a personal responsibility, and to the law; whereby a govern- 
ment of laws is created, and not a government at the will of one man." 
(p. 1514.) 

8 



170 REMOVAL OF REVOLUTIONARY SOLDIERS. 

Senator John Tyler of Virginia says (Debates, vol. x, 
pt. i, pp. 672, 673): "Is the presidential power only 
to be considered dangerous when he (the President) is 
at the head of an army ? Patronage is the sword and 
the cannon by which war may be made on the liberty 
of the human race. * * * If the offices of the gov- 
ernment shall be considered but as ^spoils,' to be dis- 
tributed among a victorious party, then indeed, sir, the 
consequences are most fatal. All stability in govern- 
ment must be at an end. Novices are introduced in 
the place of long- tried, experienced, and faithful public 
agents, and the public interests necessarily suffer, and 
suffer severely." 

Senator Peleg Sprague of Maine says (p. 388) : " Since 
the political victory of 1828, the vultures have been 
screaming over the battle-iield, and ' even the cries of 
the widows and the orphan ' could not scare them from 
their prey. A spirit of proscription for opinion's sake, 
scarcely paralleled in the annals of free governments, 
has swept in terror over the land, prostrating the purest 
and the best, breaking down the independent, bending 
the feeble, and leaving the timid, like trembling slaves, 
to eat their bread in fear. Veteran soldiers of the 
Revolution have been sacrificed for daring to exercise 
the freedom for which they fought ! Officers of the 
late war. Republicans of '98, patriots at all times, have 
been punished for daring, in a republican country, to 
breathe the language of freemen ! " 

Senator Samuel L. Southard of New Jersey says (pp. 
161, 162) : "I do not mean at this time to discuss the 
existence of the power of dismission, or to question its 
constitutionality. * * * The spoils of party * * * 
are the triumphs of corruption over virtue and the Con- 
stitution. The power of dismission, if to be exercised 
at all, should be exercised for competent cause ; and 



PATRICK HENRY FEARS POWER AND KINGS. l7l 

that competent cause must exist in the law, and by 
the commands of the law ; must be connected with the 
actual discharge of the duties required by law ; to pre- 
vent the performance of acts expressly forbidden by 
law ; to secure the performance of acts expressly com- 
manded by law ; to relieve from fraud and mental in- 
capacity to discharge the duties arising under circum- 
stances which could not otherwise be controlled. * * ^ 
There is not a man on earth to whom I would confide 
it in the extent now claimed by the advocates of the 
Executive." 

Representative William F. Gordon of Virginia says 
(Debates, vol. xi, pt. ii, pp. 1282, 1285, 1286) : " I verily 
believe * * * the wise and patriotic framers of our 
Constitution have unintentionally given to the execu* 
tive power a fearful and dangerous ascendency, which 
makes it an overbalance to all the other departments of 
government. * * * Patrick Henry* uttered this 
sententious maxim of political wisdom : ' When you 
give power, you know not what you give.' * * ^ 
We may all very plainly see that the contest for the 
executive office is the rock on which the permanency 
of this republic is likely to be wrecked ; and the vehe- 
mence of this contest will ever be in proportion to the 
executive patronage. * * * I desire to limit and 
restrain the executive patronage." 

* Mr. Henry's words were spoken in the Virginia Convention of 1788, 
the Convention that adopted the national Constitution. Speaking of 
the Constitution, Mr. Henry said (Wirt's " Life of Patrick Henry," p. 
296): " This Constitution is said to have beautiful features. When I 
come to examine these features, sir, they appear to me horribly fright- 
ful ! Among other deformities, it has an awful squinting. It squints 
toward monarchy j * * * Your President may easily become Kinff," 

Mr. Henry opposed the adoption of the Constitution with more elo- 
quence than reason. But despite his and other men's eloquence it was 
adopted by a vote of 89 to 19. 



172 STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR REMOVAL. 

Albert Gallatin, one of the founders of the govern- 
ment, and for fourteen years Secretary of the Treasury 
under Jefferson and Madison, in a letter to his wife, 
dated Washington, May 2, 1829, says (Adams's Galla- 
tin, p. 633) : " On every occasion I have freely expressed 
my entire disapprobation of the system of removal for 
political opinions." 

Senator Samuel Smith of Maryland says (Debates, 
1831-32, vol. viii, pt. i, p. 1363): "I am opposed to 
removals from office for opinions declared. But, sir, I 
ivould remove any officer who made use of his office to 
force inferiors to act contrary to their wishes. I would 
remove every postmaster who had been known to frank 
the 'coffin handbills,' or any other abusive papers of 
either of the candidates." 

Senator Thomas Ewing of Ohio says (Debates, vol. 
X, pt. ii, p. 1416) : 'I will advise and consent to the 
appointment of no man, to any office, who has earned 
that appointment in the arena as a political gladiator. 
And I will advise and consent to the reappointment of 
no man to any responsible office who, while he held that 
office, abused it to the mere purposes of party, instead 
of using it for the benefit of his country. * * * At 
the same time I would inquire into no man's political 
opinions or personal preferences. It is a gross abuse 
that such inquiries have ever been made in appointments 
to office." 

Senator Hugh L. White of Tennessee says (Debates, 
vol. xi, pt. i, pp. 488-9) : " It is asked by the opponents 
of this bill what benefit its friends expect from a state- 
ment of the reasons of the removal when the nomination 
of a successor is presented to the Senate. I answer for 
myself, I wish to cut up by the roots the demoralizing 
tendencies of office-hunting. * * * Under the pres- 
ent state of thmgs ^ ^ ^ office-hunting will become 



HOW OFFICE-HUNTERS DECEIVE PRESIDENT. 173 

a science. Men will be selected and furnished with 
funds to defray the expense of coming to Washington 
for the purpose of having one set turned out and an- 
other set put in, by means of artful tales, secretly got- 
ten up and reduced to writing, which it is supposed 
will never see the light. This officer and representative 
of office-hunters will come on with one pocket full of 
bad characters, with which to turn out incumbents, and 
the other filled with good characters, with which to 
provide for his constituents. * * * Require the 
reasons for removal to be stated, and no man will dare 
to make a statement which he does not believe to be 
true, because exposure and disgrace will certainly be 
the consequence. You will take out of the hand of the 
cowardly assassin the poisoned dagger heretofore used 
in the dark. You will shield the Executive against 
mistakes founded on false representations." 

Senator Benton, chairman of a Committee on Exec- 
utive Patronage, in a report made on May 4, 1826, says 
(Appendix to G. & S.'s Debates, vol. ii, pt. ii, p. 133) : 
'' In coming to the conclusion that executive patronage 
ought to be diminished and regulated on the plan pro- 
posed, the Committee * rest their opinion on the ground 
that the exercise of great patronage in the hands of 
one man has a tendency to sully the purity of our in- 
stitutions and to endanger the liberties of the country. 
This doctrine is not new. A jealousy of power, f and 
of the influence of patronage, which must always ac- 
company its exercise, has ever been a distinguished 

* The Committee consisted of Senators T. H Benton of Missouri, 
Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina, Martin Van Buren of New York, 
Hugh L. White of Tennessee, William Findlay of Pennsylvania, Mahlon 
Dickerson of New Jersey, John Holmes of Maine, Robert Y. Hayne of 
South Carolina, and Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky. 

f Compare with page 166. 



174 PRESIDENT J. Q. ADAMS CREATES A FLURRY. 

feature in the American character. It displayed itself 
strongly at the period of the formation and of the 
adoption of the Federal Constitution. * * * Noth- 
ing could reconcile the great men of that day to a Con- 
stitution of so much power but the guards which were 
put upon it against the abuse of power. Dread and 
jealousy of this abuse displayed itself throughout the 
instrument. To this spirit we are indebted for the free- 
dom of the press, trial by jury, liberty of conscience, 
freedom of debate, responsibility to constituents, power 
of impeachment, the control of the Senate over appoint- 
ments to office." 

The American jealousy of power is still further illus- 
trated by the following extracts from speeches in the 
United States Senate in 1826.* 

Senator John Branch of North Carolina says (De- 
bates, vol. ii, pt. i, pp. 386, 387) : "It is time to re- 
enact Magna Charta. It is time to reassert the prin- 
ciples of the Declaration of Independence. * * * 
Are we dependent on the whim, or caprice, or courtesy 
of the President for power? * * * The Senate was 
wisely designed to act as a check on the appointing 
power. * * * It is intended, I trust, to be perpetual. 
It was so designed. But I have the most awful fore- 
bodings that it will not be. * * * It (the Con- 
stitution) may not prove an adequate protection against 
the insidious encroachments of ambitious leaders." 

Senator John Randolph of Virginia says (p. 392) : 
"Since the revolution of 1801, the practice has been 
settled that the Secretary of State shall succeed the 

* These speeches were the result of a special message from President 
John Q. Adams, wherein he claimed the independent right to appoint 
a representative to a " Congress of American Nations, to be assembled 
at Panama." But out of courtesy to the Senate, he did not exercise the 
allei^ed ri^i^ht. 



PATRONAGE LIKE ARCHIMEDES'S LEVER 175 

President. Hence it is that the Secretaryship of State 
has been the apple of discord under all administrations 
succeeding that of Mr. Jefferson. It was the bone of 
contention between Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Robert Smith. 
There are more here besides myself (looking at Mr. 
Macon) that know it. It has been the apple of discord, 
ay, and of concord too, sir, since. It has been the 
favorite post and position of every bad, ambitious man, 
whether apostate Federalist or apostate Republican, who 
wishes to get into the presidency, * * * 'honestly 
if they may, corruptly if they must.' It has been that 
which Archimedes wanted to move the world, * * * 
*a place to stand upon,' ay, and to live upon too, sir, 
and, with the lever of patronage, to move our little 
world." 

Senator Littleton W. Tazewell of Virginia says (p. 
602) : " I utterly deny the correctness of this doctrine, 
which seeks to create a new, substantive, and fruitful 
source of power, in existing or future Presidents, from 
the past i3ractices of their predecessors. And I deny 
more strongly, if I may do so, the authority to enlarge 
the volume of power issuing from this newly discovered 
fountain by the process of induction and reasoning by 
analogy. Let it be once granted that the practice of one 
President gives a legitimate authority to his successor, 
and that this authority may be enlarged by analogies, 
and it must be obvious to all that the power granted 
by the people to the Executive, although made by the 
Constitution but a school-boy's snow-ball, in a few turns 
would become a monstrous avalanche, that must one 
day crush themselves." , 

Senator John Chandler of Maine says (pp. 633, 634, 
635) : '•' Hardly a session of Congress passed but what 
some power, some patronage was gained by the Execu- 
tive. * * * jjj ^i^jg government the departments 



176 POWERS SHOULD BALANCE LIKE A SEE-SAW. 

were to balance each other. Hov/ was this balance to 
be kept up ? Not by constantly increasing the power 
of one department of the government ; but the House 
of Representatives should take care of the portion com- 
mitted to them, the Senate theirs, and the President his, 
* * * Balance anything. Get a rail and play at see- 
saw. Give one a little more than the other, and away 
he would go. So it was with these powers. Give one 
of them only a hair's breadth more than it ought to 
have, and the balance would be destroyed. * * * 
Governments were made on the suspicion that all those 
who had power would go wrong." 

The forefathers not only had reason to be jealous of 
power, but they had reason to complain of the evils of 
the patronage system many years before the Declara- 
tion of Independence. Sir Thomas Erskine May, in 
his ^'^ Constitutional History of England since the Ac- 
cession of George III,^^ says that many of the colonial 
officeholders sent from England were of little account — 
were thought to be good enough for the colonies, but 
not for England.* The most lucrative colonial salary, 
he says, would often be earned by deputy. He quotes 
a letter of Lieutenant General John Huske, written in. 
1758, as follows (ii, 529) : 

" As to civil officers appointed for America, most of the places in the 
gift of the Crown have been filled with broken members of Parliament^ 
of bad, if any, principles — valets-de-chamhre^ electioneering scoundrels, 
and even livery servants. In one word, America has been for many 
years made the hospital of England." 

* Such men were more mischievous in a colony than at home. * * *^ 
To allay discontent, the government finally surrendered to the local 
Governors all appointments under £200 a year, to be filled from among 
the citizens of the several colonies. — E. F. Waters. 



CHAPTER IX. 

COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECOKOMY. 

Its Utility. — The Civil Service Systems of England, Canada, British 
India, Germany, France, Sweden, Norway, and China. 

A SHORT account of the civil service laws and cus- 
toms of a few representative nations is a fitting con- 
clusion to this book. Comparative political economy, 
past as well as present, is a useful and instructive study. 
It ought to be made a distinct branch of study in all 
governments, for it is full of information and promise. 
Like comparative anatomy (and pathology also, for na- 
tions suffer with diseases as it were), it reveals new 
sources of light. It is as broad as the earth itself, and 
as various as the divisions and subdivisions of men. 
If the combined wisdom of the world does not at least 
approximate perfection, what will?* The bigot and 
the narrow-minded man only will reject useful laws or 
regulations because they were originated in England, 
France, China, or India. The time may come when it 
will be said of the United States of 1888, "They had 
only the fragment of a government, for they either re- 
jected or were ignorant of the wisdom of other nations." 
What would be thought of a nation that rejected the 
telegraph because it had its origin in another nation? 
Washington's recommendation, which was approved by 
Jefferson, of the establishment of a National Univer- 

* Let us avail ourselves of the wisdom and experience of former 
ages. Let us aggregate the knowledge of every nation. — John Vining. 



178 HISTORY OF ENGLISH EXAMINATIONS. 

sity for "the education of our youth in the science of 
government " was certainly a wise one. 

The English civil service law is much like our own ; 
but it contains provisions that ours does not, namely. 
Preliminary examinations are held for the purpose of 
weeding out those who are " too stupid or ignorant to 
have a chance on a competitive trial." Pensions are 
granted, provided the oiiicial has served ten years — 
one sixtieth of the original salary being allowed for 
ten years of service, and an additional sixtieth for each 
succeeding year till the fortieth, when the increase stops. 
Pecuniary embarrassment, caused by an officeholder's 
imprudence, forfeits " that honorable position in the 
service which is necessary to give him a claim to pro- 
motion or increase of salary from length of service." 
There is a *^ movable clerical force of all work," that 
goes " from department to department, as convenience 
may require." These salutary regulations are worthy 
of imitation. 

Mr. Dorman B. Eaton says that promotion examina- 
tions for the customs service were begun in England 
by Lord Liverpool in 1820 ; that non-competitive ex- 
aminations were begun by Lord Melbourne between 
1834 and 1841, but that "the decisive part of the con- 
test between patronage and open competition was be- 
tween 1845 and 1855, though the victors did not take 
possession of the whole field until 1870." Lord Mel- 
bourne favored competitive examinations, but they were 
thought to be " too great an innovation to begin at 
once." The order for the competitive system of exam- 
ination was issued on May 21, 1855. 

In Canada an act was passed in 1882 providing for 
non - competitive civil service examinations. It was 
amended in 1883, '84, '85, '86, '88, and '89. The ex- 
aminations are (1) preliminary, for lower grade otMces ; 



THE PRACTICAL REQUIREMENTS IK CANADA. 179 

(2) qualifying, for clerkships and higher grade offices ; 

(3) promotion, for those already in the service. These 
examinations are held once a year^ the two former in 
November, the last in May. The examinations are 
held simultaneously throughout the Dominion, and are 
conducted by subexaminers. The written papers are 
transmitted to the Board of Examiners at Ottawa, 
where they are examined and valued. The successful 
candidates in the preliminary and qualifying examina- 
tions receive certificates and have their names printed 
in the Official Gazette, Candidates who pass the j)re- 
liminary examination, have the option of taking the 
qualifying one also. The examinations embrace the 
elementary branches of education, but candidates are 
permitted to take certain prescribed optional subjects. 
These are translating English into French and French 
into English, book-keeping, short-hand, type-writing, 
and ^ precis^ writing. The last consists in condensing 
the salient points of reports, &c., into about a fourth 
of the printed matter. For the inside service, that 
is, for those employed in the different departments at 
Ottawa (the capital), there is an additional allowance 
of $50 per annum for every additional optional subject, 
not exceeding four, in which a candidate may pass. In 
most cases an annual increase of salary is allowed, but 
it cannot exceed the prescribed limit of the respective 
classes. Having reached this limit, it remains sta- 
tionary until the • candidate is promoted to a higher 
class. When a vacancy occurs in a class next above the 
one in which an employe is serving, he may, on pass- 
ing the promotion examination, be promoted to it. 
He thus reaps the advantage of a double increase of 
salary — (1) by promotion ; (2) by annual increase. Ex- 
aminations are held in either the English or French lan- 
guage, at the option of the candidate. Thirty per cent. 



180 MR. THORBUEN FAVORS COMPETITIVE TESTS. 

of the marks allowed for each branch of study and 
fifty per cent, of the aggregate number of marks given 
to all the subjects must be attained. That is, if there 
are eight subjects taken, there must be 400 marks made. 
There is a probationary period of six months, both for 
original and promotion appointments. The respective 
ages at and between which all ordinary appointments 
to the inside service are made are 15, 18, and 35 years — 
15 for places below that of a third-class clerk ; in other 
cases 18. Deputy Heads of Departments, officers, and 
employes, whose appointments are of a permanent char- 
acter, can only be removed from office by authority of 
the Governor in Council. Employes guilty of miscon- 
duct or neglect of duty are suspended without pay till 
such time as the suspension is removed. There is an 
attendance hook in which all employes, under Deputy 
Heads, are required to record their names every morn- 
ing, or at such other times as may be required by the 
Governor in Council. 

In a letter dated Ottawa, Canada, September 9, 1887, 
J. Thorburn, LL.D., Chairman of the Board of Exam- 
iners, to whom I am indebted for the foregoing facts 
in regard to the Canadian civil service system, says : 

Dear Sir: The civil service examinations in Canada 
differ in some important respects from those in Great 
Britain and in the United States. With us they are 
only qualifying, not necessarily, when passed, leading 
to appointments ; whereas with you and in England, 
with a few specified exceptions, they are competitive. 
In this respect, I am satisfied, you have the advantage 
of us, for, as is now generally admitted, the more fully 
the political element is eliminated from them, the better 
it is for the public service. 

Our government has not hitherto seen its way to 



EARNING THEIR PROMOTION. 181 

adopt a competitive system. It retains the power of 
selecting any candidate who has passed the examina- 
tion test, irrespective of his standing as compared with 
that of others, and the result therefore naturally follows 
that as soon as an applicant for office finds that he has 
" passed the Rubicon," he sets to work at once to bring 
all the pressure, political, social, or religious, that he 
can obtain to bear upon the different ministers of the 
Crown, and it will generally be found that the weakest 
and least deserving of the candidates, conscious of their 
deficiencies, are those that make the most strenuous and 
persistent efforts to secure political backing. 

Another serious drawback to our qualifying system 
of examination is to be found in the fact that out of 
the large number of candidates who every year reach 
the standard required by the examiners, probably not 
more than one in twenty has the least prospect of ap- 
pointment. In course of time therefore we shall have a 
large army of disappointed aspirants, each one of whom 
thinks he has some special claim upon the government, 
waiting for something to turn up, instead of betaking 
themselves to other avocations of life. 

You will see from the copy of the rules and regula- 
tions sent to you that we have a promotion examination 
for those already in the service. This has given rise 
to considerable opposition, especially on the part of 
those who have been a long time in the service. The 
experience, however, of the Deputy Heads has been 
largely in its favor. It exercises a wholesome and 
steadying influence on the younger members of the ser- 
vice when they know that they have to earn their pro- 
motion, instead of relying for it upon the interest and 
solicitations of influential friends. I find that in Eng- 
land they have a modified form of promotion examina- 
tions. These are held at the request of the heads of 



182 BRITISH IKDIA, VICTORIA, ETC. 

the several departments for the purpose of selecting 
those who are fittest for promotion or reward, but they 
are not necessarily required by law. 

In reply to your question as to the extent of the re- 
form in Her Majesty^s dominions, I answer that the sys- 
tem of examination for public ofl&ces is in operation in 
India, New South Wales, Victoria,* South Australia, 
New Zealand, and Jamaica, and so far as I know, it is 
found to work satisfactorily. Eespectfully yours, 

J. THOEBUEN. 

October, 1890. — There are now several exceptions to the various 
examinations, as follows : Graduates of the Royal Military College, 
Kingston, and of any university in Canada (from qualifying) ; cit3^ post- 
masters and postoffice inspectors ; inspectors, collectors, and preventive 
officers, Customs Department; inspectors of weights and measures, and 
deputy collectors and preventive officers, Inland Reveime Department 
(witliout examination or reference to rules of promotion) ; barristers, 
attorneys, military or civil engineers, artillery officers (militia), and 
architects, draughtsmen, and land surveyors, wlien employed or seek- 
ing professional promotion. Special examinations are no longer held. 
Penal clauses were enacted in 1888 against fraudulent practices at ex- 
aminations — copying from each other, personating, kc. — J. T. 

The British India civil service law requires strict 
competitive examinations. It was passed in 1853, two 
years before the English law. England apparently 
wished to try an experiment, and began it in India. 

^^ India, ^^ says Mr. E. F. Waters, ^'has a special ad- 
ministration, differing from all the other dependencies 
of the Crown. Her Governor has larger powers, and 

* Sir Charles TVentworth Dilke, Bart., says ('" Problems of Greater 
Britain," London, 1890, p. 121): "The Victorian Civil Service Com- 
mission has met with success, and on the rare occasions wlien mem- 
bers of Parliament have hinted at a desire to revert to their old prac- 
tices, the voice of the community has at once drowned the wh.isper 
of such a suggestion. The civil service, which was at one time a 
by-word, is now a credit to the colony, and nothing can exceed tlie 
average capacity, industry, and trustworthiness of its public servants.'* 



THE VARIETY OF LANGUAGE IN INDIA. 183 

all appointments in the civil, medical, engineering, and 
artillery services of that immense and densely popula- 
ted country (150,000,000 people) are based upon com- 
petitive examination. * * * Different candidates 
are examined (according to the different Provinces of 
India, or the different departments they may wish to 
enter), in addition to ordinary studies, in jurisprudence, 
law of evidence, law of India, political economy, his- 
tory and geography of India, Arabic, Bengali, Hindi, 
Hindustani, Malayalum, Marathi, Persian, Sanskrit, 
Tamil, and Telugu." 

Mr. D. B. Eaton says that natives of France, Canada, 
Brazil, and the United States have won appointments 
in the Indian service. 

Non-competitive examinations were held in British 
India long before 1853, but they were not very success- 
ful, notwithstanding the applicants were required to 
attend Haiieybury College for two years. For exam- 
ple, Mr. Eaton says that in the years 1851 to 1854, both 
inclusive, 437 applicants were examined for commissions 
in the Indian army. Nearly a third failed in English 
and a still greater number in arithmetic. This college, 
which was conducted on the patronage system plan, 
was abolished in 1854. 

In Prussia (Germany) the civil service has been gov- 
erned since her humiliation in 1806 by the first Napo- 
leon as scientifically perhaps as has her military ser- 
vice, which, in turn, in 1870-71, humiliated the third 
Napoleon, and one has improved and strengthened the 
government about as much perhaps as the other.* The 
following speaks for itself (Cyclopedia of Political Sci- 

* Prussia owes it very much to the high order of efficiency which has 
been introduced into her civil service that she has risen to be one of 
the first powers in the world. Improvements in administration have 
hardly been less in France and Great Britain. — C. C. Andrews. 



1 84 EXAMINATION AND RE EXAMINATION. 

ence, iii, 445) : " Various services are directly subor- 
dinate to the Ministry of State (council of ministers), 
such as the official journal, the archives, printing, and 
various others, notably the Commission of Examination 
for future functionaries. To be a functionary it is nec- 
essary to have studied three years at the University, 
to have passed a period of instruction and preparation 
for the public service, and to undergo a new examina- 
tion, called the state examination, before the Commis- 
sion. The candidate then obtains the title of Assessor, 
which confers the right of being employed and compen- 
sated, but sonae time elapses before a place with the 
title of Councilor can be had. The functionaries of 
lower grade and simple employes, are likewise obliged 
to pass an examination, but the requirements are not 
so great. 

" As to the internal organization of the public ser- 
vices, some are organized into bureaus ; that is, they 
have a chief, a sole functionary, and employes. But 
most of these services have Councils or Committees, in 
which the President often has a great preponderance, 
but in which each Councilor has his powers (dece7'?iat) 
clearly defined." 

In France the civil service is free of politics and pub- 
lic offices are held during good behavior. Mr. E. F. 
Waters, who has traveled in France and other parts of 
Europe, and who was for twenty years an editor of 
the Boston Daih/ Advertiser, in a pamphlet (issued in 
1881) entitled "The Great Struggle in England for 
Honest Government," says (p. 28) : " It is not con- 
tended that the English service is the best attainable. 
The French system is in some respects better. * It is 
the result of nearly a hundred years of experience. 
Every officer in it below Minister of Finance, com- 
menced his service in a clerkship, or some more subor- 



GREAT STABILITY OF SERVICE IN FRANCE. 185 

dinate position^ and the advancement which his fidelity 
and abiUty secured has never been hindered by polit- 
ical frowns, or even by political revolutions. His ap- 
pointment was without partiality, and public examina- 
tions have awarded him his promotions.* For more 
than fifty years a record has been kept of every man's 
official conduct, as reported by different superior of- 
ficers. * * * Under such a system, it becomes 
almost impossible for an unworthy man to work his 
way to a position where his incompetency or corruption 
can largely prejudice the reputation of the service, or 
materially affect the revenue of the empire.' " 

In a letter dated October 10, 1887, Mr. Waters fur- 
ther says of the French civil service : " It is bureau- 
cratic, but intelligent, honest, and faithful. Their en- 
tire idea is to do their duty, and nothing else, and they 
take an extreme pride in their position. A common 
track-guard on a State railway is as proud as a King 
of his position, and although courteous, is unrelenting 
in carrying out instructions. Nothing can exceed the 
courtesy of the higher trained officials."! 

Concerning the French diplomatic and consular ser- 
vices Mr. Abram 8. Hewitt says (Cong. Record, 1878, 
p. 1652) : " A most elaborate scheme of examination is 
laid down for admission to the permanent consular and 
diplomatic services. The examinations embrace interna- 
tional law, diplomatic history, statistics, political econ- 
omy, geography, and the languages — two modern lan- 
guages besides their own. * * * Promotion is made 
from the lower grades of the entire foreign service." 

* Compare with page 56, '^with or without the President," &c. 

f Subordinate officeholders serve one year without pay, but this is 
compensated by pensions for faitliful service. Salaries are " far below 
what the same service could be procured for in any private business." 
But, notwithstanding this fact, there is great eagerness for office. 



186 AN INGENIOUS SWINDLE CHECKED. 

These eminently practical examinations have been in 
force for about sixty-five years. 

In Sweden subordinate public officials and employes 
are appointed without regard to politics and serve dur- 
ing good behavior. This has been the rule since 1809, 
the date of the adoption of the present Constitution. 
Subordinate officials can only be removed after trial, 
but are suspended immediately on complaint. Experi- 
ence has shown that any tendency this rule may have 
to cause disrespect or disobedience is overbalanced by 
the hope of promotion and better pay, which can only 
be attained by faithful service. Some of the higher 
officials, however, can be removed by the King without 
trial. Again, notwithstanding strict non-competitive 
examinations for all officials are required, the King, in 
cases of emergency, can dispense with them. All ap- 
pointments are made by the King and his Ministers. 

It is noteworthy that there are three entirely different 
sets of distillery inspectors — the witness^ the controller, 
and the over controller. One watches the other. All 
are required to see that no distiller}^ manufactures more 
than the annual prescribed quantity of liquors. This 
latter provision, in case the liquor tax is raised, prevents 
an ingenious swindle. In the United States, for exam- 
ple, when there is talk of increasing the liquor tax, dis- 
tilleries usually double their manufacture. When the 
tax is actually raised, little or no liquor is manufac- 
tured for about a year. The government thus loses 
heavily the first year after the increase. 

There are two distinct grades of education for public 

offices in Sweden.* For subordinate offices, such as the 

_ - 

* In Sweden " education is not free except for the poor ; but it is ob- 
ligatory in this sense, that children cannot be admitted to their first 
communion until they are able to read and write." (" Cyclopedia of 
Political Science," iii, 838.) 



THE EDUCATION REQUIRED IN SWEDEN. 187 

post and customs departments, it is only required that 
a person shall have graduated at a high school ; but 
for those who wish to enter any of the higher branches 
of the service, it is necessary to pass at least one of two 
examinations at the University. There are two high 
school courses — the practical and the classical. The 
practical course consists of geography, history, arithme- 
tic, algebra, trigonometry, chemistry, mineralogy, bot- 
any, drawing, and the French, English, and German 
languages. The classical course embraces the Latin, 
Greek, and Hebrew languages instead of the English 
and German. It is necessary to pass an examination 
in one of these courses in order to enter the University. 
The University course consists of political economy, 
judicial encyclopedia, the law of nations, Swedish con- 
stitutional law, administrative law, the law of private 
rights, and legal process. There are three University 
examinations, the preliminary, requiring about a year's 
study, and the written and oral, requiring from two 
to two and a half years of additional study. Each an- 
swer in the written examination must be wholly im- 
promptu, and must be made in about eight hours. 
Only those who pass the written examination can enter 
the oral, which is public, and which also occupies about 
eight hours. There are two other University courses 
and kinds of examination, both in law, either of which 
qualify a person for admission to the civil service, 
though they are intended more especially as tests for 
admission to the judicial service. 

The respectability of the service is probably the main 
reason why students devote so much time to study in 
order to enter it. Further, in some cases the pay is 
good, and only about six or eight hours' work a day 
is required. Owing to the long course of study, oiBce- 
holders are usually 24 years old on entering the service. 



188 THE FIRST EIGHT YEARS OF SERVICE. 

An applicant, who must furnish certificates from two 
reputable persons as to his character, practical ability, 
&c., is almost invariably appointed first as a ' super- 
numerary,' at an annual salary of 1,000 crowns (about 
$270).* After serving for about eight years, on proba- 
tion as it were, he is promoted to a regular or ^ fixed ' 
position, and his salary is increased. After this, pro- 
motions to fill vacancies in all ordinary ofiices usuallj' 
go to the person who has served longest in the next 
lower grade. But this is not the case in important 
ofiices. In these the only question is as to ability. 

There is, in some cases, after five and ten years of 
service, an annual increase of pay of from about $125 
to $150 respectively. There is a practice, peculiar to 
the Department of Foreign Affairs, of granting ' expect- 
ance ' pay (about $1,000 a year) to persons temporarily 
out of diplomatic employment. Pensions are paid to 
persons of 70 years of age, provided they have served 
30 years ; and also to persons of 65 years of age, pro- 
vided they are disabled and have served about 40 years. 
The annual sum paid is from about $800 to 82,000. 
There is also a " separate pension establishment for 
widows and children of persons in the service," the 
funds for which are raised by assessing the public of- 
ficers, in addition to which the government annually ap- 
propriates about $24,000. f 

In Norway the civil service rules are practically the 
same as in Sweden. '' Norway is united with Sweden 

* A Swedish crown (kronor, formerly called riksdaler) is equivalent 
to ^0.26.8. 

f The facts concerning the civil service of Sweden are based on a 
report of Minister C. C. Andrews, and were furnished to him, in Swed- 
ish, by M. Yon Steyern, the Dispatching Secretary and Secretary-in-Chief 
of the Ecclesiastical Department. (See *' Foreign Relations of the Uni- 
ted States," 1876, pp. 553 to 564.) 



COMFETlTiVE EXAMINATIONS FOR 4,000 YEARS. 18^ 

under one sovereign, but according to the terms of its 
Constitution (adopted November 4, 1814, and revised 
in 1869), is 'free, independent, indivisible, and inalien- 
able.' The King exercises the executive power through 
a Council of State, consisting of two Ministers of State 
and seven Councilors. Two of the Councilors and. one 
Minister reside near the King at Stockholm, and the 
remainder are at Christiania." In Sweden the govern- 
ment consists of the King and " a Council of State, 
composed of ten members, two of whom, called Min- 
isters of State, hold the portfolios of Justice and For- 
eign Affairs, and eight of whom are called Councilors 
of State." In Norway it is noteworthy that " the rail- 
ways and telegraphs are the property of the govern- 
ment." I am informed by the Swedish-Norwegian Con- 
sul in New York that this is partly the case in Sweden 
also. * 

In China competitive examinations have been in use 
about 4,000 years. Mr. William A. P. Martin says the 
system is " the most admirable institution of the Chinese 
empire." He further says (North American Review, 
July, 1870, pp. 65, 66, 68, 72, 75, 76) : " The germ from 
which it (the competitive system) sprung was a maxim 
of the ancient sages, expressed in four syllables, ITil 
Men jiri neng — 'employ the able and promote the 
worthy,' and examinations were resorted to as affording 
the best test of ability and worth. Of Yushun, that 
model Emperor of remote antiquity, who lived about 
2,200 B. C, it is recorded that he examined his officers 
every third year, and after these examinations either 
gave them promotion or dismissed them from the service. 

" Every third year the government holds a great ex- 
amination for the trial of candidates, and every fifth 

* The words quoted in the above paragraph are from the American 
Cyclopedia. 



190 THE COMPETITIVE SYSTEM A SAFETY-VALVE. 

year makes a formal inquisition into the record of its 
civil functionaries. * * * The candidates for office, 
those who are acknowledged as such in consequence 
of sustaining the ' initial trial/ are divided into three 
grades, * * * < budding geniuses,' ' promoted schol- 
ars/ and those who are ' ready for office.' 

*' We have met an old Mandarin, who related with 
evident pride how, on gaining the second degree, he 
had removed with his whole family to Peking, from the 
distant province of Yunnan, to compete for the third ; 
and how *at each triennial contest he had failed, until, 
after more than twenty years of patient waiting, at the 
seventh trial, and at the mature age of three-score 
years, he bore off the coveted prize. He had worn his 
honors for seven years, and was then Mayor of the 
city of Tientsin. In a list now on our table of 99 suc- 
cessful competitors for the second degree, 16 are over 
40 years of age, 1 62, and 1 83. The average age of 
the whole number is above 30 ; and for the third degree 
the average is of course proportionally higher. 

"The political bearings of this competitive system 
are too important to be passed over, and yet too nu- 
merous to be treated in detail. * * * Jt serves the 
state as a safety-valve, providing a career for those am- 
bitious spirits which might otherwise foment disturb- 
ances or excite revolutions. Whilst in democratic coun- 
tries the ambitious flatter the people, and in monarchies 
fawn on the great, in China, instead of resorting to 
dishonorable acts or to political agitation, they betake 
themselves to quiet study. They know that their men- 
tal caliber Avill be fairly gauged, and that if they are 
born to rule, the competitive examinations will open to 
them a career. The competitive system has not indeed 
proved sufficient to employ all the forces that tend to 
produce intestine commotion ; but it is easy to perceive 



THE SYSTEM A KIND OF CONSTITUTION. 191 

that without it the shocks must have been more fre- 
quent and serious. 

" It operates as a counterpoise to the power of an 
absolute monarch. Without it the great offices would 
be filled by hereditary nobles, and the minor offices be 
farmed out by thousands to imperial favorites. With 
it a man of talents may raise himself from the hum- 
blest ranks to the dignity of viceroy or premier. Tsi- 
ang slang pun lou cluing^ ' the General and the Prime 
Minister are not born in office,' is a line that every 
school-boy is taught to repeat. Rising from the peo- 
ple, the Mandarins understand the feelings and wants 
of the people, though it must be confessed that they 
are usually avaricious and oppressive in proportion to 
the length of time it has taken them to reach their ele- 
vation. Still they have the support and sympathy of 
the people to a greater extent than they could have if 
they were the creatures of arbitrary power. The system 
therefore introduces a popular element into the govern- 
ment — a check on the prerogative of the Emperor as to 
the appointment of officers, and serves as a kind of 
Constitution to his subjects, prescribing the conditions 
on which they shall obtain a share in the administration 
of the government. * * * It is the Chinaman's 
ballot-box, his grand charter of rights. Even the Em- 
peror cannot tamper with it without peril. Though 
the Emperor may lower its demands, in accordance 
with the wishes of a majority, he could not set it aside 
without producing a revolution. 

" In districts where the people have distinguished 
themselves by zeal in the imperial cause, the only 
recompense they crave is a slight addition to the num- 
bers on the competitive prize list. Such additions the 
government has made very frequently of late years, in 
consideration of money supplies. It has also, to relieve 



192 EXAMIJS^EK PEICHING PUT TO DEA.TH. 

its exhausted exchequer, put up for sale the decorations 
of the literary orders, and issued patents admitting con- 
tributors to the higher examinations without passing 
through the lower grades. But though the government 
thus debases the coin, it guards itself jealously against 
the issue of a spurious currency. Seven years ago 
Peiching, First President of the Examining Board at 
Peking, was put to death for having fraudulently con- 
ferred two or three degrees. The fraud was limited in 
extent, but the damage it threatened was incalculable. 
It tended to shake the confidence of the people in the 
administration of that branch of the government w^hich 
constituted their only avenue to honors and office."* 

* Mr. Martin, in order to show how strictly the examinations are con- 
ducted, says : " The government examinations of China admit about 
2,000,000 candidates every year, and pass only 1 per cent.'- He says 
that about 2,000 competitors enter the lists for the degree of Budding 
Geniuses, and that of this number about 20 are successful. But they 
win honors only ; further competition is necessary to attain office. The 
successful student *' is the best of a hundred scholars, exempted from 
liability to corporal punishment, and raised above the vulgar herd. The 
social consideration to which he is now entitled makes it a grand day 
for him and his family." Of the " model scholar of the empire," or 
" scholar laureate," who is chosen every three years by the Emperor> 
Mr. Martin says : " Provinces contend for the shining prize, and the 
town that gives the victor birth becomes noted forever. Swift heralds 
bear the tidings of his triumph, and the hearts of the people leap at 
their approach. We have seen them enter a humble cottage, and amid 
the flaunting of banners and the blare of trumpets, announce to its 
startled inmates that one of their relations had been crowned by the 
Emperor as the laureate of the year. And so high was the estimation 
in which the people held the success of their fellow-tounsman, that his 
wife was requested to visit the six gates of the city, and to scatter be- 
fore each a handful of rice, that the whole population might share in 
the good fortune of her household." 

Mr. Martin may well ask what could be more democratic than choos- 
ing one of the chief officers of a nation of about 400,000,000 people 
from *' a humble cottage," or words to that effect. 



CONFUCIUS'S WISDOM AND STATESMANSHIP. 193 

"One great defect," says the Encyclopedia Britan- 
nica (v, 669), " in the competitive system in China is 
that there is no limit to the number of candidates, nor 
to the age when they may go up for examination, and 
the result is that, what with the surplus victors and 
the unsuccessful aspirants,* who go on trying year after 
year until they have become gray-haired old men, there 
exists a large non-producing class in the community 
which acts as a dead weight on the national prosperity." 

Confucius (551 B.C.), the philosopher and statesman, 
whose wise words are an important supplement to the 
foregoing extracts, speaking of officeseekers and office- 
holders, says ("Chinese Classics," i, 189) : "While they 
have not got their aims, their anxiety is how to get 
thera. When they have got them, their anxiety is lest 
they should lose them. When they are anxious lest 
such things should be lost, there is nothing to which 
they will not proceed." 

Confucius's estimate of the value of education as a 
qualification for officeholding may be inferred from the 

* Dr. Martin, who is now (Nov., 1890), lecturing in this country, 
says: ^' There are no surplus victors in the competition for the third 
degree, the only one that professes to open to them the doors of office." 

AVilliam Alexander Parsons Martin, D.D., LL.D., was born in Livo- 
nia, Indiana, April 10, 1827; went to Ning-po, China, in 1850, where 
he was engaged for ten years in missionary labor. From 1863 till 1868 
he was a missionary at Peking, and in 1869 became President of the 
Tong Weng College in that city and Professor of international law. He 
acted as an adviser of Chinese officials on questions of international law 
when disputes have arisen with European powers, notably during the 
conflict with France in 1884-85. In 1885 he was made a Mandarin 
of the third class. (Appleton's Cyc. of Am. Biography, iv, 234.) 

Dr. Martin is the author of a work entitled '' The Chinese: their Ed- 
ucation, Philosophy, and Letters " (Harpers, 1881), and he will " soon 
bring out another volume of similar import." 
9 



194 GEEAT U:N-ITY of the CHIjq^ESE. 

following (p. 208): ''The student^ having completed 
tis learning, should apply himself to be an officer. 
The officer, having discharged all his duties, should 
devote his leisure to learning/^ 

A government founded on these principles is sure to 
stand. It is like a house built on a rock. When it 
perishes, if a government founded on such imperishable 
principles can perish, it will be from natural causes. 
But alas for the Chinese, the same wall that for so 
many centuries inclosed their learning and wisdom, also 
excluded the learning and wisdom of other nations ! 

John W. Draper says (''Intellectual Development of 
Europe,'' ii, 397, 398) : "A trustworthy account of the 
present condition of China would be a valuable gift to 
philosophy, and also to statesmanship. On a former 
page I have remarked that it demands the highest pol- 
icy to govern populations living in great differences of 
latitude. Yet China has not only controlled her cli- 
matic strands of people — she has even made them, if 
not homogeneous, yet so fitted to each other that they 
all think and labor alike. Europe is inevitably hasten- 
ing to become what China is. In her we may see what 
we shall be like when we are old.'' 

In two respects, at least, the United States and China are much 
alike, namely, in great extent of territory and ''great differences of 
latitude." If we can make our " climatic strands of people think and 
labor alike," the success of republican government is probably assured. 

Montesquieu says ("Spirit of Laws," Am. Ed., i, 255, 263, 270): 
*'If it be true that the temper of the mind and the passions of tlie 
heart are extremely different in different climates, tlie laws ouglit to 
be relative both to the variety of those passions and to the variety 
of those tempers. — The law which forbade the Cartliaginians to drink 
wine, was a law of the climate. Such a law would be improper for 
cold countries, where the climate seems to force them to a kind of 
national intemperance very different from personal ebriety. — Happy 
climate which gives birth to innocence and produces a lenity in the 
law." 



APPENDIX. 



Note. — The following articles were written for the Albany Evening 
Journal by the author of this work, but only two of tlie five were 
published by it. The matter has been retouched, and a few notes 
have been added. 

FIRST AETICLE. 
To the Albany Uvening Journal: A writer in your 
paper of the 12th instant (Nov., 1889), objects to the 
civil service law because it is an experiment. The 
objection is not valid, because all laws are experiments. 
Sir George Oornwell Lewis truly says. (See note, page 
25.) The writer also says, and repeats the assertion (in 
substance) five times in the course of his article, that 
the certification of three names to an appointing officer 
is ^^practically to dictate appointments/^ Again he is 
mistaken, for an appointing officer may, if he deems it 
for the good of the service, object in writing to ap- 
pointing any or all of the three. (See Fifth An. Eept. 
U. S. C. S. Com., p. 60.) The law, in fact, is fiexible. 
It does not say that the President shall or must do 
thus and so, but that he '^is authorized ^^ to do thus 
and so. In fact, in case of an emergency — of war, for 
example — if he deemed it for the public good, he 
could temporarily suspend the operation of the entire 
civil service law system, just as, under similar circum- 



196 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM UTTERANCES. 

stances, the writ of liaheas corpus (the guardian of our 
liberties), may be constitutionally suspended. The 
writer is again mistaken when he says : /' No party in 
convention ever proclaimed what the character of the 
desired reform should be.''^ (See note, p. 94.) 

The question of official removals, about which the 
writer speaks, is of great importance. The power of 
removal is just as necessary in public business as it is 
in private business, for it is essential to discipline. 
But it is often abused. A remedy for its abuse is one 
of the errors of omission of the civil service law. (See 
p. 114.) 

5j* SfC 'p 1* 1^ H* 3|C 

Note. — One of the headings to the above article was as follows : " A 
Plank from such Eminent Authority as a Democratic Platform." The 
following planks are taken from such eminent authority as Republican 
platforms : 

1872. "Any system of the civil service under which the subordi- 
nate positions of the government are considered rewards for mere party 
zeal is fatally demoralizing, and we therefore favor a reform of the sys- 
tem by laws which shall abolish the evils of patronage, and make hon- 
esty, efficiency, and fidelity the essential qualifications for public posi- 
tion, without practically creating a life tenure of office." 

1876. The gist of it was that '^Senators and Representatives 
* * * should not dictate appointments to office," and that minor 
offices should "be filled by persons selected with sole reference to 
efficiency of the public service." 

1880. * * * "Fitness, ascertained by proper practical tests, 
shall admit to the public service ; * * * that the tenure shall 
be during good behavior, with power of removal for cause." 

1884. "The reform of the civil ser\ice, auspiciously begun under 
Republican administration, should be completed by the further exten- 
sion of the reformed system, already established by law, to all the grades, 
of the service to which it is applicable. The spirit and purpose of the 
reform should be observed in aU executive appointments, and all laws 
at variance with the object of existing reformed legislation should be 
repealed, to the end that the dangers to free institutions which lurk iu 
the power of official patronage may be wisely and effectively avoided." 

1888. After speaking of "the men who abandoned the Republican 



CIYIL SERVICE REFORM IIS" E:S^GLAISrD. 197 

party in 1884," it says : ''We will not fail to keep our pledges because 
they have broken theirs, or because their candidate has broken his. 
"We therefore repeat our declaration of 1884" (as above). 

The only notable civil service reform utterance in a national Demo- 
cratic platform, except that of 1876 (printed on page 94), is that of 
1872, as follows: '' The civil service of the government has become a 
mere instrument of partisan tyranny and personal ambition, and an 
object of selfish greed. It is a scandal and reproach upon free insti- 
tutions, and breeds a demorahzation dangerous to the perpetuity of re- 
publican government," &c. 



SECOND AETICLE. 

To the Albany Evening Journal: Mr. Ham begins 
his second article by saying that competitive examina- 
tions have ''been on trial in England since 1871, with 
indifferent and unsatisfactory results/' They have been 
on trial since May 21, 1855, and have so purified the 
civil service of that country that the old act of 1782, 
which disfranchised 40,000 excise, customs, and postof- 
fice officials for corruption at elections, was repealed in 
1858. Mr. Ham also says that public opinion in Eng- 
land ''has veered around and is now opposing if (the 
competitive system). The aristocracy of England have 
always been more or less opposed to the system. (See 
p. 69.) 

As to the " commission '^ which Mr. Ham says "has 
been sitting there for over two years,'' seeking remedies 
for defects, I have addressed a letter of inquiry to the 
British Civil Service Commission, the answer to which 
I will, if permitted, publish in the Journal, * 

* In a letter of Dec. 19, 1889, the Secretary of the British Civil Ser- 
vice Commission says : ''I inclose for yonr perusal a copy of the Treas- 
ury Minute of August last, on the recommendations of the Royal Com- 
mission of Civil Establishments (called from its Chairman the Ridley 
Commission). This Commission was appointed to inquire how far the 
scheme of Civil Service Organization recommended by the Playfair 



198 E:t^GLAND'S ADMIRABLE POSTAL SERVICE. 

In the same paragraph Mr. Ham says^ in effect, that 
civil service reformers oppose the discussion of civil 

Commission some thirteen years ago had been tried, and whether any 
modifications of this scheme were needed. The main principle of the 
Playfair Scheme was the division of the service into two grades of 
clerkships, recruited by two different open competitive examinations, 
the regulations regarding which I inclose; and this arrangement is 
fully accepted and approved for the future. The compititive exami- 
nations held under these regulations have, however, for a time been 
discontinued, pending the substitution of Lower Division for Higher 
Division clerks, and the extension of the liours of work in the Lower 
(or Second) Division. These examinations will, however, be resumed 
as soon as the reorganization of the service is complete. 

''The regulations, which I also inclose for 3'our perusal, regarding 
examinations for female clerks, bo}^ clerks, and telegraph learners, as 
well as those for higher appointments abroad (in India, Ceylon), and 
for some technical appointments, will show yon that the general prin- 
ciple of selection by open competition is fully maintained." 

The Ro3^al Commission, in the course of the Treasury Minute, says : 
" The reform of the civil service * * * -^vill in no great number 
of years attain, or nearly attain, the object at which the Playfair and 
Ridley Commissions have aimed. * * * Changes should be car- 
ried out gradually, and with the minimum of disturbance. It cannot 
be doubted that constant reorganization is prejudicial to discipline and 
to that confidence in easy and steady administration which is essential 
to the efficiency of the civil service." 

A. J. Mundella, M. P., says : " The postal service was the first to 
be rescued from tlie influence of politics. * * * The postal de- 
partment is as well served as any private firm in Great Britain — I 
believe I should be justified in saying better ser^^ed. It is the one 
department of which all Enghshmen are proud. It is unequaled for 
punctuality, civility, and dispatch. It has been able to go on steadily 
with reductions and reforms. * * * 

"The competitive system was adopted as the test o( fitness for of- 
ficial employment ; and I stand before you the representative of one 
of the largest constituencies in England, without the power to influ- 
ence in the smallest degree the appointment of a custom house of- 
ficer or an exciseman. I rejoice in this for seveml reasons, personal 
and pubhc. Personally, I say no representative can be strictly inde- 
pendent who touts after the Executive for appointments. Xo man 



TWO coktkadictio:n"s. 199 

service reform principles. He is mistakBn. They are 
discussing them in the press (religious and secular), 
in the pulpit, in circulars, pamphlets, &c. In fact, 
they invite discussion. This is well, for a system that 
will not bear discussion is not worthy of trial even. 

Mr. Ham, speaking in his first article of appoint- 
ments, says : " The commission has fixed a very nar- 
row limit within which the appointing power must 
confine its choice. ^^ By a ^^very narrow limit" he 
either means the eligible list or the still narrower 
limit, the three highest competitors. In his second 
article he says : '^The appointing power is not bound 
by the eligible list.'' Again, in his first article he 



can efficiently serve his constituents and his country whose time is 
occupied and mind harassed by hunting after and dispensing patron- 
age. He knows that for every office he bestows he is pretty sure 
to make ninety-nine enemies and one ingrate. The pubUc reasons 
are still more potent. The prizes of the State are open to all classes, 
without distinction of rank or social position. The child of the poor 
man with brains has the same chance as the son of a peer. The 
effect of the system upon the education of the people must be ben- 
eficial in the highest degree. When it is once seen that the son of 
the artisan may snatch the prize from his noble competitors, parents 
will be more willing to make sacrifices for the education of their chil- 
dren. Not only will the winners be rewarded, but even the unsuc- 
cessful will be gainers in intelligence and intellectual force. The 
nation will gain every way. It will secure honest and competent 
servants, whose tenure of office and promotion will be solely depend- 
ent upon meritorious service ; and when representatives are chosen, 
not for what they can get or can give, but for their knowledge of 
political science and their power and disposition to service the father- 
land, a higher tone may be expected to pervade the circle of politics." 
James Bryce, M. P., who takes the same view of civil service re- 
form as Mr. Mundella, and who is an equally good representative of 
English public opinion, speaking of civil service reform in this coun- 
try, says ("American Commonwealth," ii, 476): ''Thej^ (the Ameri- 
cans) are laboriously striving to bring their civil service up to the 
Grerman or English level." 



200 WEKE THE PEOPLE DECEIVED? 

says: ^^ President Harrison goes on making removals 
without fear^ * * * and he listens^ as men have 
of yore^ to the voice of the politician before he acts/'' 
In his second article he says President Harrison is 
doing his ^^best to sustain it (the law), as Gen. Grant 
did the law of 1871/^ Comment is unnecessary. 

Mr. Ham says: ^^In the rank and file where the 
competitive scheme would have a chance to operate, 
there was efficiency and little or no corruption ; and 
the people were deceived by the venders of this elixir 
which was offered as a panacea.''^ 

It is true that the government has been blessed with 
many efficient and faithful subordinate employes. But 
it has also been cursed by many corrupt employes, 
both chief and subordinate. The following narratives 
almost surpass belief. The United States Civil Ser- 
vice Commissioners say (Fourth Report, p. 123) : 

''Senator Hoar, in his speech on the Belknap impeachraent trial, 
forcefully stated the condition of the pubHc mind at that time when 
he said: 'I have heard in highest places the shameless doctrine, 
avowed by men grown old in office, that the true way by which 
power should be gained in this republic is to bribe the people with 
the offices created for tlieir service, and the true end for which it 
should be used when gained is the promotion of selfish ambition and 
the gratification of personal revenge.' " 

Again the Commissioners say (same Eept., p. 121) : 

" Before the enactment of the civil service act the condition of the 
executive civil service in the departments at Washington and in the 
customs and postal services was deplorable. In tlie Department of 
the Treasury 3,400 persons were at one time employed, less than 
1,600 of them under authority of law. Of these 3,400 employes. 1,700 
were put on and off the rolls at the pleasure of the Secretary, who 
paid them out of funds that had not by law been appropriated for 
the payment of such employes. At that time, of a force of 958 per- 
sons employed in the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, 539, with 
annual salaries amounting to $390,000, were, upon an investigation 
of that bureau, found to be superfluous. For years the force in some 



TWENTY TO PERFORM THE WORK OF ONE, 201 

l3ranclies of that bureau had been twice and even three times as great 
as the work required. In one division there was a sort of platform, 
built underneath the iron roof, about seven feet above the floor, to 
accommodate superfluous employes. In another division 20 messen- 
gers were employed to do the work of one. The Committee that 
made this investigation reported that 'patronage,' what is known as 
the -spoils system,' was responsible for this condition, and declared 
that this system had cost the people millions of dollars in that branch 
of the service alone. So great was the importunity for place under 
the old system of appointments, that when $1,600 and $1,800 places 
became vacant, the salaries thereof would be allowed to lapse — to 
accumulate — so that these accumulations might be divided among the 
applicants for place on whose behalf patronage-mongers were inces- 
sant in importunity. In place of one $1,800 clerk, three would be 
employed at $600 each — would be employed, according to the pecu- 
liarly expressive language of the patronage-purveyors, 'on the lapse.' 
'In one case,' said a person of rehability and of accurate information, 
testifying before the Senate Committee on Civil Service Reform and 
Retrenchment, '35 persons were put on the "lapse fund" of the 
Treasurer's office for eight days at tlie end of a fiscal year to sop up 
some money which was in danger of being saved and returned to the 
treasury.' Unnecessary employes abounded in every department, in 
every customs office, and in almost every postoffice. Dismissals were 
made for no other purpose than to supply with places the proteges 
of importunate sohcitors for spoils." 

In the face of such testimony^ and much more to 
the same effect, how can Mr. Ham say that '^'^the peo- 
ple were deceived ?'' 

Mr. Ham says ^^that one of the main incentives 
which induced public men to give the ^ competitive ' 
theory support was a desire to rid themselves of the 
^importunity^ of small ofRceseekers. * * * But it 
is a serious question whether a public servant, under 
our institutions, has a right to pass a law simply to 
elude the demands of his constituents, who have as 
perfect a right to seek place or preferment at his 
liands as they have to cast the ballot that aids to ele- 
Tate the Senator or Kepresentative to public station. ^^ 



202 OKE OF CONGRESS'S RIGHTS. 

In view of the above facts (facts printed on pages 
58, 59, 60 of this work), is it strange that Congress- 
men should " desire to rid themselves of the impor- 
tunity of small officeseekers ?^^ A man^s ^'^ right to 
seek place or preferment '' cannot be denied ; but he 
has no right to obstruct the business of Congress or 
to annoy Congressmen. That is carrying the demo- 
cratic principle a little too far. As to a man's ab- 
stract right to office Daniel Webster says. (See p. 36.) 
The abstract right of Congress to prevent its business 
from being obstructed certainly cannot be denied. 

Under the heading, ''The First Agitation,'' Mr. 
Ham claims that Mr. Jenckes began the civil service 
agitation in 1866, when, as he says, ''the nation had 
just successfully emerged from a struggle for exist- 
ence," and when, owing to the demoralization caused 
by that struggle, "the people were in ripe condition 
to reform abuses." As a matter of fact Senator Sum- 
ner framed the first competitive examination bill in 
1864, when the nation was in the very throes of war. 

He 4c 4; 4c 4c :ic 4c 



THIRD ARTICLE. 
To the Albany Evening Journal: In his third arti- 
cle Mr. Ham charges that Mr. Jenckes "was certainly 
guilty of plagiarism from Benton and Calhoun's re- 
ports on civil service reform, made in 1826 and 1835." 
As the object of Messrs. Benton and Calhoun and 
their colleagues was to diminish the President's power, 
while Mr. Jenckes's object was to increase his power, 
the charge of plagiarism is not well taken. Even if 
the respective objects were the same, there would be 
nothing wrong or unusual about the matter, for it is 
a common thing for statesmen of one generation to 



A RECKLESS CHARGE. 203 

copy those of another — to drink of the wisdom of the 
past, as it were. (See note, p. 100.) Mr. Benton 
once said : '' The very men who advocate the spoils 
system for public business, would call a man a fool if 
he proposed the same system for private business. ^^ 
Would any one think of charging Mr. Benton with 
plagiarism because he gave force and form to a self- 
evident truth, a truth that is probably as old as gov- 
ernment itself ? There are some things in political 
science as well as literature that are held in common. 
New ideas, like discoveries, are rare. We should not 
forget that history repeats itself. 

Mr. Ham is either very careless or very reckless, 
for he charges Messrs. Benton and Calhoun and all 
their equally earnest colleagues, and all subsequent 
civil service reformers, with insincerity ! He says : 
'^The truth is that neither in 1826, nor in 1835, nor 
yet in 1866, much less in 1871 and 1882, when civil 
service reform found its way on the statute book, was 
there any real or sincerely apprehended danger from 
^ patronage.^ ^^ Shades of the Revolution, of 1812, of 
^61, of every struggle for honesty in and improvement 
of government, did ye ever dream that an American 
could charge ye with insincerity ! To mention one 
individual, Mr. Ham charges that unsurpassed hero 
of the Revolution, Nathaniel Macon, who declined a 
commission and served as a private soldier, and who 
subsequently served in Congress from 1791 till 1828, 
with insincerity ! Would Mr. Ham charge Phillips, 
the Lovejoys, Garrison, Giddings, Smith, Johnson, 
Brown, Birney, and the noble band of equally earnest 
Abolitionists who aided them, with insincerity ? What 
does Mr. Ham think of the civil service reform dec- 
larations of the national Republican platforms for the 
past sixteen years— 1872 to 1888 ? (See p. 196.) 



204 A RIDICULOUS CHARGE. 

Mr. Ham says^ among other things, that the civil 
service reformers of 1870, ^71, &c., spread ^^the most 
alarming statements * * * concerning the condi- 
tion of the civil service ;^^ that ^^it was alleged to be 
corrupt/^ and that ^^ bells were tolled to warn the 
people against danger from the ^officeholders^ and 
General Grant/^ After reading the extracts from the 
^^ Fourth Eeport of the United States Civil Service 
Commission/' printed in my second article (p. 200), 
the reader will see that there was reason for the 
charge of corruption against some officeholders at least. 
As to ^^ General Grant,'' he can speak best for him- 
self. [An extract from his second annual message 
(1870) appears on page 94 of this work.] In his third 
annual message he further says: ^^If bad men have 
secured places, it has been tlie fault of the system. 
* * * A civil service reform which can correct 
this abuse is much desired." Fourth annual message : 
^^•An earnest desire has been felt to correct abuses 
which are growing up in the civil service of the coun- 
try through the defective method of making appoint- 
ments to office." In his fifth annual message he sug- 
gests ^Hhat a special committee of Congress might 
confer with the Civil Service Board * * * f^p 
the purpose of devising such rules as * * * will 
secure the services of honest and capable officials, and 
which will also protect them in a degree of independ- 
ence while in office." Sixth annual message: ^^The 
effect (of the rules), I believe, has been beneficial on 
the whole, and has tended to the elevation of the 
service." He adds to this last message that ^^it will 
be a source of mortification if it (civil service reform 
labor) is to be thrown away." In the face of all this, 
what reason had civil service reformers '"to warn the 
people against danger from * * * General Grant ?" 



AlSiOTHER RECKLESS CHAEGE. 205 

Could any of them have served the cause better un- 
der the circumstances ? How can Mr. Ham insult 
the intelligence of the American people by making 
such a charge ? He might as well tell us that Gen- 
eral Grant's soldiers warned the people against him. 

Under the head of ^^ Jackson as a Horrible Exam- 
ple, '' Mr. Ham says : '' Their (civil service reformers') 
denunciations of Jackson as a ^ partisan^ were more 
properly applicable to Mr. Jefferson, who removed Fed- 
eralists because they were Federalists. '^ The charge 
is simply reckless, and is best refuted by Mr. Jeffer- 
son himself. Writing on February 14, 1801, he says 
(Jefferson's Works, iv, 353) : "^o man who has con- 
ducted himself according to his duties would have 
anything to fear from me, as those who have done ill 
would have nothing to hope, be their political princi- 
ples what they might. The obtaining of an appoint- 
ment presents more difficulties. The Eepublicans have 
been excluded from all offices from the first origin of 
the division into Republican and Federalist. They 
have a reasonable claim to vacancies till they occupy 
their due share.''* Again, March 29, 1801 (p. 391): 
"^ Officers who have been guilty of gross abuses of of- 
fice, such as marshals packing juries, &c., I shall now 
remove, as my predecessor ought in justice to have 
done. The instances will be few, and governed by 
strict rule, and not party passion. The right of opin- 
ion will suffer no invasion from me." And again, Oc- 
tober 25, 1802 (p. 451): ^^I still think our original 
idea as to office is best ; that is, to depend, for the 

* Compare with page 73. The officials who were nominated by 
Adams and confirmed by the Senate on the night of March 3, 1801, 
ought not to be charged to Mr. Jefferson's removals account. He 
said they were ''considered as nullities," and that Mr. Adams's best 
friends agreed that they ought to be treated as such. 



206 A RAKE DISH OF HODGEPODGE. 

obtaining a just participation^ on deaths, resignations, 
and delinquencies/^ 

Speaking of Jefferson, Mr. Ham further says: ''It 
would not do for the average civil service reformer 
to hold him up as a ^ partisan.'' ^^ In the face of his 
preaching above and his practice while President, how 
coidd they ^''hold him up as a partisan,"'' in the ordi- 
nary acceptation of the term ? But Mr. Ham does 
so. Hands off the first six Presidents, Mr. Ham, if 
you please. The man who says they removed subor- 
dinate officeholders for partisan reasons, slanders them. 
All of them denounced this doctrine. (See p. 91.) In 
the words of President Hayes, let us return to the prin- 
ciples and practices of the founders of the government. 
Born of passion, if not revenge, tlie infamous system 
of removal for i^artisan reasons was not engrafted on 
our national government till 18:29. (See p. 74.) 

Speaking of Senator Marcy^s celebrated spoils doc- 
trine speech, Mr. Ham perpetrates the following ex- 
traordinary if not unparalleled jumble of words : 

^^ Mr. Marcy's fjimiliar remark — wliich the advocates of civil service 
reform so delight to recall from its slumbers — viz.. that 'to the victors 
belong the spoils,' contained a very essential appendage, which is al- 
ways suppressed. Mr. Wright (sic) added, ' but I do not mean to Sity 
that the victors should phuider their own camp.^ A very important 
qualification indeed ; one that carries a complete refutation of the con- 
struction placed in his (sic) original remark by the civil service people ! " 

Does Mr. Ham imagine he can befog the reader 
with such hodgepodge as the foregoing I How can 
Mr. Wright's words be an '^''' essential appendage ^^ to 
or ^^a very important qualification'^ of J/r. Jlarcy's 
words? Mr. Wright could not have *' added ^^ any- 
thing at the time,* for he was not a member of the 

* Mr. Wright succeeded Mr. Marcy. taking his seat January 14. 
lSn8. Charles E. Dudlev was Mr. Marcv's Xew York colleaorue. 



DEFIKITIONS OF THE WORD SPOILS. 207 

Senate at the time. But even if Senator Marcy had 
used the words himself, which he did not, would they 
qualify the spoils principle laid down by him in the 
least ? In quoting from a speaker, how can unuttered 
words be ^"^ suppressed ?'^ Mr. Marcy^s ^'^ familiar re- 
mark ^^ is quoted on page 81 of my ^'^ Civil Service 
Law.^^ If Mr. Ham can find anything ^'^ essential ^^ to 
the main question ^^ suppressed/^ he can do more than 
I can, and I have read all three of Senator Marcy^'s 
speeches on this occasion (the debate on the confir- 
mation of Martin Van Buren as Minister to England.) 
Mr. Ham^s serious charge against '' the civil service 
people ''^ is so mixed, absurd, and contradictory as to 
be actually comical. 

Mr. Ham speaks of ^^the construction placed in his 
original remark,^^ &c. Of course a had construction 
can be placed on a remark of Mr. Marcy or anybody 
else ; but how can a good construction be placed on 
the word spoils ? Webster defines the word (the noun) 
thus : ^^That which is taken from others by violence ; 
especially the plunder taken from an enemy ; pillage ; 
booty ; that which is gained by strength or effort ; 
act or practice of plundering ; robbery ; corruption ; 
cause of corruption."^ 

The man who hath not music in himself, 
Nor is not moved with concord of sweet sounds, 
Is tit for treasons, stratagems, and spoils. — Shakespeare, 

As I have said in my '^ Civil Service Law,"" if Amer- 
icans, when talking about public offices, would stop 
to think of the exact meaning of this word, it would 
no longer mar our political vocabulary. In the polit- 
ical vocabulary, if not the dictionary, of the Twenty- 
fifth Century the word will probably be defined thus : 
A relic of barbarism. Obs. . 



208 TWO MORE co:n'tradictioxs. 

FOURTH ARTICLE. 
To the Albany Evening Journal: Mr. Ham begins 
his fourth article most inauspiciously. He says : 

"Following the passage of the civil service law of 1871 came the 
zealous efforts of the reformers to prepare rules and regulations to 
make the scheme work out their theories. They failed, and the 
'competitive' idea finally collapsed in 1875-6." 

A few lines further on and he says : 

''There was some difference of opinion, but Congress must liave 
conceived that the law was not worth the powder, or it would not 
have allowed it to die for want of money to keep it in motion, as 
that was the method tixken to put it to death." 

The last statement, which is substantially true, con- 
tradicts the first statement. The first statement is not 
only not true, but it contradicts President Grant^s 
sixth annual message, whicli says. (See p. 204.) 

Again, in his second article, in speaking of *^the 
competitive feature of the civil service law,^^ he says : 

" And yet in this country the slightest manifestation of a disposi- 
tion to reexamine the matter is denounced, but upon what assump- 
tion, no one save so-called civil service reformers can discover." 

In his fourth article he says : 

" This only seemed to wet {sic) the appetite of the reformers, who 
commenced a systematic siege, and for several yejirs in public print 
in conventions, meetings, and on the st\mip. it was sought to create 
a sentiment which would justifv a second appeal to Congress of suf- 
ficient proportions to terrify and bulldoze the legislative branch into 
passing an elaborate act." 

' The truth of Mr. Ham^s first statement was dispu- 
ited in my second article, and now he disputes it him- 
iself, and therefore contradicts himself. An honest 
[and intelligent discussion of public issues for the pur- 
pose of creating **' sentiment,'" means health to the 
body politic. This is indisputable. How could tlie 



PRESIDENT GRAXT REFUTES MR. HAM. 209 

reformers ^^ terrify ^^ or ^^ bulldoze ^^ Congress? The 
charge is ridiculous. 

Speaking of Mr. Eaton and others^ Mr. Ham says : 

"These aristocratic persons, who go abroad for ideas, and who 
deehne to perform the duties of good citizens, conceive themselves 
aggrieved because the people neglect to honor them with office." 

President Grant, who is almost as high an author- 
ity as Mr. Ham, says that Mr. Eaton and the other 
two Commissioners did not ^^ decline to perform the 
duties of good citizens. ^^ In his 1874 message he says : 

"The gentlemen who have given tlieir services, without compen- 
sation, as members of the Board to devise rules and regulations for 
tlie government of tlie civil ser\dce of the country, have shown much 
zeal and earnestness in their work, and to tliem, as well as to my- 
self, it will be a source of mortification if it is to be thrown away." 

In the sublime -^Sermon on the Mount ^^ it is said : 
^^ Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteous- 
ness^ sake : for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. ^^ Not- 
withstanding President Grant^s earnest pleadings in 
five consecutive annual messages, and the fact that 
he was speaking of business that pertained to the 
executive (his own) department, and the further fact 
that he was in almost daily communication with the 
heads of the departments, and knew their wants, which 
Congressmen as a rule did not. Congress allowed the 
law, as Mr. Ham says, ^^to die for want of money to 
keep it in motion. ^^ Under the circumstances how 
could such treatment be anything but ^^a source of 
mortification " to him ? 

Speaking of Mr. Eaton^s Report on the English civil 
service, Mr. Ham, among other things, says : 

^'The suggestion which it conveyed, to wit: that the abuses in 
England had been eradicated by civil service 'competitive' examina- 
tions, rather than by revolutions, was the weakest feature of his his- 
torical effort." 



210 ''A BUSINESS MEASURE." 

As there has not been a political revolution in Eng- 
land since 1688^ Mr. Ham is evidently mistaken. 

Mr. Ham says " Senators did not concede that there 
was any corruption or inefficiency in the grades which 
the law would reach. ^^ Let us decide whether this 
statement is true or not by giving the words not only 
of ^ Senators^ but of Kepresentatives also before, dur- 
ing, and after 1871. * 

Eepresentative John H. Hubbard of Connecticut, 
speaking of Mr. Jenckes^s civil service bill, says (Cong. 
Globe, Feb. 6, 1867, pp. 1033-34) : 

''I regard it as one of the most important bills ever offered here 
since I first had the honor to take a seat in this Hall. * * * it 
is a business measure, not a party one. * * * j^ ^vill furnish a 
strono^ incentive to the vouno- to lead honorable and useful lives. A 



* A late (1864) Commissioner of Customs says (House Repts.. Xo. 
8, 39th Congress, Second Session, January 31, 1867, vol. i. p. 9j: 
'' It is known that men have been appointed* as custom Ijouse in- 
spectors, at compensations varying from $1.50 to $2.50 and $3 a 
day, who were never required to perform a single day's service, and 
whose only attendance at the custom house was for the purpose of 
receiving and receipting for their pay. Sucli appointments were made 
as rewards for past or expected pohtical labors or influence, and were 
so understood b}^ the appointees, who felt under no obligations, not 
even a moral one, to render any service to the government whose 
money their consciences did not forbid lliem to take." 

In this same (tlie Jenckes Joint Select Committee) Report (p. 1) it 
is said : '^ The result of this system, or rather want of system, has been 
that persons have been received into the service as officers of the 
government who have had to be educated in the duties which tliey 
are to perform afcer receiving their connnissions, and without any 
probationary course during which their qualifications for the office 
might be tested. And in cases where there has been manifest inef- 
ficiency on the part of the appointee, and where a disposition has 
been shown to do as little for the public service as was necess^iry 
to satisfy the minimum requirements in his office, the politiciil influ- 
ences which secured the original appointment have been able to pre- 
vent a removal." 



SE:N'AT0R SHERMAN'S TESTIMONY. 211 

certificate of good character and efficiency from such a government 
board, a board appointed by the President of the United States, will 
help destitute young men to obtain employment in private life, if they 
fail to get a public office. Thousands upon thousands of poor boys 
will struggle hard and practice much self-denial to obtain such a prize." 

Mr. Hubbard^s prophecy has been partly fulfilled. 

Eepresentative Robert C. Schenck of Ohio^ who also 
favored Mr. Jenckes's bill, suggested to Eepresentative 
Woodbridge of Vermont, who somewhat facetiously 
opposed the bill, that he (Woodbridge) offer an amend- 
ment to the bill like this (Cong. Globe, Feb. 6, 1867, 
p. 1036): 

''That the appointments shall be made from such persons as are 
recommended by a member of Congress from Vermont, or some other 
State, for services performed in securing by treats of liquor or other- 
wise the votes of Bill Johnson and Sam Smith for said member at the 
last preceding election. [Laughter.] " 

Mr. Schenck not only completely turned the tables 
on Mr. Woodbridge, but he described precisely how 
some votes are secured. He also spoke seriously of 
the need of civil service reform. He was as pro- 
phetic as Mr. Hubbard, for he said the report of the 
(Jenckes) Committee on the Civil Service, whereof he 
himself was a member, would be a guide for the ac- 
tion of future Congresses. It was followed by the acts 
of 1871 and 1883. 

Senator Sherman says (Cong. Globe, 1870, p. 3846) : 

" Every man of sense knows that he can go to any of these depart- 
ments and cut off one-half of the clerical force, and yet have a sufficient 
force to perform all the duties. If others do not know it, I at least 
have a very strong conviction on this point. There is scarcely a de- 
partment of this government in which, if conducted by a private in- 
dividual as he would conduct his private business, or the affairs of a 
private corporation, he would not only reduce the compensation of these 
employes, but reduce largely the number of the employes. Who does 
not know that this is so in every one of the executive departments ? " 



212 JAMES G. blai:n"e's views. 

Senator Trumbull, referring to the above, said : 

"I think the country slionld know this, and it comes to us au- 
tlioritatively. I did not know it. I had no conception tliat there 
were twice as many employes in tliese departments as the pubhc 
service required. Certainly I should not have voted for any increase 
of the number of clerks had I known such to be the fact." 

Had the noble Senator Morton known these facts^ 
he never would have opposed civil service reform. 
He made an effort to ascertain the facts by address- 
ing letters of inquiry to several heads of departments, 
but he failed to get them. The evils, as Mr. Trum- 
buirs confessions prove, were insidious. 

A FEW FURTHER FACTS. 

In his third article Mr. Ham says that Messrs. 
Blaine, Wilson, Windom, Allison, and Kasson were 
^^men who took no stock in the idea^^ (civil service 
reform), and in his fourth article he says practically 
the same thing about Senator Dawes. Let these gen- 
tlemen speak for themselves. 

James G. Blaine says (^^ Twenty Years of Congress, ^^ 
ii, 648, 651) : 

"The settled judgment of discreet men in both pohtical parties is 
adverse to the custom of changing non-political officers on merely 
pohtical grounds. Tliey believe that it impairs the efficiency of the 
public service, lowers the standard of pohtical contests, and brings 
reproach upon the government and the people. * * * Xq reform 
in the civil service ^\^ll be valuable that does not release members of 
Congress from the care and the embarrassment of appointments : and 
no boon so great could be conferred upon Senators and Representa- 
tives as to relieve them from tlie -worry, the annoyance, and the re- 
sponsibility which time and habit have fixed upon them in connec- 
tion with the dispensing of patronage, all of which belongs, under 
the Constituti«», to the Executive. On the other hand, tlie evil of 
which President [W. H.] Harrison spoke — the employment of the 
patronage by the Executive to influence legislation — is far the great- 
est abuse to which the civil service has ever been perverted.'' 



WHAT li:n^col:n^ said to wilson^. 213 

Senator Wilson says (Cong. Globe, 1871, p. 670) : 

'^Mr. Lincoln said to me one day, in speaking of this terrible (of- 
ficeseeking) pressure, that it seemed to liim that while one end of 
the house was on fire, instead of putting it out, he was called upon 
to give men httle offices, and that if we put down the rebellion, he 
did not know that the country could live ten or twenty years longer 
unless the present system was broken up. Sir, everybody in office 
and out of office admits these abuses."* 

Senator Windom says (Cong. Eecord, 1882, p. 365) : 

" I am in favor of the bill substantially as reported from the com- 
mittee, and I much prefer to have a vote upon it to making a speecli. 
* * * There ought to be an improvement in the mode of making ap- 
pointments, and I am for this bill because I think it will improve it.'^ 

Mr. Windom's belief in the utility of the civil ser- 
vice law has been confirmed by experience. He says 
{Report of Secretary of Treasury, 1889, p. cvi) : 

'^The beneficial influences of the civil service law, in its practical 
workings, are clearly apparent. Having been at the head of the de- 
partment both before and after its adoption, I am able to judge by 
comparison of the two systems, and have no hesitation in pronounc- 
ing the present condition of affairs as preferable in all respects. Un- 
der the old plan appointments were usually made to please some one 
under political or other obligations to the appointee, and the question 
of fitness was not always the controlling one. The temptation to 
make removals, only to provide places for others, was always pres- 
ent, and constantly being urged by strong !x.xiaences ; and this rest- 
less and feverish condition of departmental life did much to distract 
and disturb the even current of routii.o work. Under instrumentali- 



* Speaking of Col. S. S. Fisher (whose services are mentioned on 
page 36 of this work), Mr. Wilson said : '• I believe he has never 
been surpassed by any officer that lias been in that office (the Pat- 
ent Office) during my time." Senator Morrill of Vermont said : " That 
is my opinion." 

It is related of Col. Fisher that in giving verbal orders for an ex- 
amination for promotion in the Patent Office he said: "Peg it to 
them. It is not as if they were a set of poor devils who would lose 
their places if they didn't pass." 



314 CAPABLE^ WORTHY, ADAPTABLE CLERKS. 

ties which are now used to secure selections for clerical places, the 
department has some assurance of mental capacity, and also of moral 
worth, as the character of the candidates is ascertained before exam- 
ination. * * * The clerks received from the Civil Service Cora- 
mission usually adapt themselves readily to the duties they are called 
upon to perform, and rank among the mo^st efficient in the department" 

Senator William B. Allison not only favored civil 
service reform, but he wanted to make the enforce- 
ment of the civil service law binding on the President 
instead of optional. (See Congressional Eecord, Dec. 
23, 1882, p. 603.) 

Eepresentative John A. Kasson, who introduced the 
Pendleton-Eaton bill in the House (January 4, 1883), 
where it was passed by a vote of 155 to 47 (87 not 
voting), says (Cong. Record, 1883, p. 8G6) : 

''It is not here and now, as with some men, that I for the first 
time lift my voice in favor of this reform. I did so before the last 
election and upon the stump in the State of Iowa." 

Senator Henry L. Dawes, in the course of a mas- 
terly speech, says (Cong. Record, 1882, p. 1082) : 

"Mr. President, the general public anxiety for an improvement in 
the methods of appointments to office is a healthy sign. That there 
is diversity of opinion as to the best mode of securing it is no cause 
for discouragement. The more urgent and constant this anxiety for 
a better way shall become, the more surely will that diversity of 
plans which now troubles us disappear." (See note, p. 60.) 

In 1870 Mr. Dawes, though in favor of the reform, 
thought the movement somewhat in advance of pub- 
lic sentiment. (See Cong. Record for Jan. 2-1, 1882.) 

SIX OTHER CONCESSIOXS OF CORRUPTIOX. 

Here are six other Congressmen who were brave 
enough to call a spade a spade. 

Senator Trumbull says (Cong. Globe, 1871, p. 666) : 

''The great objection to the mode in which persons are apj^K)inted 
to office is that it reaches out among the people ; that it demoralizes 



BARGAINS, CORRUPTION, AVARICE, ETC. 215 

the people ; that it is corrupting in its influence, and is calculated 
to bring improper influences to bear in the congressional districts and 
in the States. Representatives get postmasters and revenue officers 
and others appointed, who become mere instruments to electioneer 
for them. It is just as corrupting as if money was offered. So in 
regard to more general offices, where Senators use their influence to 
have men appointed to this office or that office." 

Senator George B. Vest of Missouri says (Cong. Ee- 
cord, Dec. 20, 1882, p. 461) : 

'• That very great evils exist there can be no sort of question, evils 
so monstrous, so deadly in their effects that men of all political par- 
ties have come to the conclusion that some remedy must be applied." 

Representative Edw. Y. Rice of Illinois says (Cong. 
Globe, 1872, pp. 3071-72) : 

^'The history of our civil service is the history of incompetency, 
unfaithfulness, and corruption, notwithstanding there are many hon- 
orable exceptions. * * * Jt is estimated that one-fourth of the 
revenues are lost to the government in consequence of the vicious 
and unsatisfactory condition of the civil service of the country, in- 
volving an annual loss to the treasury of a sum greater than was 
required to support the government prior to 1860. * * * The 
same influence that secures position in the public service is employed 
to retain in place those who are known to be unfaithful, and to con- 
ceal their frauds, and to protect from removal and merited punish- 
ment men who bring the service into disrepute." 

Representative James R. McCormick of Missouri says 
(Cong. Globe, 1872, p. 1748) : 

''The present condition of the civil service of the United States, 
Mr. Speaker, calls so loudly for reform that its consideration rises 
above party. The evils which afflict it result mainly from a disregard 
of principles found in the Constitution, and from a widespread avarice 
now pervading almost every condition of society in this country." 

Comparing the policy of the six first Presidents 
with that in vogue in 1872, Mr. McCormick said : 

"Faithful and efficient men were appointed to office without re- 
gard to their political views. * * * Xow the first great prere- 
quisite for office is fidelity to party." 



216 SIXTEEN^ STATESMEN VERSUS MR. HAM. 

Representative William S. Holman of Indiana says 
(Appendix to Cong. Globe^, 1872, p. 334) : 

^' We cannot ignore the imperative necessity for reform ; we can- 
not shut our eyes to the painful fact tliat venaHty riots in every de- 
partment of the g-overnment. * * * a repubhc cannot long 
exist unless there is purity and honesty in the conduct of its affairs. 
* * * We have readied a period in our history when * * * 
men (should) be appointed to off.ce because they are competent and 
honest, and not for mere partisan services." 

Representative Albert S. Willis of Kentucky says 
(Cong. Record, 1882, pp. 5809, 581G) : 

"Both (bills) are aimed at our false, inefficient, and unrepublican 
system of civil service, that fountain head from which flows nearly 
every stream of political corruption in our land. Tlie complete over- 
throw of that system is, sir, in my judgment, the great demand of 
the hour. * * * jj^ every forum of opinion our civil ser\ice 
has been denounced as a national disgrace and a national danger. 
Let us make merit the sole test of official appointment and promotion." 

Mr. Ham is certainly mistaken when he says that 
*' Senators did not concede that there was any cor- 
ruption or inefficiency in the grades which the law 
would reach. ^^ Sixteen statesmen are asrainst him. 



FIFTH ARTICLE. 

To the Albany Evening Journal: Mr. Ham begins 
his fifth article thus : 

''The resort to Mr. Pendleton was about as astute a political con- 
ception by men supposed to l^e above the ' dirty pool of politics ' as 
the average patronage politician would have thouglit of " 

In a letter of September 20, 188T, Mr. Eaton says : 

"I placed the act in Senator Pendleton's hands, who had never 
before seen it, and he presented it precisely as handed to him in the 
Senate, waiving and abandoning a previous and utterly unlike bill 
which he had before presented, I being glad to have my relation 
ignored if only a Senator would have the patriotic courage to pre- 
sent the bill.'' 



MR. PENDLETOX'S H0:N"0RABLE RECORD. :>17 

In other words, Mr. Eaton merely gave his bill to 
Mr. Pendleton for examination, and Mr. Pendleton 
compared it with and preferred it to his own bill. 
Mr. Eaton trusted his bill to Mr. Pendleton because 
he knew he had '^the patriotic courage ^^ to present 
it, but he did not know till he tried him that he also 
had the magnanimity to present it instead of his own. 
Did any Senator, except Mr. Pendleton, forfeit his 
seat in the Senate because of his advocacy of civil ser- 
vice reform principles ? There may have been abler 
men in the Senate than Mr. Pendleton, but none was 
braver or purer. He did that which some statesmen 
fail to do — he rose above party. It is noteworthy that 
Mr. Pendleton, in order to lighten the burdens of 
officeseeking, proposed a constitutional amendment 
making postmasterships elective instead of appointive 
offices. This was also prior to introducing the Eaton 
bill. ^^ Dirty pool of politics.'' Bah! 

Mr. Ham quotes the words of ''a leading (newspa- 
per) correspondent,'' who, writing nearly six months 
after the inauguration of President Harrison, says : 

" Cabinet officers have been compelled to close their doors and see 
callers only by card, because the crowds of place-hunters left them 
no time to attend to puV)lic business." 

This is bad, but it is nothing new. (See p. 82.) 
President Harrison has no one to blame for this de- 
plorable state of affairs but himself. He and he only 
could have prevented it by simply obeying the man- 
date of his party platforms. The civil service planks 
of the Republican platforms of 1884 and 1888 say : 
^' The spirit and purpose of the reform should be 
observed in all executive appointments." President 
Harrison has not only disobeyed this mandate himself, 
but he has permitted others to disobey it. Common 
honesty as well as consistency required that no re- 
10 



218 PREACHING VERSUS PRACTICE. 

movals should be made except for cause.* ^^That 
the tenure shall be during good behavior^ with power 
of removal for cause/^ says the Eepublican platform 
of 1880. That Washington should be inundated, as 
it were, with ofFiceseekers is not the fault of the civil 
service law, for the law can neither enforce itself nor 
increase its own scope. But the President can. 
The correspondent quoted above further says : 

"Republican Congressmen, who ordinaril}- would have gone away 
for the summer long ago, are still kept here by tlie importunities of 
their officeseeking constituents," &c. 

The correspondent's words, in full, have been prin- 
ted in many civil service reform periodicals. Mr. Ham 
gets on the wrong side of the question when he prints 
them, of course. But it is not his first *^ offense '^ in 
this line. Therefore he has some excuse for the fol- 
lowing words in his seventh article: **From the line 
of defense * * * we enter upon a line of attack. '^ 

* In his letter of acceptance Mr. Harrison said : ^' In appointments 
to every grade and department fitness and not party service should 
be the essential and discriminating test, and fidelity and efficiency 
the only sure tenure of office. Only the interest of the public ser- 
vice should suggest removals from office." If this is not preaching 
one thing and practicing anotlier, what is? 

In 1886, speaking of and condemning Mr. Cleveland's postoffice re- 
movals, Mr. Harrison, among other things, said (Cong. Record. 1886, 
p. 2^795): ''I do lift up a hearty prayer that we may never have a 
President who will not either pursue and compel his Cabinet advisers 
to pursue the civil service policy pure and simple, and upon a just 
basis, allowing men accused to be heard, and deciding against tliem 
only upon competent proof and fairly ; either have tliat kind of a civil 
service, or. for God's sake, let us have that other frank and lx>ld, if 
brutal, method of turning men and women out simply for political 
opinion. Let us have one or the other." He also spoke of ''this 
wretched condition of things in which men and women are condemned 
without a hearing." What has Mr. Harrison to Si\y of his own pi'jst- 
office removals? "What heiiring has he given removed postmasters? 



WHO THE HYPOCRITES ARE. 219 

So Mr. Ham is on all sides of the question — even the 
comical side. 
Mr. Ham says : 

" This may not be a nation of liars, but it is fast drifting toward 
a nation of hypocrites, and the inevitable tendency of the 'competi- 
tive' idea is to hasten that result." 

So far as ^Hhe ^competitive^ idea^^ (the civil ser- 
vice law) is concerned, the only ^^ hypocrites ^^ are 
those who pretend to favor it before election and op- 
pose its execution after election. This hypocrisy is 
not caused or even j)romoted by ^^the ^competitive^ 
idea/' hut hy the greed for spoils^ as every thinking 
and fair-minded man can testify, Mr. Ham to the con- 
trary notwithstanding. Mr. Ham, the words quoted 
above will make every true American blush. And yet 
you, and others as honorable as you presumably are, 
defend the system that makes their use permissible ! 
'^ A nation of hypocrites ! '^ When these words can be 
truthfully applied to the American people, it will be 
the beginning of the end of the American republic* 

Again Mr. Ham says: ^^The act of 1820, fixing 
tenure at four years, was repealed a few years later, 
because it was alleged to aggravate an evil.^' He is 
mistaken. The law is still in force, notwithstanding 
civil service reformers have urged its repeal for over 
sixty years, and, further, that the Republican plat- 
forms of 1884 and 1888 say that ^^all laws at vari- 
ance with the object of existing reformed legislation 
should be repealed.'" (See note, p. 160.) The act of 
1820 is in conflict as well as ^^'at variance'' with the 
civil service law. 

* It is noteworthy that at a recent meeting of a faction of the Re- 
publican party of Albany, New York, under the lead of the Evening 
Journal, resolutions were passed favoring the repeal of both the New 
York State and the national civil service laws. 



220 MR. BRYCE'S GRAPHIC PICTURE. 

So much for Mr. Ham's fifth article. 

In his second article he says: ''Hundreds signed, 
papers and petitions in favor of * * * civil ser- 
vice reform. "" In his fourth article he says: ''Soon 
petitions began to pour into Congress.'' In his third 
article he says: "Xo volume of genuine public sen- 
timent ever stood behind the 'competitive' scheme." 
The last quotation not only contradicts the two first, 
but it is self-contradictory, for the civil service law 
could not even have been passed, much less enforced, 
if "public sentiment" had not been "behind" it. 
Hundreds of petitions, signed in the aggregate by 
thousands of men, did "pour into Congress," as any 
one will find by examining the records of Congress 
from 18G9 till 1882.* 

Again, in his second article Mr. Ham says : "That 
evils existed was well known." In his sixth article 
he says: "There was no corruption nor inefficiency 
in the grades which that scheme (the civil service 
law) was really designed to reach." Again he is mis- 
taken, if he does not actually contradict himself, for 
^^that scheme" was "designed to reach," sooner or 
later, corruj)tion and inefficiency in all the public of- 
fice "grades." The assertion in his third article that 

* James Brjxe, M. P., a disinterested and very close observer, says 
(•'American Commonwealth," i, 658): "Civil service reform has for 
some time past received the lip service of both parties, a lip service 
expressed by both with equal warmth, and by the average profes- 
sional politicians of both with equal insincerity. Such reforms as 
have been effected in the mode of filling up places, have been forced 
on the parties by public opinion, mtlier than carried througli by either. 
None of the changes made — and they are perhaps the most henetidal 
of recent changes — has mised an issue between the parties, or given 
either of them a claim on the confidence of the country. The best 
men in both parties support the Civil Service Commission : the worst 
men in both would i^ladlv e:et rid of it." 



THE USES OF COMPETITION. 221 

Mr. Schurz introduced Mr. Jenckes's bill in the Sen- 
ate is another mistake. (See p. 8.) The words (in 
the same article), ^^ perhaps make Carl Schurz Presi- 
dent/' imply that that gentleman is eligible to the 
presidency. This is still another mistake, for Mr. 
Schurz is foreign born. 

When contradictions and misstatements become mo- 
notonous, it is time to stop, for they tire the reader 
as well as the writer. So Mr. Ham's six other articles 
must go unanswered. The salient points of the five 
first articles only have been noticed. 

With Mr. Ham civil service competition is a buga- 
boo. It is the burden of his song throughout his 
whole series of articles. He does not appreciate its 
utility, however much he may appreciate the utility 
of competition generally. 

The competitive theory, as I understand it, is in 
harmony with that great fundamental principle of re- 
publican government, namely, that every educated and 
self-respecting citizen is the equal of any other citi- 
zen, no matter where he comes from, what his color, 
what his politics, what his religion, or what his finan- 
cial standing. In fact, competition seems to be in- 
dispensable to human government. To be stable, a 
government must avail itself of the services of its most 
competent men, civil and military, and in no way 
can they be better tested, theoretically or practically, 
than by competition ; and the more systematic and 
thorough the plan of competition the better. 

Life is a series of competitions. Youth competes 
with youth, man with man, firm with firm, corpora- 
tion with corporation, city with city. State with State, 
nation with nation. When man competes with man, 
one teaches and expands the mind of the other. Com- 
petition prevents indolence, stagnation, monopoly, ex- 



232 COMPETITION" HAS HOXOK FOR ITS BASIS. 

tortion^ &c., &c., and in civil service examinations it 
prevents, or tends to prevent, favoritism ; it leads to 
improvement ; in fact, there could be little progress 
without it. Of course it can be abused.* 

Competition for office under the patronage system is 
the same in principle as under the merit system, but 
it is very different in practice. The advantage of the 
merit system plan is that it is governed by carefully 
drawn rules and regulations, while the patronage sys- 
tem plan i« governed by the rule, such as it is, of 
^^ every fellow for himself,''^ &c. 

The late Senator Morton, speaking of offices and 
defending the patronage system, said : ^' Tliere will be 
competition for them as there always has been. Men 

* Compare witli pag;© 33. 

John C. Calhoun, in tlie course of lii3 '^ Disquisition on Govern- 
ment," says (Works, i, pp. 65, 67): "When something must be done, 

* * * the necessity of the case will force to a compromise. * * * 
Under its influence * * * the prevailing desire would be to promote 
the common interests of the whole; and hence the competition would 
be, not which should yield the least to promote the common good, 
but which should yield the most." 

The most important practical use of the word competition is in the 
political economy of commerce, where it is the great motive-power of 
production and enterprise. — The service of government by contmct 
may be made as effective as any other kind ' of competition. — Em- 
ployers compete to get work as much as workmen compete for em- 
ployment. — Ghamhers^ s Encyclopedia. 

Though what produces any degree of pleasure be in itself good, 
and what is apt to produce any degree of pain be evil, yet often we 
do not call it so, when it comes in competition. — Locke. 

Amidst the variety of competition with whicli the world abounds, it 
is a difficult matter to guard against pride and self-consequence. — Gilpin. 

Men have gone on warring, grudging, struggling, competing from 
the beginning, and tliey will do so to the end. — Ki?igsley. 

Competition and emulation have honor for their basis. — Worcester. 

• The co-operative in lieu of the competitive principle. — Quart. Beview. 
Is trade competition? — E. B. Browning. 



"Ai^ ARMY OF JAILERS." 223 

will come in droves just as they always have done/^ 
And here is a life-like picture of how men act when 
they go to Washington ^^in droves ^^ to seek office. 
Messrs. Nicolay and Hay, in their ^^ Abraham Lincoln : 
a History/^ describing the officeseeking scenes in Wash- 
ington in the spring of 1861, say (Century Magazine, 
March, 1888, p. 718) : 

'' The city was full of strangers ; the White House full of appli- 
cants from the North. At any hour of the day one might see at the 
outer door and on the staircase one file going, one file coming. In 
the ante-room and in the broad corridor adjoining the President's of- 
fice there was a restless and persistent crowd — 10, 20, sometimes 50, 
varying with the day and hour — each one in pursuit of one of the 
many crumbs of official patronage. Tliey walked the floor ; they talked 
in groups ; they scowled at ever}' arrival and blessed every departure ; 
they wrangled with the door-keepers for right of entrance ; they in- 
trigued with them for surreptitious chances; they crowded forward 
to get even an instant's glance through the half-opened door into the 
executive chamber; they besieged the Representatives and Senators 
who had privilege of precedence ; they glared with envy and growled 
with jealousy at the cabinet ministers who, by right and \isage, pushed 
through the throng and walked unquestioned through the doors. At 
that day the arrangement of the rooms compelled the President to 
pass through this corridor and the midst of this throng when he went 
to his meals in the other end of the Executive Mansion ; and thus, 
once or twice a day, the waiting expectants would be rewarded by 
the chance of speaking a word or handing a paper direct to the 
President himself — a chance which the more bold and persistent were 
not slow to improve. 

"At first Lincoln bore it all with the admirable fortitude acquired 
in western political campaigns. But two weeks of this experience on 
the trip from Springfield to AVashington and six weeks more of such 
beleaguering in the executive office, began to tell on his nerves. 
What with the Sumter discussion, the rebel negotiation, the diplo- 
matic correspondence, he had become worked into a mental strain 
and irritation that made him feel like a prisoner behind the executive 
doors, and the audible and unending tramp of the applicants outside 
impressed him hke an army of jailers." 

, And here is a picture of the way in which business 



224 SHERMAN'S STATEMENT CORROBORATED. 

is conducted after such men (that is, men who are 
cursed by this evil system) are appointed to office. A 
late Auditor of the Treasury, of fifteen years^ experi- 
ence, who needed fifty additional clerks, when asked 
if he could not suggest some change that would in- 
sure greater efficiency and economy, said (Cong. Re- 
cord, 1882, p. 1084) : 

''Were I permitted to manage tlie business of my office as any 
good business man would manage 250 men under him, I would un- 
dertake to produce better results than I now do with 50 less men 
than I now have ; but as at present managed the office must have 
50 more. I can have no choice in the selection or retention of the 
men under me. A power above me puts to work under me whom 
he pleases, discharges whom he pleases, transfers the most efficient 
to other duties if he likes, and promotes without consultation with 
me. I carmot discharge a dunce, or a drone, or a rasc;d ; I cannot 
promote merit or discharge incompetence. Men come to serve under 
me commissioned by one who neither knows the character of the 
men he sends to me nor the work they are to perform."* 

Can any sane man fail to see the danger depicted 
in the two preceding pictures ? And yet they reflect 
the workings of a system that some people call *^*the 
American plan.^^ The reader may decide for himself 
which of tlie two systems — patronage or merit — is safe 
and which is unsafe ; which is systematic and which 
is unsystematic ; which is business-like and which is 
unbusiness-like ; which is admirable and which is not ; 
which leads to stability of government and which to 
anarchy ; which is American and which un-American. 

* Compare with Senator Sherman's remarks, page 211; also with 
the extract from the U. S. Civil Service Commission's Report, p. 200. 

Note. — The late Mr. 'U^indom, Secretary of the Treasury, in his 
Report for 1890, says : '' The past year's experience of the excellent 
working of the civil service law * * * leads me to emphasize what 
was said on this subject in my last annujil Report * * * There has 
been entire and uniform compliance with the requirements of law re- 
specting the collection of money for political purposes." (See p. 213.) 



''patroxaCtE axd party. '» 225 

THE EOCKS ON WHICH EEPUBLICS HAVE 
FALLEN. 
Joseph Storey, LL.D., says ('^Exposition of the 
Constitution/^ ]}]}. 2-i7, 267) : 

'•The fate of other republics, their rise, their progress, their de- 
dine, and their fall, are written but too legibly on the pages of his- 
tory, if indeed they were not continually before us in the startling 
fragments of their ruins. Those lepubhcs have perished, and have^ 
perished by their own hands. Prosperity has enervated them ; cor- 
ruption has debased them, and a venal populace has consummated: 
their destruction. The people, alternately the prey of military chief- 
tains at home, and of ambitious invaders from abroad, have heexL 
sometimes cheated out of their liberties by servile demagogues ; some- 
times betrayed into a surrender of them by false patriots, and some- 
times they have willingly sold them for a price to the despot who 
has bidden highest for his victims. They have disregarded the warn- 
ing voice of their best statesmen, and have persecuted and driven 
from office tlieir truest friends. They have listened to the councils 
(sic) of fawning sycophants, or base calumniators of the wise and the 
good. They have reverenced power more in its high abuses and 
summary movements than in its calm and constitutional energy, when 
it dispensed blessings with an unseen but a hberal hand. They have 
surrendered to faction what belonged to the common interests and 
common rights of the country. Patronage and party^ the triumph of 
an artful popular leader, and the discontents of a day, have outweighed,, 
in their view, all solid principles and institutions of government. Such. 
are the melancholy lessons of the past history of republics down ta 
our own.* 

"The besetting sin of republics is a restlessness of temperament^ 
and a spirit of discontent at slight evils." 



THE DANGERS OF PARTISANSHIP. 
George WASHi:NrGTOX says (''Writings/^ xii, 224): 

"I have already intimated to you the danger of parties in the 

* Switzerland is an exception. The foundation of the Swiss Con- 
federation was laid on August 1, 1291. Compare Judge Storey's re- 
marks with Mr. Holman's on page 216; also with those on page 40. 



226 '^BY FORCE OF PUBLIC OPIN^IOJS". " 

state, with particular reference to the founding of them on geograph- 
ical discriminations. Let me now take a more comprehensive view, 
and warn you in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects 
of the spirit of party generally. 

'^This spirit unfortunately is inseparable from our nature, having 
its root in the strongest passions of the human mind. It exists un- 
der different shapes in all governments, more or less stifled, controlled, 
•or repressed; but in those of the popular form it is seen in its great- 
est rankness, and is truly their worst enemy. 

" The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened 
by the spirit of revenge, natural to party dissension, which in differ- 
ent ages and countries has perpetrated tlie most liorrid enormities, is 
itself a frightful despotism. But tliis leads at length to a more for- 
mal and permanent despotism. Tlie disorders and miseries wliich 
result, gradually incline tlie minds of men to seek security and re- 
pose in the absolute power of an individual ; and sooner or later the 
chief of some prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than 
his competitors, turns tlrs disposition to the pur^wses of his own 
elevation — on the ruins of Public Libert}'. 

^•Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which 
nevertheless ought not to be entirely out of sight), the conmion and 
continual mischiefs of the spirit of party are sufficient to make it the 
interest and duty of a wise people to discourage and restrain it. 

''It serves always to distract the Public Councils and enfeeble the 
Public Administration. It agitiites the Community with ill-founded 
jealousies and false alarms ; kindles the animosity of one part against 
another; foments occasionally riot and insurrection. It opens the 
door to foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated ac- 
cess to the government itself through the channels of party passions. 
Thus the poUc}^ and the will of one country are subjected to the 
policy and will of another. 

"There is an opinion that parties in free countries are useful checks 
upon the administration of the government, and serve to keep alive 
ihe spirit of Liberty. This, within certain limits, is probably true : 
and in governments of a Monarchical cast. Patriotism may look with 
indulgence, if not with favor, upon the spirit of party. But in iliose 
of" the popular character, in governments piu'ely elective, it is a spirit 
not to be encouraged. Dvm their 7iatural tendency, it is certain there 
will always be enouyh of that spirit for every salutary pio-pose. And, 
there being constant danger of excess, the effort ought to be, by 
force of public opinion, to mitigate and assuage it.'' * * * 



BISHOP POTTER'S IMMORTAL WORDS. 227 

Henry C. Potter, D.D., in the course of his ad- 
dress at the Centennial Commemoration Service of 
Washington's Inauguration, at St. PauFs Church, Xew 
York, April 30, 1889, said : 

^'The conception of the National Government as a liuge machine, 
existing mainly for the purpose of rewarding partisan service — this 
was a conception so aUen to the character and conduct of Washing- 
ton and his associates that it seems grotesque even to speak of it. 
It would be interesting to imagine the first President of the United 
States confronted with some one who had ventured to approach him 
upon the basis of what are now commonly known as ' practical poli- 
tics.' But the conception is impossible. The loathing, the outraged 
majesty with which he would have bidden such a creature to be- 
gone, is foreshadowed by the gentle dignity with which, just before 
liis inauguration, replying to one* who had the strongest claims upon 
Iiis friendship, and who had applied to him during the progiess of 
the ^ presidential campaign,' as we should say, for the promise of an 
appointment to office, he wrote : ' In touching upon the more delicate 
part of your letter, the communication of which fills me with real 
concern, I will deal by you with all that frankness which is due to 
friendship, and which I wish should be a characteristic feature of my 
conduct through life. * ♦ * Should it be my inevitable fate to 
administer the government, * * * I ^in go to the Chair under 
no preengagement of any kind or nature whatsoever. But when in 
it, I will, to tlie best of my judgment, discharge Jie. duties of the 
office with that impartiality and zeal for tlie public good which ought 
never to suffer connections of blood or friendship to intermingle so 
as to have the least sway on decisions of a public nature.' (ix, 476.) 

''On this high level moved the first President of the republic. To 
it must we who are the heirs of her sacred interests be not unwill- 
ing to ascend, if we are to guard our glorious heritage ! 

'•The traits which in him shone preeminent, as our own Irving 
has described them, 'Firmness, sagacity, an immovable justice, cour- 
age that never faltered, and, most of all, truth that disdained all ar- 
tifices ' — these are characteristics in her leaders of which the nation 
was never in more dire need than now. God give us the grace to 
prize his grand example, and, as we may in our more modest meas- 
ure, to reproduce his virtues." 

* Benj. Harrison, a signer of the Declaration of Independence ; great- 
grandfather of President Benj. Harrison. Letter dated March 9, 1789. 



THE CIVIL SERVICE STATUTE. 

An Act to regulate and improve the civil service of the United States. 

Be it enacted^ cfcc, That the President is authorized to appoint, by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, 3 persons, not more than 2 
of whom sliall be adherents of the same party, as Civil Service Corarais- 
sioners, and said 3 commissioners shall constitute the United States 
Civil Service Commission. Said commissioners shall hold no other of- 
ficial place under the United States. The President may remove any 
commissioner ; and any vacanc}" in the position of commissioner shall 
be so filled by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, as to conform to said conditions for the first selection of com- 
missioners. The commissioners shall each receive a salary of $3,500 a 
year. And each of said commissioners shall be paid his necessary trav- 
eling expenses incurred in the discharge of his duty as a commissioner- 

Sec. 2. That it shall be the duty of said commissioners — 

1. To aid the President, as he may request in preparing suitable rules 
for carrying this act into effect, and when said rules shall have l>een 
promulgated, it shall be tlie duty of all officers of the United States in 
the departments and offices to which any such rules may relate, to aid 
in all proper ways in carrying said rules and any modifications thereof 
into effect. 

2. And, among other things, said rules shall provide and declare, as 
nearly as the conditions of good administration will warrant, as follows : 
1. For. open competitive examinations for testing the fitness of appli- 
cants for the public service now classified or to be classified hereunder. 
Such examinations shall be practical in their character, and so far as 
may be shall relate to those matters which will fairly test the relative 
capacity and fitness of the persons examined to discharge the duties of 
the service into which thej^ seek to be appointed. 2. That aU the of- 
fices, places, and employments so arranged or to be arranged in classes, 
shall be filled by selections, according to grade, from among those graded 
hi.i!:hest as the results of such competitive examinations. 3. Appoint- 
ments to the public service aforesaid, in the departments at Washington, 
shall be apportioned among the several States and Territories and the 
District of Columbia upon the basis of population as ascertiiined at the 
last preceding census. Every application for an examination shall con- 
tain, among other things, a stiitement, under oath, setting forth his or 
her actual bona fide residence at the time of making the application, as 
well as how long he or she has been a resident of such place. 4. That 
there shall be a period of probation before any absolute appointment or 
employment aforesaid. 5. That no person in the public service is for 
that reason under any obligations to contribute to any politiciU fund, or 



THE CIVIL SERVICE STATUTE. 229 

to render any political service, and that he will not be removed or other- 
wise prejudiced for refusing to do so. 6. That no person in said service 
has any right to use his official authority or influence to coerce the po- 
litical action of any person or body. 7. There shall be non-competitive 
examinations in all proper cases before the commission, when competent 
persons do not compete, afler notice has been given of the existence of 
the vacancy, under such rules as may be prescribed by the commission- 
ers as to the manner of giving notice. 8. That notice shall be given in 
writing by the appointing power to said commission of tlie persons se- 
lected for appointment or employment from among those who have been 
examined, of the place of residence of such persons, of the rejection of 
any such persons after probation, of transfers, resignations, and removals, 
and of the date thereof, and a record of tlie same shall be kept by said 
commission. And any necessary exceptions from said 8 fundamental 
provisions of the rules shall be set forth in connection with such rules, 
and the reasons therefor shall be stated in the annual reports of the 
commission. 

3. Said commission shall, subject to the rules that may be made by 
the President, make regulations for, and liave control of, such examina- 
tions, and, through its members or the examiners, it shall supervise and 
preserve the records of the same ; and said commission shall keep min- 
utes of its own proceedings. 

4. Said commission may make investigations concerning the facts, and 
may report upon all matters touching the enforcement and effects of said 
rules and regulations, and concerning tlie action of ari}^ examiner or board 
of examiners hereinafter provided for, and its own subordinates, and 
those in the public service, in respect to tlie execution of this act. 

5. Said commission shall make an annual report to the President for 
transmission to Congress, showing its own action, the rules and regula- 
tions, and the exceptions thereto, in force, the practical effects thereof, 
and any suggestions it may approve for the more effectual accomplish- 
ment of the purposes of this act. 

Sec. 3. That said commission is authorized to employ a cliief examiner, 
a part of whose duty it shall be, under its direction, to act with the ex- 
amining boards, so far as practicable, whether at Washington or else- 
where, and to secure accuracy, uniformity, and justice in all their pro- 
ceedings, which shall be at all times open to him. The cliief examiner 
shall be entitled to receive a salary at the rate of $3,000 a year, and he 
shall be paid his necessary traveling expenses incurred in the discharge 
of his duty. The commission shall have a secretary, to be appointed by 
the President, who shall receive a salary of $1,600 per annum. It may, 
when necessary, employ a stenographer and a messenger, who shall be 



230 THE CIVIL SERVICE STATUTE. 

paid, when employed, the former at the rate of $1,600 a year, and the 
latter at the rate of $600 a year. The commission shall, at Washington, 
and in one or more places in each State and Territory where examina- 
tions are to take place, designate and select a suitable number of persons, 
not less than 3, in the official service of the United States, residing in 
said State or Territory, after consulting the head of tlie department or 
office in which such persons serve, to be members of boards of examin- 
ers, and may at any time substitute any otlier person in said service liv- 
ing in such State or Territor}^ in tlie place of any one so selected. Such 
boards of examiners shall be so located as to make it reasonabh' con- 
venient and inexpensive for applicants to attend before them ; and 
where there are persons to be examined in any State or Territory, ex- 
aminations shall be held therein at least twice in each j-ear. It shall be 
the duty of the collector, postmaster, and other officers of the United 
States, at any place outside of the District of Columbia where examina- 
tions are directed by the President or by said board to be held, to allow 
the reasonable use of the public buildings for holding sucli examinations, 
and in all proper ways to facilitate the same. 

Sec. 4. That it shall be the duty of the Secietary of the Interior to 
cause suitable and convenient rooms and accommodations to be assigned 
or provided, and to be furnished, heated, and lighted, at the City of 
Washington, for carr3ing on the work of said commission and said ex- 
aminations, and to cause the necessary stationer}- and other articles to 
be supplied, and the necessary printing to be done for said commission. 

Sec. 5. That any said commissioner, examiner, copyist or messenger, 
or any person in the public service, who shall willfully and corruptly, by 
himself or in co-operation with 1 or more other persons, defeat, deceive, or 
obstruct any person in respect of his or her right of examination accord- 
ing to any such rules or regulations, or who shall willfully, corruptly, and 
falsely mark, grade, estimate, or report upon the examination or proper 
standing of any person examined hereunder, or aid in so doing, or who 
shall willfull}- and corruptly make any flilse representations concerning 
the same, or concerning the person examined, or who shall willfully and 
corruptlj^ furnish to any person anj'- special or secret information for the 
purpose of either improving or injuring the prospects or chances of any 
person so examined, or to be examined, being appointed, employed, or 
promoted, shall for each such offense be deemed guilty of a misdemean- 
or, and upon conviction tliereof shall be punished by a tine of not less 
than $100, nor more than $1,000, or by imprisonment not less than ten 
daj^s, nor more than one year, or by both such line and imprisonment 

Sec. 6. That within 60 days after the passage of this act it sliall be 
the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury, in as near conformity as may 



THE CIVIL SERVICE STATUTE. 231 

be 10 the classification of certain clerks now existing under the 163d 
section of the Revised Statutes, to arrange in classes the several clerks 
and persons emploj-ed by the collector, naval officer, surve3'or, and ap- 
praisers, or either of them, or being in the public service, at their respec- 
tive offices in each customs district where the whole number of said clerks 
and persons shall be all together as man 3^ as 50. And thereafter, from 
time to time, on the direction of the President, said Secretary shall make 
the like classification or arrangement of clerks and persons so employed, 
in connection with anj^ said office or offices, in any other customs district. 
And, upon hke request, and for the purposes of this act, said Secretary 
shall arrange in one or more of said classes, or of existing classes, any 
other clerks, agents, or persons employed under his department in any 
said district not now classified ; and every such arrangement and clas- 
sification, upon being made, shall be reported to the President. 

2. Within said 60 days it shall be the duty of the Postmaster-General, 
in general conformity to said 163d section, to separately arrange in 
classes the several clerks and persons employed, or in the public service, 
at each postoffice, or under any postmaster of the United States, where 
the whole number of said clerks and persons shall together amoimt to 
as many as 50. And thereafter, from time to time, on the direction of the 
President, it shall be the duty of the Postmaster-General to arrange in 
like classes the clerks and persons so emploj-ed in the postal service in 
connection with any other postoffice ; and everj^ such arrangement and 
classification, upon being made, shall be reported to the President. 

3. That from time to time said Secretar}^, the Postmaster-General, and 
each of the heads of departments mentioned in the 158th section of the 
Revised Statutes, and each head of an office, shall, on the direction of the 
President, and for facilitating the execution of this act, respectively revise 
any then existing classification or arrangement of those in their respective 
departments and offices, and shall, for the purposes of the examination 
herein provided for, include in 1 or more of such classes, so far as practica- 
ble, subordinate places, clerks, and officers in the public service pertain- 
ing to their respective departments not before classified for examination. 

Sec. 7. That after the expiration of 6 months from the passage of this 
act no officer or clerk shall be appointed and no person shall be em- 
ployed to enter or be promoted in either of the said classes now existing, 
or that may be arranged hereunder pursuant to said rules, until he has 
passed an examination, or is shown to be specially exempted from such 
examination in conformity herewith. But nothing herein contained shall 
be construed to take from those honorably discharged from the military 
or naval service any preference conferred by the 1754th section of the 
Revised Statutes, nor to take from the President any authority, not in- 



,232 THE CIVIL SERVICE STATUTE. 

consistent with this act, conferred by the 1753d section of said statutes ; 
nor shall any officer not in the executive branch of the government, or 
any person merely employed as a laborer or workman, be required to be 
classified hereunder ; nor, unless by direction of the Senate, shall any 
person who has been nominated for confirmation by the Senate be re- 
quired to be classified or to pass an examination. 

Sec. 8. That no person habitually using intoxicating beverages to ex- 
cess shall be appointed to, or retained in, any office, appointment, or 
employment to which the provisions of this act are applicable. 

Sec. 9. That whenever there are already 2 or more members of a fam- 
ily in the public service, in the grades covered by this act. no other mem- 
ber of such family shall be eligible to appointment to any of said grades. 

Sec. 10. That no recommendation of any person who shall apply for 
office or place under the provisions of this act which may be given by 
any Senator or member of the House of Representatives, except as to 
the character or residence of the applicant, shall be received or consid- 
ered by any person concerned in making any examination or appoint- 
ment under this act. 

Sec. 11. That no Senator, or Representative, or territorial Delegate of 
the Congress, or Senator, Representative, or Delegate elect, or any officer 
or employe of either of said houses, and no executive, judicial, military, 
or naval officer of the United Suites, and no clerk or employe of any de- 
partment, branch, or bureau of the executive, judicial, or military or naval 
service of the United Suites shall, directly or indirectly, solicit or receive, 
or be in any manner concerned in soliciting or receiving, any assessment, 
subscription, or contribution for any political purpose whatever, from any 
officer, clerk, or employe of the United States, or any department, branch, 
or bureau thereof, or from any person receiving any salary or compensa- 
tion from moneys derived from the Treasury of the United States. 

Sec. 12. That no person shall, in any room or building occupied in the 
discharge of official duties by any officer or employe of the United States 
mentioned in this act, or in any navy-yard, fort, or arsenal, solicit in any 
manner whatever, or receive any contribution of money or any other 
thing of value for any political purpose whatever. 

Sec. ] 8. No officer or employe of the United States mentioned in this 
act shall discharge, or promote, or degrade, or in [any] manner change 
the official rank or compensation of any other officer or employe, or prom- 
ise or threaten so to do, for giving or withholding or neglecting to make 
any contribution of money or other valuable thing for any political pur- 
pose. 

Sec. 14. That ijo officer, clerk, or other person in the service of the 
United States shall, directly or indirectly, give or hand over to any other 
officer, clerk, or person in the service of the United States, or to any 
Senator or member of the House of Representatives, or territorial Dele- 

• gate, any money or other valuable thing on account of or to be apphed 

• to the promotion of any political object whatever. 

Sec. 15. That any person who shall be guilty of violating any pro- 
vision of the four foregoing sections, shall be deemed guilty of a misde- 
meanor, and shall, on conviction thereof be punished by a fine not ex- 
ceeding $5,000, or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years, 
or ))y such fine and imprisonment both, in the discretion ot^ the court. 

Approved, January 16th, 1883. 



INDEX. 



Adams J. on removals. 91 ; notes, 
158, 165 : notes of debate in Sen- 
ate on power removal, 154-159. 

Adams John Quincy, on removals, 
92; notes, 160, 174. 

Allan Chilton, power removal, 166. 

Allison W. B. radical views of, 214. 

Ames F. power removal, 124—127 ; 
predictions of, 125, 126, 162. 

Andrews C. C. notes, 183, 188. 

Appeals, a proposed board of, 114. 

Application papers, how marked 
(note) 26. 

Applicants' certificates (note) 27. 

Appointments cannot be dictated, 
195. 

Aristocracies, cause of and remedy 
for, 63-66. 

Aristocracy, no use for in this coun- 
try, 62 ; little danp^er of officehold- 
ers', 61, 66; Roman and Eno:lish, 
63, 64; views of latter, in 1855, 
of English civil service law, 69. 

Aristocrats, real and apparent, 62. 

Arthur C. A. on fitness for and sta- 
bility in office, 37, 95. 

Auditor Treasury, testimony ofj 224. 

Baldwin A. power removal, 134. 

Bancroft G-eorge, note, 24. 

Barton D. on purity and freedom 
of elections, 42 ; on 4-years' law, 
162; good behavior tenure, 167. 

Bayard James A. why he changed 
his vote from Burr to Jefferson 
in 1801, civil service views of, 
vindication of, &c. 97-100. 

Bayard T. F. obligation to, 98 : de- 
nounces so-called ' practical poh- 
ticians' and spoils system, 107. 



Bell J. on freedom of elections and 
patronage evils, 42 ; quotes Eng- 
lish histor}' and a celebrated res- 
olution of Parliament, 43, 44. 

Benson K. power removal, 129. 

Benton T. H. note, 19; on patron- 
age and the freedom of elections, 
41 ; on congressional decision as 
to power removal, 159; report 
on executive patronage, 173. 

Bibb G. M. power removal, 168 ; on 
division of governmental powers 
(note) 169. 

Bill, the first civil service, 7, 202. 

Blaine J. G-. civil service views of, 
212. 

Board of Appeals, a proposed, 114. 

Boudinot E. note, 113; power re- 
moval, 121-124. 

Branch J. on Senate's functions and 
danger ambitious leaders, 174. 

Brenton Samuel, resolution of, 8. 

Bribery at elections, danger of, 39 : 
Buchanan, Harrison, Benton, Jef- 
ferson, and Bell on, 40-43 ; pat- 
ronage a great cause of, 40. 

British Civil Service Commission, 
the, 197 ; letter from secretary 
of. 197, 198. 

British India, civil service of, 182. 

Brokerage, office, 39. 

Brooks E. competitive tests, &c. 65. 

Browning E. B. on competition, 222. 

Bryce James, M. P. on civil service 
reform in America, 199, 220. 

Buchanan James, on danger of bri- 
bery at elections, 40 ; Mr. Marcy 
to, 82; subordinate officers, 93. 

Burr A. adroitness of, 71 ; unrepub- 
lican ideas of about elections, 72. 



234 



IlS'DEX. 



Burt Silas W. difference between 
the conduct of public and private 
business (note) 19; on competi- 
tive examinations, 35, 37. 

Butler P. power removal, 155. 

Cjesar Julius, anecdote of, 64. 

Calhoun John C. denounces spoils 
system, criticises debate on re- 
moval, and gives his own views, 
106, 107, 163, 164; on compro- 
mise and competition, 222. 

Canada, civil service of, 178-182. 

Carroll C. power removal, 154. 

Caucus system, the (note) 105. 

Chamber of Commerce, New York, 
favors examinations for custom 
house officials, 35, 36, 

Chambers's Encyclopedia, on com- 
petition, 222. 

Chandler J. departmentjil balances, 
175. 

China, civil service of, 189-193. 

Civil service bills, various, 7, 8. 

Civil service law of 1871, why it 
"collapsed," 208. 

Civil service law (the stiitute) 228. 

Civil service law, the, siunmary 
of provisions of, 9-1 2 ; why iis 
scope should be increased, 12- 
13 ; fruits and fe<itures of, 17-21 ; 
its chief object, 19; its constitu- 
tionality, 20-24; an elaboration 
and improvement of two preced- 
ing laws— §§ 164 and 1753 of U. 
S. Revised Statutes, 23 ; causes 
a radical change, 24: will in- 
crease efficiency, elevate politics, 
aid in purif3ang elections, kc. 
38—40 ; will promote self-respect, 
honesty, impartiality^, kc. 54-56 ; 
I has caused a salutary change and 
promises complete reform, 89, 
90; itsflexibilit}^ 195; no objec- 
tion because it is experimentol, 
195; cannot enforce itself, 218. 

Civil service laws, two other, 23. 

Clay H. denounces proscriptive pol- 
icy, relates incident of a dem- 
ocratic convention, tells Marcy 
that Grov. Metcalfe practiced the 
merit system, criticises decision 



on power removal, 76, 81, 163: 
resolution of, 168. 

Cleveland G-. on Castle G-arden cor- 
ruption. 56; notes, 89, 90; de- 
fends the merit system, 96, 97. 

Clinton D. W. on patronage. 73. 

Clymer G. power removal, 128. 

Commission, the civil service, no 
right to depart from the law and 
evidence (note) 26, 27; on cor- 
ruption in Washington, 200, 201. 

Commission, the New York State 
civil service, on results realized 
and competitive tests, 18, 33; 
on siime in Ireland, 34 : on read- 
justment of salaries. G6. 

Commission, the Jay, 57. 

Commission, the Royal. 198. 

Commissioner of Customs, report 
of, 210. 

Commissions, tlie Ridlev and Play- 
fiir, 197, 198. 

Committee, joint select, report of, 
210. 

Committee of Parliament on pro 
motion examinations (note) 28; 
should be carefully conducted, 
28; in Patent Office (note) 213. 

Competition, uses of, 33. 221, 222. 

Competitive examinations — back- 
bone of civil service law, 26; im- 
partiality and utility of 26-28; 
supplemented by trial by proba- 
tion, 27 ; compare favorably in 
results with West Point examin- 
ations. 28; a cheek on politically 
ambitious chief officials, 29 ; re- 
lieve the President and others of 
burdens, 29, 213; sometimes se- 
cure private employment 14. 15, 
16, 30; superior to non-competi- 
tive, 30 ; not a guarantee of go<xi 
character, but may expose l\-id 
chamcter, 30; education requir- 
ed. 31 ; high character of indi- 
viduals examined (note) 31; in 
Ireland, 34; in England, 198. 

Confucius, maxims of. 193. 194. 

Concrressmen and officeseekers, 58, 
59. 60; a right of 202. 

Constitution, the American, W. E. 
Gladstone's opinion of (note) 21. 



INDEX. 



235 



Corrupt Practices Act, 52. 

Council of Appointment, the old, 71. 

Cox J. D. on corruption in Wash- 
ington, 30, 58, 87; tenure of of- 
fice act, inefficacy of, 115. 

Crawford W, H. ambition of, 161; 
author 4-y ears' law, 161. 

Crosby Howard, on certain politi- 
cians (note) 54. 

Crockett D. on President Jackson's 
susceptibility to flattery (note) 7 7. 

Curtis Gr. W. obligation to, 4; civil 
service rules of, 45 ; defends civil 
service law, 67-69 ; peroration to 
1885 Newport address (note) 68 ; 
on old Council of Appointment 
and amusing incident connected 
with it (note) 7 1 ; reasons for and 
authorship of 4-years' law, 161. 

Davis David, on Lincoln, 85. 

Davis Garrett, report of, 112. 

Dawes Senator, bill of 8; graphic 
picture by, 59. 60; philosophiciil 
remarks by, 214; on '* public sen- 
timent." 214. 

Departments, the goverrmient, as 
schools (note) 28. 

Draper's (J. W.) warning of a false 
standard of social distinction and 
description of the depravit}^ of 
the Roman aristocnicy that re- 
sulted therefrom (note) 63; on 
Chinese government, 194. 

Eaton D. B. author of civil service 
law bill, 7 ; examinations some- 
times expose bad cliamcter, 31; 
*4nfluence," 57; Burr and Yan 
Buren, 71; Crawford and Yan 
Buren, 161; defalcations, 161; 
EngUsh civil service histor}^ 178; 
British India civil service, 183; 
serves without pay, 209; versus 
Mr. Ham, 209 ; why he trusted 
Pendleton, 217. 

Edward I, election law of, 46. 

Elections, interference with. See 
^'Bribery at elections." 

Elections, D. Barton on purity and 
freedom of 42 ; W. J. Graves on 
same and Jackson's removals, 44. 



Elections, tlie crime of buying or 
selhng votes at (note) 52. 

Elections, too much care and inter- 
est cannot be taken in, 40, 45; 
America profits by England's ex- 
perience, 52. 

Ellsworth 0. power removal, 155^ 
156, 159. 

Encyclopedia Britannica, on an al- 
leged defect of Chinese civil ser- 
vice system, 193. 

English aristocracy, pitiable condi- 
tion of, 64; how it viewed the 
civil service law (in 1855) 69. 

English civil service law, good ef- 
fect of, 50; features of, 178; let- 
ter from civil service commission 
of, 197, 198 ; reorganization of 
system of, 198. 

English election laws, chief, from 
1275 till 1883, 46-52. 

English government, one cause of 
sttibiljty of, 45. 

Everett E. on ''the importance of 
education in a republic," 32. 

Ewing T. against confirming 'polit- 
ical gladiators ' by Senate, 172. 

Examinations by Postmaster-Gen- 
eral and Secretary of Navy (note) 
27. 

Examinations, competitive. See 
" Competitive examinations." 

Examiners, why government offi- 
cials are chosen to act as (note) 9. 

Favoritism, an inherent if not nec- 
essary fault of humanity, 55. 

Federalists, not removed hy Jeffer- 
son for partisan reasons, 205. 

Fisher S. S. holds first competitive 
examinations, 36; rigid promo- 
tion examinations by, with anec- 
dote. 213; Senators Wilson and 
MorrUl's opinions of, 213. 

Foot S. A. attributes proscriptive 
policy to Yan Buren, 76. 

Forsyth J. boomerang speech of, 78. 

Four-years' law, the (note) 160- 
162; not repealed, 219. 

France, civil service of, 184. 

Frankhn Benjamin, deprecates high 
salaries, 64 ; warns the constitu- 



236 



IKDEX. 



tional convention against ambi- 
tious and avaricious men, 88. 

Gallatin A. on qualifications of 
subordinate officers, 32; opposes 
removal for opinion's sake. 172. 

Garfield James A. clear and plain 
words of, 95. 

George II, election laws of, 49. 

George III, election law of, disfran- 
chising 40,000 voters, 49. 

George lY, election law of, 50. 

Gerry E. power removal, 140-142. 

Gibbons Cardinal, patriotic ad\k'e 
of (note) 52. 

Gilpin Mr. on competition, 222. 

Gladstone Willi^un E. on American 
Constitution (note) 21. 

Godkin E. L. maxim of officehold- 
ers' aristocrac}^ insults bv and 
cause of aristocracies, insolence 
of office, 36, 61, 62, 65, 70. 

Goodhue B. power removal, 133. 

Gordon William F. fears executive 
patronage and power. 171. 

Government departments, the, con- 
ducted as schools, would produce 
diplomatists, financiers, soldiers, 
&c. (note) 28. 

Government. English, one cause of 
stability of, 45. 

Grant Ulysses S. on defect of pat- 
ronage system, 30: on need of 
civil service reform, 94, 204; re- 
futes Mr. Ham, 209: pleads in 
vain with Congress, 209. 

Graves E. 0. testimony of (note) 58. 

Graves Wm. J. on freedom of elec- 
tions and Jackson's removals, 44. 

Grayson William, power removal, 
156, 158. 

Hager a. D. letter of (note) 83. 

Ham E. attacks of on civil service 
law, 195-221. 

Hamilton A. principles and plan of 
21, 22; Senate should be con- 
sulted in removals (note) 138. 

Harrison Benj. removals of 200: 
preaches one thino: and practices 
another, 217, 218.^ 

Harrison Benj. Washington to, 227. 



Harrison W. H. on removal and the 
freedom of elections. 41. 

Hartley T. power removal, 127. 

Hawthorne Julian, report of 64. 

Hayes Rutherford B. views of 94. 

Hayne Senator, on Van Buren. 78. 

Henry P. eloquent but mistaken op- 
position of to Constitution. 171. 

Henry YI, election laws of 46. 47. 

Herndon Wm. H. on Lincoln. 85. 

Hewitt Abram S. on French diplo- 
matic and consular services. 185. 

Hill D. B. on ^ open competition,' 34. 

Hoar G. F. an unparalleled story 
of corruption by. 200. 

Hohnan W. S. on ''the imperative 
necessity for reform.'' 216. 

Holmes Senator, maxim of 107. 

Hubl^ard Bepresentative, civil ser- 
vice views and prophecy of 210. 

Huntington B. power removal. 140. 

Huske General, on English officials 
in American colonies, 176. 

Hypocrites, who they are, 219. 

'•Influence," injurious effects of 
57 : note on, 58. 

Insincerity, civil service reformers 
not guilty of 203. 

Insolence of office and remedv for. 
70. 

Ireland, competitive tests in, 34. 

Irving Washington, on Geo. Wash- 
ington's traits of character. 227. 

Ivins W. M. on modus operandi of 
English election law. 50-52. 

Izard R. power removal. 159. 

Jackson Andrew, first to practice 
patronage system nationally, 71 : 
preaches one thing and practices 
another, 73: probable causes of 
his radical change, 74-79. 

Jackson J. power removal, 143-45. 

Jackson Mrs. abuse and death of 74. 

James Mr. election law of 52. 

James T. L. postoffice rules of 37. 

Jay Chief Justice John, civil service 
principles and practices of 22. 

Jay John, report of and note on, 57. 

Jefferson T. on constitutions, laws, 
monopolies (note) 21 : talent and 



INDEX. 



237 



wortli for office, 32 ; on election 
of 1800 Hiid interference with 
elections, 41. 42 ; circular of, 42 ; 
on division of patronage, 73, 205 ; 
on removal, 91; mistake of, 98; 
conditional assurances of (note) 
100; on 4-years' law (note) 160; 
'ODinion' of (note) 165: refutes 
Mr. Ham, 205. 

Jenckes T. A. bill of and luunor of, 
8, 62 ; New York Indejjfindent 
on (note) 8 ; not a plagiarist, 202. 

Jenckes joint select committee, re- 
port of (note) 210. 

Johnson Andrew, his removals, 86 ; 
his comparativeh" conservative 
course. 87 ; power removal liable 
to abuse, 93. 

Johnson Cave, on postal reforms 
(note) 12. 

Johnson W. S. po\Ver removal, 159. 

Jones P. H. competitive tests, 37. 

Kassox J. A. bill of, 8: introduces 
Eaton's bill in tlie House, 214. 

Kent James, power removal, 164. 

'' King Caucus," deatli of (note) 105. 

Kingsley Mr. on competition, 222. 

Kinney W. alleged remark of and 
note on, 83. 

Kleiner J. J. experience of, 60. 

Lally T. a. note on, 158. 

Law, the civil service. See '* Civil 
service law." 

Lawrence Jolui, probabl}^ antedated 
Burr in advocating spoils system 
(note) 72: on removal, 127. 

Lee R. B. on removal, 132. 

Lee R. H. on removal, 156, 157. 

Lewis Sir G. C. on adapting laws to 
the people (note) 25. 

Lewis W. B. on Mrs. Jackson (note) 
74; on danger spoils system, 75. 

Life tenures, no danger in if based 
on merit, 66 ; will be rare, 66. 

Lincoln A. preaches one thing and 
practices another, 83 ; remarks 
of to Lamon, Sumner, Schurz, 
Wilson, 83, 84, 213;'Lamon's 
dark picture of (note) 84 ; Swett 
and Trumbull corroborate La- 



mon, 84, 85 ; Davis and Hern- 
don on, 85 ; ^^ worked into a men- 
tal strain and irritation" by of- 
ticeseekers, 223. 

Livermore S. on removal, 142. 

Locke John, on competition, 222. 

Low Seth, on competitive tests, 34. 

Lowell J. R. on Prince of Wales's 
' celebrated ' speeches, 64. 

Macaulay Thos. Babington, on 
corrupt English elections, 47. 

Macon N. resolution of and note on, 
100; a tj'pical reformer, 203. 

Madison J. on appointments and 
removals, 21: mistake of, 81 ; on 
the spoils of victory, 92 ; power 
removal, 117-120; on 4-years' 
law (note) 160. 

Marc}' W. L. speech, humorous let- 
ter, use of word spoils, 81, 82 ; 
letter from Jas. Parton about, 82 ; 
his speech correctly quoted, 207. 

Martin Wm. A. P. on Chinese civil 
service, 189-192; note on, 193; 
refutes the Encyclopedia Britan- 
nica (note) 193. 

Massachusetts, civil service exami- 
nations in, 16; veteran soldiers 
triumph in (note) 53. 

May T. E. on P]nglish officeholders 
in American colonies, 176. 

McCormick J. R. warning of, 215. 

McDuffie G-. on removal, 169. 

McKee S. resolution of (note) 66. 

Metcalfe Thomas, non-partisan ap- 
pointments of (note) 81. 

Mill J. S. on competitive tests, 30. 

Miller Senator, on Yan Buren, 78. 

Monarchical power, inherent fear in 
Americans of, 166. 

Moni'oe James, views of, 92. 

Montesquieu Charles de, on climat- 
ic influences, 194. 

Morehead James T. report of, 113. 

Morrill Justin S. opinion of, 213. 

Morton Oliver P. inquiries of, 212; 
on competition for office, 222. 

Mundella A. J. on English civil ser- 
vice before the reform (note) 64 ; 
after the reform (note) 198, 199. 

Murtha W. H. good example of, 56. 



238 



IKDEX. 



Napoleon I, official rules and an- 
ecdote of (note) 114. 

Nicholas John, assurances of, 99. 

Nicolay and Hay, description of of- 
ficeseekino^ scenes by, 223. 

Norway, civil service and govern- 
ment of, 188, 189. 

O'Brien H. on laborers and Bos- 
ton's labor bureau (note) 16. 

Office brokerage, 39. 

Office, insolence of, remedy for, 70. 

Officeholders, ignorance of some, 
55; favoritism shown by, 55. 

Officeholders' salaries, too much dif- 
ference in. 64—66: readjustment 
of, 66 ; N. Y. C. S. C. on (note) 66. 

Officeholders, able-bodied sliould be 
soldiers (note) 28 ; politically am- 
bitious, how checked, 29 ; should 
be protected from mistakes, 114. 

Officeholding, why sometimes un- 
desirable, 55; ordinary, some- 
thing better than, 90. 

Officeseeking, pictures of by Cox, 
Dawes, Quincy, Nicolav, Hav, 
58, 59, 60, 87, 88, 101-106, 223; 
interferes with Cabinet officers, 
82, 217 ; affect of on Lincoln, 223. 

TA<3tE J.* power removal, 145-147. 

Paley W. on patronage, 108, 109; 
woman suffrage (note) 110. 

Parton J. on Mrs. Jackson's death, 
affect of on Jackson, Van Buren's 
tact and secrecy, 74, 75, 79; let- 
ters from, 80, 82 ; a reformer, 80. 

Party spirit, danger in, 225, 226. 

Paterson W. on removal, 157. 

Patronage evils insidious, 89, 212. 

Patronage system, the, fairness of 
only apparent, 72, 73; undemo- 
cratic and un-American, 86. 

Pearson H. Gr. competitive tests. 35. 

Peiching (a Chinese examiner) put 
to death for fraud, 192. 

Pendleton G-. H. unique civil ser- 
vice record of, 216. 217. 

Philhps Lee, letter of, 15. 

Planks, civil service, of all national 
Democratic and Republican plat- 
forms (notes) 94, 196, 197. 



Poindexter G-. on Yan Buren, TY. 

Poles, pohtical views of, 121. 

Potter H. C. on Washington, 227. 

Potts Wm. report of, 16. 

President, the. status of (note) 151. 

Principle, voting for, 39; carrying 
the democratic too far, 202. 

Probation, trial by. uses of 27, 28. 

Promotion examinations, compulso- 
ry, 10; should be carefully con- 
ducted, 28; note on, 28. 

Prussia, civil service of, 183. 

Public business, fundamental rules 
of, the same as private, 19. 

Quincy E. on Macon (note) 100. 

Quincy Josiah, characteristic prop- 
osition and speech of, 101-6: rule 
of law laid down by (note) 106. 

Quincy Josiah, jr. maxim of, 106. 

Randolph J. on patronage, 174. 

Read G-. on removal, 158. 

Reform, civil service, '^surest guar- 
antee of the safety and success 
of American institutions," 97. 

Reformers, civil service, invite dis- 
cussion, 199; not insincere, 203. 

Removal, importance of power, 112. 

Removals, danger of sweeping, 56; 
number by 7 first Presidents. 9:). 

Republics, cannot st^^nd multiform 
and long -continued corruption. 
40; Holman on, 216: besetting 
sin of, 225 ; rocks on which they 
have Men, 225, 226: natun\l 
tendency to party spirit in. 226. 

Reynolds J. views of 83. 

Rice E. Y. plain words of 215. 

Robertson Wm. H. on competitive 
examinations. 35. 

Roman aristocracy, depravity of 63. 

Satterlee Henry Y. plain, direct. 

coiu'ao-eous. truthful words of 52. 
Schonck R. C. views and prophecv 

of 211. 
Schurz C. bill of 8: conversation 

with Lincoln. 84; not eligible to 

the presidency, 221. 
Scott Thomas, on removal, 134. 
Sedowick T. on removal, 131. 



IKDEX. 



239 



Senate, great power and use of, 116. 

Sherman John, testimony of, 211. 

Sherwin H. letter of, 14; civil ser- 
vice examinations form a part of 
a general educational system. 18. 

Smith S. deposition of (note) 100; 
removal for opinion's sake. 172. 

Smith W. on removal, &c. 137-39. 

Southard S. L. favors repeal of 4- 
years' law, 161 ; on removal, 170. 

Spoils, a military and bad word, 82, 
85, 86; definitions of, 207. 

Spoils, a pandemonium of, 86, 87, 
88, 200, 201, 223. 

Sprague P. on effects of Jackson's 
proscriptive policy, 170. 

Statute, the civil service, 228-232. 

Stone M. J. removal, prophecy, civil 
service rules, 148-152; cringing 
disposition requisite for an office 
held at will and pleasure, 151. 

Storey J. opinion of, 24; on remo- 
val. 164: solemn warning of, 225. 

Sumner C. bill of, 7, 202. 

Sumter T. removal and note on, 153. 

Sweden, civil service of, 186-188; 
tyranny in (in 1789) 121, 143. 

Sylvester P. on removal, 135. 

Systems, civil. service, none perfect, 
30. 

Tazewell L. TV. on executive pow- 
er, 175. 

Tenure, advantage of security of 56. 

Tenure of office law, failure of 115. 

Thomas J. L. examinations by, 37. 

Thorburn John, letters from, 180-2. 

Tilden S. J. gift of, views of 33, 94. 

Tree of Liberty, what will kill it, 41. 

Trevelyan Sir C. (note) 18. 

Trumbull L. author § 1753 U. S. R. 
S. 7 ; bill of, 58 • on Lincoln, 85 ; 
on Johnson's removals (note) 86 ; 
on Sherman's revelations, 212; 
on evils of patronage, 214, 215. 

Tucker T. T. on removal, 152 ; con- 
stitutional amendments, 152-53. 

Tyler J. on regulating and restrain- 
ing removal, 93 ; on ' spoils,' 170. 

Van Burex M. adroitness of 71; 
on drawbacks of patronage, 79; 



harsh words (uttered in the heat 
of debate) concerning, 76-79; a 
good word from James Parton 
about, 80. 

Yest G. B. on patronage evils, 215. 

Veteran soldiers triumph (note) 53. 

Veteran soldiers and sailors, pref- 
erence for. 10, 53. 

Vining J. on removal, Sweden, Po- 
land, 120, 121; on aggregating 
pohtical knowledge (note) 177. 

Washington Geo. on officeseeking 
burdens, 29; maxim of, 32; on 
national university, 32; lays the 
foundation for civil service law, 
91 ; solemn warning of, 225, 226. 

"Waters E. F. note, 176; civil ser- 
vices of British India and France, 
182, 184; letter from, 185. 

Webster D. on legislative powers 
(note) 20; maxim of, 36; pubhc 
virtue the principle of republican 
governments (note) 40 ; depreca- 
ted Irgh salaries (note) 64; pre- 
diction of (note) 79; criticises 
Madison (note) 119; criticises de- 
cision on removal, 1 60 ; 4-years' 
law, Jackson's nominations, evils 
of patronage (notes) 162, 163. 

Webster W. H. letter from, 13. 

Wljeeler E. P. views of, 18. 

Wliite Alexander, on removal, 136. 

White H. L. on office-hunting, 172. 

Whitridge Fred. W. on the end of 
old Council of Appointment, 71. 

William III, election laws of, 47-8. 

William and Mar}^, election law of, 
47. 

Williams G. H. on decision of first 
Congress on removal, 165. 

Wilhs A. S. ringing words of, 216. 

Wilson Henry, conversation with 
Lincoln, 213 ; on Fisher, 213. 

Wilson Justice, on patronage and 
appointments, 110, 111; Wash- 
ington on and maxim of, 110, 114. 

Windom Wm. on '' beneficial influ- 
ences of civil service law," 213. 

Wise Henry A. on Van Buren, 79. 

Woman suffrage (note) 110. 

Worcester J. E. on competition, 222. 



240 PUBLIC OPIXIOX. 

It is a work of lasting value. — ISfeio Haven Palladium. 
The book is one of the needs of the times. — Christian at Work. 
It appears to be a broad, thorough, able treatise. — CongregationaUst, 
It leaves little to be said on the subject, either for or against. — 
Boston CoramonvjeaUh. 

It is a masterly defense of the principles of civil service reform. — 
Terre Haute (Ind.) Gazette. 

This volume might well be called the civil service reformers' vade 
mecum. — Providence (R. I.) Journal. 

The book is written with a full appreciation of the merits of the 
subject. — New York Commercial Advertiser. 

The book is an armory of argument in favor of a proper system 
of government service. — -American Bookseller. 

It covers its subject with much conciseness and compreJiensive- 
ness, and is a valuable presentation of the reform. — Boston Post. 

It is so thorough * * * that we commend it to all who are inter- 
ested in the subject as an authoritiitive treatise. — Tndianajwlis Xews. 

The work is of marked historicid value, and is a powerful argu- 
ment in favor of a national reform which is as yet largely a creature 
of the imagination. — Philadelphia Episcojml Recorder . 

This book gives an excellent presentation of the entire civil ser^'ice 
reform discussion, being by no means, as its title would seem to in- 
dicate, confined to the law itself — American Hebrew. 

It is an instructive volume, which will be a real armory for the 
supporters of civil service reform, and which will open the eyes of 
the opponents of the system. — Charleston (S. C.) Simday Xeivs. 

This book is full of information about the workings and the benefit 
of a practical civil service reform, and will prove a valuable hand- 
book to the student of political economy. — Manchester (X. H.) Union. 

If any one doubts tlie benefits to be derived from a properly en- 
forced civil service law, or the necessity for such a law, he needs only 
to read this book to have his doubts removed. — Savannah {Go.) Xews. 

This book covers the field in a thorough and able manner. It 
gives evidence of great research, and its luminous pages will be 
highly appreciated by those who desire information upon this impor- 
tant subject. — *S'^. Louis Republic. 

The " Power of Removal " is discussed with much ability. The 
extensive compilation of opinion, gleaned from the great men of the 
present and past, and representing botii sides of the question, is col- 
lected with untiring pains and research, and quoted with admirable 
fairness and generosity. — Public Opinion (Washington and Xew York). 

It is a compact, well-filled, interesting, and timely volume, which I 
hope may have a large circulation. The intbrmation it contains and 
the principles it enforces should be a part of tlie possessions of evev^ 
citizen who assumes to be fairly well informed concerning the poli- 
tics and government of this country. I congratulate you on having 
rendered a patriotic and useful public service. — Donnan B. Eatoji. 

H 262 83 



•/ J>^ % 'W^WS >* % \gp/ J'^^. '') 









°o 



"*bl 



°*. . 







V .^i^L:* c> 



J^ ov-^-. \.,^' ^^iS^:-. "-..-^^ '"^" 




V* 



--lo*. . 


























.•^'* .*^ 









V-^^ 







.4 Oft ^ 








.4^ : 



• A>"^ - 










.«• .^"-^^.^ V 





AOt 



'^^ ''TT;-* ,^-«-' 














m. AUG 83 

HB' n. manchestei 
hf indiana 4696: 



*..•• aO 














